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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 describes the functioning of the broadcasting market, with 
particular emphasis on the platforms involved, in order to prepare the 
reader for the analysis of platform competition strategies that follows. I 
discuss so-called “multi sided market theory”, and describe some 
examples of platforms. In this context I point out that the broadcasting 
sector involves both vertical integration, horizontal integration and 
multi-sided market platforms, and the theme of access to platforms is 
discussed with reference to all three types. 
In chapter 3 I stress that multi-sided platforms are pervaded by 
externalities. For this reason I deal with price allocation on the two 
sides of the market in order to demonstrate that price allocation by the 
platform is not neutral. Then I discuss the existence of price differences 
in one-sided and two-sided markets with both single homing and 
multihoming, and with exclusive and non-exclusive services.  
In chapter 4 under the leitmotiv of the evolution of pluralism of 
information, I review the main Italian Constitutional Court judgments 
on this topic and the ex ante regulation of the broadcasting sector in 
Italy, verifying whether the existing antitrust limits are still consistent 
with the current level of technology, considering the DVB-T 
broadcasting technique and the sale of frequencies on the secondary 
market. 
In chapter 5 I describe the various relevant broadcasting markets in 
accordance with European Commission case decisions. I demonstrate 
that the activities of multi-sided broadcasting platforms are subject to 
Article 81 and 82 of the European Treaty, just like any other integrated 
platform, since in any case they can determine input or customer 
foreclosure. Furthermore I deal with the relationship between media 
 xv 
broadcasting and the social value of sport with reference to the many 
antitrust cases in the broadcasting sector concerning the sale of sports 
event rights to media platforms, and I discus Italian Law 9/2008 which 
establishes the collective trading of such rights. 
Chapter 6 considers the issue of access to content by focusing on 
emerging multi-sided platforms. I compare them with the vertically 
integrated platforms and discuss the potential of multi-sided platforms 
to remove entry barriers to the sector by means of unbundling, which is 
made possible by the must-offer and must-carry obligations introduced 
into Italy by the most recent legislation. 
Chapter 7 contains my conclusions. 
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Chapter 1 
_____________________________________________ 
Introduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In recent years the trend among broadcasting companies is to produce, 
distribute and transmit television content via a single platform that 
integrates the various steps in the chain under its sole control. In 
contrast to horizontal integration, which by eliminating competition 
between companies or increasing the scope for collusion may give rise 
to a significant loss of effective competition, vertical platforms are less 
likely to produce negative economic effects. Indeed, vertical 
agreements might even have some positive impacts on consumer 
welfare such as the elimination of the problem of double 
marginalisation and the reduction of opportunistic behaviour, as well 
as lower transaction costs, thereby increasing efficiencies in input 
choices and other static and dynamic efficiencies.  
Yet although the vertical integration of resources into one platform still 
appears to be the prevalent business model in the broadcasting sector, 
the provision of broadcasting services to third parties is evolving in 
response to the development of new transmission techniques and new 
kinds of business are being conducted.  
We refer here to so called multi-sided broadcasting platforms, which are 
platforms that do not integrate all the production and distribution 
phases but simply involve a number of economic operators (e.g. 
content providers, advertisers and viewers), chosen on a non-
discriminatory and impartial basis for the provision by the platform of 
broadcasting services without exclusive rights. 
The growth in the sector of this new kind of platform is partly 
hampered by the established broadcasters, who have to give up their 
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exclusive rights to content and grant access to emerging platforms 
(‚must offer‛) or are obliged to broadcast the content of external 
content providers who request such a service (‚must-carry‛).  
To prevent the foreclosure from the market of emerging multi-sided 
platforms due to abuse of the existing platforms’ dominant position, it 
has been necessary to create a new regulatory framework ex ante and 
invoke the intervention of competition watchdogs. 
Recently, as a result of moral suasion stemming from European law, 
the Italian Parliament passed legislation aimed at safeguarding access 
to platforms by emerging broadcasters. 
For this reason, after describing the general features of the relevant 
economic theory, we wish to analyse the legislation and regulatory 
practice concerning multi-sided platforms in the broadcasting sector. 
We will also discuss the agreements between platforms and content 
providers and their effects with respect to competition regulations.  
The broadcasting sector is heavily influenced by two closely related 
components: (i) audiovisual content and (ii) advertising. Indeed 
advertisers are the sector’s main source of income, far more important 
than other purchasers (e.g. viewers or programme makers) or 
financiers (e.g. government). For example in 2008 Italian television 
advertising accounted for 46.4% of broadcasting revenues, TV license 
fees 18.9% and viewer subscription revenues 31.5%. However, this 
situation is likely to change since in 2008 the demand for digital Pay 
TV content increased by 2.2% compared to 2007, so that if this trend 
continues, in a few years television advertising revenues will be 
overtaken by viewer subscription fees1. 
                                                          
1 See Annual Report 2009 of the Italian Communications Authority, sections 
1.2.3 and 1.2.6. Available from 
http://www.agcom.it/Default.aspx?message=viewrelazioneannuale&idRelazion
e=17. 
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Chapter 2 
_______________________________________________________________
Broadcasting platforms: an overview. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction.  
In this chapter we give a brief description of the functioning of the 
broadcasting sector, which is characterized by two basic kinds of 
business, that is (i) one based on in-house integration within a single 
company of the network and the content and (ii) one based on the 
sharing of content among a plurality of companies and the provision of 
this content to the viewers through a third party. 
In both cases the broadcaster plays the role of a platform, with 
distinctions that we will explain later, which exploits the externalities 
associated with various business strategies. In this context the economic 
literature provides a new theory to explain the phenomenon of content 
sharing among platforms called multi-sided market theory. This is 
considered an evolution of the concept of positive network effects. 
Indeed in the broadcasting markets, network effects occur in a context 
of convergence between several technologies and infrastructures. For 
this reason a brief introduction to the topic of multi-sided broadcasting 
platforms is necessary at this juncture. Here we aim to introduce the 
reader to the topic of multi-sided markets, citing some examples of 
platforms which share content among different economic operators 
(advertisers, content providers, viewers). 
In any case, the question of access to platforms has important 
implications for those platforms that vertically integrate content 
production within a single company.  
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For a complete description of the broadcasting industry, starting from 
the beginning, we will make reference to relevant broadcasting markets 
as identified by the European Commission. 
Then in Chapter 3 we will come back to the matter of multi-sided 
markets, adding further information with reference to their 
functioning, and dealing with the issue of competition among 
platforms. Therefore let us first focus on what a platform is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Multi-sided market platforms: a brief introduction. 
In general terms the word ‚platform‛ is widely used in various fields. 
Even in the broadcasting sector it is sometimes used generically to 
identify the technological infrastructure that enables the transmission 
of information, that is, as a synonym of ‚network". At other times, 
however, the term "platform" refers to the technology used in the 
transmission (analogical or digital). Let us now discuss the meaning of 
"platform" for the purposes of our research.  
The word ‘platform’ has its origins in the field of computer science. 
Originally it referred to a hardware or software architecture that served 
as a foundation or base. Historically, most application programs have 
had to be written to run on a particular platform. Each platform 
provided a different application program interface for different system 
services. Initially it concerned only hardware, and it may still refer to a 
Central Processing Unit model or a computer family. The terms 
"platform" and "environment" in this case can be used interchangeably. 
Platforms can also be ‚Software Only‛ or ‚Operating Systems‛. In the 
latter case the hardware is generally implied, whereas ‚Software Only‛ 
indicates an operating system that applications must interface with. An 
application can also be a platform if it functions as a base for other 
programs. For example, web browsers accept third-party plug-ins, 
which are small software components that add functions. The browser 
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thus becomes a platform for these extra components. A messaging or 
groupware platform is a base program that e-mail, calendaring and 
other client programs communicate with. 
Whatever their type, software platforms are always a two-way street; 
they provide basic functions and communicate back and forth with 
other software. A single application that runs in isolation is not a 
platform. For example, a simple photo editor that does not accept third-
party plug-ins cannot be called a ‚platform‛. 
This dual dimension inherent in information platforms led to the word 
‚platform‛ being used in all circumstances where it was necessary to 
rely on the dichotomy between two or more dimensions. Consequently, 
the term ‚platform‛ has been used to refer to other things which are not 
strictly related to computers. 
One case is the formal declaration of principles by which a group, such 
as a political party, makes its appeal to the public during an election 
campaign. In geology it means the ancient, stable and inferior layer of a 
continental craton, composed of igneous or metamorphic rocks covered 
by a thin layer of sedimentary rock. 
In economics the word ‚platform‛ has been used to refer to the 
environment where economic operators meet to share information, content 
and images2. In order to determine the business model on which the 
platform is founded (integrated or multi-sided) we need to look at 
content integration or non-integration within the same entity. 
Here we discuss multi-sided market platforms and in the following 
sections we will also deal with integrated platforms. 
As Evans, one of the most important proponents of two-sided market 
theory, said in 2003: ‚Dating clubs, for example, enable men and women to 
meet each other; magazines provide a way for advertisers to find an audience; 
and computer operating system vendors provide software that applications 
users and applications developers can use together.‛ Thus all these 
phenomena, i.e. dating clubs, magazines, and computer operating 
                                                          
2 EVANS D.S. (2003) ‚Some empirical aspects of multi-sided platform 
industries‛, Review of Network Economics, vol. 32, pp. 309-328. 
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systems, are examples of platforms. As in the original information 
view, these platforms coordinate the demands of distinct groups of 
customers who need each other in some way3. For the purposes of our 
research we may keep the definition of the two-sided market adopted 
by Evans4. 
A market is said to be two-sided if: "at any point in time there are (a) two 
distinct groups of customers; (b) the value obtained by one kind of customers 
increases with the number of the other kind of customers; and (c) an 
intermediary is necessary for internalizing the externalities created by one 
group for the other group". The presence of two different user groups calls 
for a modification to the standard analysis of externalities. 
Evans described three types of multi-sided platform markets: 
a) matchmakers, such as stock exchanges or real estate agents, 
who bring buyers and sellers together on a single platform; 
b) audience-makers, such as newspapers or yellow pages, which 
serve as intermediaries between interdependent readers and 
advertisers; 
c) demand-coordinators, such as computer operating systems, 
credit cards, or Bloomberg, which do not fall into the first two 
categories but nevertheless balance the interests of two or more 
customer groups. 
He focused on operating system producers, which coordinate the 
following three classes: (i) applications developers, (ii) computer end-
users, and (iii) hardware manufacturers. In principle, the operating 
system producers could charge both developers and users. But to 
balance the market, they often charge the software developers little or 
nothing, and pass costs on to the operating system users5. 
                                                          
3 Ibidem. 
4 EVANS D.S. (2003) ‚The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform 
Markets‛, Yale Journal on Regulation, vol. 2, pp. 325-382. See also REISINGER M. 
(2004) Two sided markets with negative externalities [online]. Available from 
http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/478/1/munichtwsi.pdf. 
5 EVANS D.S., ‚The Antitrust Economics‛, supra at footnote 4. 
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This theory posits an evolution of traditional industries based on the 
concept of positive network externalities. In this scenario a consumer 
(or rather a system user) is a positive function of other economic 
agents. In any case a two-sided market implies another element in 
addition to a simple market characterised by the effects of network 
externalities, which is the contemporary presence of two or more 
different user types seeking to purchase the same company’s services 
(or products) in one market. They need each other so that a particular 
transaction can happen.  
For example, in order for the broadcasting sector to exist, content 
providers and viewers are both necessary, since the audiovisual 
activity and the respective demand function are interdependent.6 
In other network industries, even those which are one-sided, the value 
of the externality for one economic agent can be described as follows: 
the surplus gained by the first agent increases as a function of the 
number of members of the other kind. Thus, price variations on one 
side of the demand also have effects on the other side. It would be more 
appropriate to define this situation as characterized by cross-positive 
externalities, which should not be confused with the cross elasticity of 
demand.  
The presence in the market of the platform is justified by its function as 
an intermediary between or among users, to the extent that it 
internalizes the value created by one user group for the second one. As 
Evans said: ‚Firms profit themselves and society by figuring out ways to 
internalize these externalities‛7 
In two-sided markets it is not possible to determine price according to 
the normal economic theory based on the condition of equivalence 
between profit and marginal cost because the supply and demand 
functions for the two kinds of users are different. Thus any mistake in 
                                                          
6 For a description of this theory applied to the electronic communications 
sector, see RENDA A. (2005) ‚Domanda e offerta di contenuti multimediali: la 
strategia competitiva", VIII Rapporto IEM, FONDAZIONE ROSSELLI, Rome. 
7 See EVANS D.S., ‚The Antitrust Economics‛, supra at footnote 4. 
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determining the price on one side involves a risk of a reduction in 
supply for the other side, which may withdraw from the platform, thus 
reducing its appeal for the first kind of user. 
In competition terms the ‘chicken-and-egg’ dilemma is the creation of 
the market by the first company that is able to create a network 
composed of a sufficiently large number of users to attract the other 
kind of users. In the start-up phase the entry strategy is iterative and 
the number of users must be built up by adapting to the situation as it 
develops (‚learning by doing‛).8 Time behaves as a cross-subsidy 
among the various parties of two sided markets which "learn" about 
each other over time9. 
Time is even more significant for digital TV, where uncertainty exists 
over both the demand side (e.g. it is not certain whether consumers are 
willing to adopt any new technology) and the supply side (e.g. content 
providers have not yet decided on the type and variety of programmes 
they will offer over a digital platform)10. Regulation of television is also 
influenced by time. 
For an optimal degree of intervention by the public authorities, the 
related framework has to be dynamic, and adapt to a mature market 
rather than a infant market where uncertainty is high and the parties 
are still learning the fundamentals of the market. 
With reference to the number of parties involved in the platform, when 
there are more than two, the platform is called multi-sided, based on 
the interactions among the demands of multiple groups of customers.  
 
 
                                                          
8 See ARMSTRONG M. (2006) ‚Competition in Two Sided Markets‛, RAND 
Journal of Economics Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 668–691. 
9 This point was made by VALLETTI T. at the Seminar on Competition among 
multiproduct platforms, Rome 7-8.06.2007. 
10 For a model enriched with a stochastic dimension, where the two sides 
"learn" about each other over time, see ARMSTRONG M., ‚Competition‛, supra 
at footnote 8. 
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2.3. Multi-sided platforms: functions and scope. 
Most markets are one-sided in nature, as in the case of customers 
interested in buying a book. But a multi-sided market involves a 
number of players, each one with its own interests to be served, and 
they are all interdependent. For instance, hair salons can choose to 
serve either men or women or both. By contrast, dating clubs must 
serve both men and women. 
Examples of multi-sided markets are pervasive in today's economy and 
range from financial exchanges, real estate listings, online 
intermediaries like eBay (buyers and sellers), ad-supported media (ad 
sponsors and readers/viewers), computer operating systems 
(application developers and users), videogame consoles (game 
developers and users), shopping malls (retailers and consumers), 
digital media platforms (content providers and users), dating clubs 
(men and women) and many others. These multi-sided markets are 
platforms that serve two or more distinct groups of customers who 
value each other's participation. 
Two- and multi-sided markets are markets in which firms need to get 
two or more distinct groups of customers who value each other's 
participation on board the same platform in order to generate economic 
value. In traditional one-sided markets, firms serve different types of 
customers, but they lack interdependency.  
Multi-sided markets in general are not new at all. They have been 
around for ages. However, it was only recently that economists realized 
that there are interesting common threads linking markets which, on 
the face of it, have nothing to do with each other: credit cards, 
videogames and media for example. 
It is also true that certain categories of two-sided markets have become 
more numerous, mostly due to technological evolution. The Internet 
has spawned many two-sided platforms, and the software platforms 
that run our computers, PDAs, and mobile phones have emerged only 
recently. Credit card companies make their revenues mostly from 
retailers rather than from consumers. More interestingly, vendors of 
operating systems like Apple, Microsoft, Symbian, and Palm derive 
their profits from users through licensing fees and do not charge much 
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to allow application developers to access their platforms. In contrast, 
videogame console makers like Sony, which makes the PlayStation, and 
Microsoft, which makes the Xbox, make their profits from game 
developers through royalties and incur losses on the sale of consoles to 
users by pricing them below cost. 
The key reason for this is that two-sided platforms must solve a 
chicken-and-egg problem. For example, without sufficient applications 
developed for it, an operating system has no value for users, and 
therefore cannot attract them. Conversely, without a solid user base, no 
application developer will be interested in supporting that operating 
system. If the platform vendor decides to charge positive prices on both 
sides, it might end up attracting neither. So the idea is to subsidize one 
side in order to attract it more or less regardless of the other side and 
then turn to the second side and charge it positive prices. Of course, 
depending on the market, the timing and mechanism of adoption by 
the two sides varies, and there are interesting differences to look at, but 
the fundamental chicken-and-egg issue is the same. 
A market has network effects (also known as network externalities or 
positive-feedback effects) when the value consumers place on a 
product increases in relation to its frequency of use by other 
consumers. The direct network effect means that the consumer values 
the product because others have purchased it as well. In the case of 
indirect network effects, the consumer values (and therefore has a 
stronger demand for) the product because his or her purchase means 
that the demand for complementary products is higher and the 
suppliers of those complementary products will benefit. 
The fundamental functions performed by platforms are the following: 
reducing search costs (this helps in matchmaking contexts: typically 
buyers and sellers); creating audiences (this is essentially the function 
of advertising platforms); and saving on shared costs (i.e., providing an 
infrastructure that can be used for many transactions between the 
different sides of the platform). 
All multi-sided platforms perform at least one of these three functions 
and many perform more than one. Let us look at some examples. 
The interchange fee for credit card purchases is the payment for the 
service provided by the issuer of the credit card, a service which 
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involves at least four parties, i.e. the consumer, the seller and their two 
respective banks, allowing them to save on shared costs.11 
Operating systems save the shared costs of providing low-level 
functions that all applications can use. 
Shopping malls save on shared costs by pooling together many retailers 
in the same place and thereby also reducing search costs. 
EBay creates value by reducing search costs for buyers and sellers, and 
at the same time it saves on shared costs by offering PayPal as a 
convenient payment platform. In performing these services, it is also 
creating audiences for advertisers. 
In all these cases and in order to determine the optimal pricing 
structure (that is, how much to charge one side compared to others) we 
need to carefully analyze the related interdependencies among the 
multiple sides as well as their willingness to pay and join the platform.  
The scope of the multi-sided platform is also a key decision variable. As 
already mentioned, the scope of the intermediation between or among 
users is the internalization of the value created by the user groups 
involved in the platform. In the next chapter we will discuss this topic 
in greater detail, focusing on the broadcasting markets in particular. 
Let us now take a look at the other kind of platform that is commonly 
found in the broadcasting sector, that is, integrated platforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 For a description of the credit card industry with three or four parties, see 
PARDOLESI R. and GUARNIERI M. (2006) ‚La concorrenza nell’industria 
delle carte di credito. Riflessioni preliminari‛, Diritto Bancario I, p. 3; 
TRIFILIDIS M. (2004) ‚Carte di pagamento e tutela della concorrenza. Funzione 
ed effetti della commissione interbancaria multilaterale – MIF’‛, Merc, Conc., 
Reg., 3, p. 559; CHANG H.H. and EVANS D.S. (2000) ‚The Competitive Effects 
of the Collective Setting of Interchange Fees by Payment Card Systems‛, 
Antitrust bulletin 45, pp. 641-644. 
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2.4. Vertical and horizontal platforms: foreclosure from the 
market. 
Multi-sided platforms are just one part of the broadcasting sector. 
Given the object of our research (i.e. access to platforms), we cannot 
avoid making reference to those broadcasting platforms which 
internalize broadcasting content and services. 
The vertical and horizontal business scopes of a platform are critical 
because they determine the platform's ability to create viable 
ecosystems by getting the relevant sides on board, generating 
interactions among them, and extracting profits.  
Vertical scope in particular has to do with the decision to integrate 
upward or downward content in the value chain. Whereas allocative 
efficiency is reached by pushing prices towards marginal costs, 
dynamic efficiency is achieved through the invention, development, 
and distribution of new products and processes that either reduce costs 
or increase wealth. 
On this point we should stress that vertical integration does not result 
in a multi-sided market, because in vertically integrated platforms 
content is integrated in a single company that purchases or licenses it 
from content providers; in multi-sided markets, content is broadcast by 
a third party, i.e. the platform, which does not have exclusive rights to 
the content. 
Therefore the vertically integrated platform is one-sided in the sense 
that the platform (which owns both content and networks) cuts 
transitional costs among different services and content providers and is 
able to provide customers with a more competitive price and quality 
compared to a non-integrated platform. 
The economic literature on vertical integration in platforms is huge12. In 
general terms we can say that integration among firms is the process by 
                                                          
12 See for example SINGER H.J. (2007) ‚Vertical Foreclosure in Video 
Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators‛, Review of Network 
Economics, Vol. 6, Issue 3; GABSZEWICZ J.J. and ZANAJ S. (2006) Competition 
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in successive markets: entry and mergers [online]. Available from: 
http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp06/dp2006_97.pdf; RUBINFELD 
D.L. and SINGER H.L. (2001) ‚Vertical foreclosure in broadband access?‛, The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 49 Issue 3, pp. 299-318; HASS D.A. (2008) 
‚First, Assume a Monopoly: The Failure of Vertical Foreclosure Theory on the 
Never-Was-Neutral Internet‛, Journal of Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, 
Vol. 6, No. 5, p. 42; HANN M. (2001) ‚The Economics of Free Internet Access‛, 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Vol. 157, No. 3; VAN 
LONG N. and SOUBEYRAN A. (2003) Favoritism in Vertical Relationship: Input 
Prices and Access Quality, CIRANO Working Paper No. 14; ALEXANDER C. 
and REIFFEN D. (1995) ‚Vertical Contracts as Strategic Commitments: How 
Are They Enforced?‛, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 4, issue 
4, pp. 623–649; CHEMLA, G. (2003) ‚Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, 
and Vertical Integration‛, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 12, 
issue 2, pp. 261–289; CHEN. Y. (2001) ‚On Vertical Mergers and Their 
Competitive Effects‛, RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 32, pp. 667-685; CHOI J. 
and Yi S.S. (2000) ‚Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input 
Specifications‛, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 31, pp. 717-743; CHURCH J. and 
GANDAL N. (2000) ‚Systems Competition, Vertical Merger and Foreclosure‛, 
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 9, pp. 25-51; COOPER J. et al. 
(2005) Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, Mimeo, Federal Trade 
Commission; HART, O. and TIROLE J. (1990) ‚Vertical Integration and Market 
Foreclosure‛, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, pp. 205-285; 
KATZ M.L. (1987) ‚Vertical Contractual Relations”, Handbook of Industrial 
Organization, Vol. 1, Amsterdam: North Holland; ORDOVER J.A,, SALONER 
G. and S. SALOP (1990) ‚Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure‛, The American 
Economic Review, vol. 80, pp. 127-142; ORDOVER J.A., SALONER G. and 
SALOP S. C. (1992) ‚Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Reply‛, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, pp. 698-703; REY P. and TIROLE J. (2005) A 
Primer on Foreclosure, Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI) Working Paper 
No. 203; SPENGLER, J. (1950) ‚Vertical Integration and Anti-Trust Policy‛, 
Journal of Political Economy, 58, pp. 347-352; VALLETTI T. (2004) ‚Vertical 
integration and exclusivity contracts when consumers have switching costs‛, 
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 71, No. 1 pp. 36-59; SALINGER M. (1988) 
‚Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure‛, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 103, pp. 345-356. 
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which several steps in the production and the distribution of content 
are controlled by a single company or entity, increasing its power in the 
marketplace. 
Vertical integration between companies which co-operate at different 
levels of the supply chain may have anti-competitive effects when the 
merged entity's behaviour limits or eliminates competitors' access to 
supplies (input foreclosure) or markets (customer foreclosure)13. 
For us to understand the risk of foreclosure for platforms in the 
broadcasting sector, the study of the literature on the topic of vertical 
integration in platforms is crucial14.  
In the following analysis we seek to ascertain whether, and if so in 
what ways, an integrated platform which produces its own content 
and/or has its own network will find it profitable to discriminate 
against network providers and content providers. 
First we define the downstream market as the ‚broadcasting signal 
transport service‛, which is a market served by terrestrial, satellite and 
cable providers and any other firm that provides consumers with a 
broadcasting signal link between their homes and a platform and also 
provides them with ancillary services. 
Second, we define the upstream market as the ‚audiovisual programmes 
packaging service”, a market served by all firms that devise, package and 
distribute broadcasting content. 
From this point of view a platform can discriminate against network 
providers and content providers that do not join it and an anti-
competitive strategy may thus arise. 
An integrated platform can refuse to grant access to its content to other 
networks; this behaviour can be called ‚network discrimination‛. On the 
                                                          
13 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, adopted on 
28.11.2007 [online] Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/nonhorizontalguide
lines.pdf, at par. 29-30. 
14 See papers mentioned supra at footnote 12. 
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other side, an integrated platform can refuse to grant other content 
providers access to its network, thus implementing so-called ‚content 
discrimination‛15. 
The use of vertical foreclosure as a means of extending a firm’s 
monopoly power was criticised by the Chicago School, who formulated 
the ‚one bottleneck monopoly theory‛, according to which a vertically 
integrated firm with monopoly power in the downstream market can 
charge the monopoly price for the downstream service, thereby 
extracting all the profits of the upstream producer16. The vertically 
integrated firm in this case does not gain anything from the elimination 
of its own upstream rivals. Although this fact should not give rise to 
regulatory intervention, some scholars believe that it is necessary in 
any case17. 
Over the past few decades many authors have discussed the ability of 
vertical foreclosure to generate harm. Ordover, Saloner and Salop said 
that refusal by the vertically integrated firm to grant access to rivals of 
its downstream division implies that the remaining upstream suppliers 
will face less competition in serving the foreclosed downstream firms. 
If these non-affiliated upstream suppliers then raise their prices to the 
rival downstream firms, the latter will respond by raising prices for end 
users18.  
Hence, diminished upstream competition increases the integrated 
firm’s downstream market share and supports higher downstream 
prices and increased profits. Because the foreclosure equilibrium 
                                                          
15 See CORTADE T. (2006) A strategic guide on two-sided markets applied to the ISP 
market [online]. Available from: http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/2602/1/MPRA_paper_2602.pdf. 
16 RUBINFELD D.L. and SINGER H. L., ‚Vertical foreclosure in broadband 
access?‛, supra at footnote 12. 
17 CARLTON D.W. (2001) ‚A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and 
Refusal to Deal — Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided‛, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Vol. 68, Issue 3, pp. 659-683. 
18 ORDOVER J.A., SALONER G. and SALOP S.C., ‚Equilibrium Vertical 
Foreclosure‛, supra at footnote 12. 
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involves higher prices for all downstream firms without any offsetting 
efficiency gains, overall social welfare decreases. 
With reference to the television market, Church and Gandal said that 
conflict over access to content will arise with the development of the 
information highway and competition between alternative technologies 
and vendors. They demonstrated that foreclosure by a single firm can 
occur if the products of the downstream markets are highly 
differentiated and the marginal value in the upstream market is small, 
or when downstream product differentiation is not very high19. 
Furthermore Whinston20 recognized that in the presence of scale 
economies in the production of complementary goods, the unaffiliated 
rival would not be insulated from the actions of the vertically 
integrated firm. If the refusal to deal with the unaffiliated rival causes 
the rival’s output to drop below an economically efficient scale, the 
rival might consider exiting the industry. Assuming that at least some 
consumers of the integrated firm wanted only the service produced by 
the rival firm, those consumers would suffer harm from reduced 
competition.21 
From an antitrust point view, in order for the possibility of foreclosure 
to arise, a number of aspects must be established: 
a) the ability of the vertical firms to foreclose; 
b) the incentive to foreclose; and 
c) the overall impact on effective competition22. 
                                                          
19 For an application of the vertical foreclosure theory to the hardware and 
software markets see CHURCH J. and GANDAL N., ‚Systems Competition, 
Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure‛, supra at footnote 12. 
20 WHINSTON M. (1990) ‚Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion‛, The American 
Economic Review, p. 837, p. 859. 
21 CARLTON D.W., ‚A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct‛, supra 
footnote 17; for a description of the Time Warner and Turner Case see 
RUBINFELD D.L. and SINGER H.J., ‚Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband 
Access?‛, supra at footnote 12. 
22 See Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, sections 31 and 60 onwards. 
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As recognised by the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the 
European Commission, in order to be able to foreclose competitors, the 
new entity must have a significant degree of market power (which does 
not necessarily amount to dominance) in one of the markets concerned. 
Specifically, the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines note that the 
merged entity would only have the ability to foreclose downstream 
competitors if, by reducing access to its own upstream products or 
services, it could negatively affect the overall availability of inputs for 
the downstream market in terms of price or quality.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5. The distinctive features of broadcasting platforms. 
As we already mentioned, both the above-described kinds of platform 
(multi-sided and vertically integrated) exist in the broadcasting sector.  
In fact, regardless of whether content production is integrated in the 
platform, all platforms act as a physical space where many economic 
operators, such as audiovisual content providers, advertisement 
makers, network providers, service providers and viewers, can meet. 
Each platform can be regarded as integrated or non-integrated 
depending on how it behaves with respect to those economic operators. 
In Italy for example the Free to Air (hereinafter ‚FTA‛) TV companies 
Rai Radiotelevisione Italiana (hereinafter ‚RAI‛) and Mediaset S.p.A. 
(hereinafter ‚Mediaset‛) and the satellite Pay TV company Sky Italia 
(hereinafter ‚Sky‛) are considered as broadcasting platforms; content 
integration in Rai, Sky and Mediaset makes them vertically integrated 
whereas the broadcast of content provided by a third party makes the 
same platforms multi-sided. 
                                                          
23 See par. 36 of the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
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With reference to the number of parties involved in a multi-sided 
platform, it is three-sided if it involves at least a viewer, a content 
provider (or a programme maker) and a seller who sells its products to 
customers and advertises them on television (as with FTA TV); in 
contrast the platform is two-sided if it involves just a content provider 
and a viewer (as in case of Pay TV). 
As far as FTA television companies are concerned, the viewers are not 
charged for watching programmes and the editorial responsibility for 
content is in the content provider’s hands. 
With reference to revenues, the FTA TV company that owns the 
broadcasting infrastructure and the radio spectrum (on a concession or 
licence basis) charges only one side, as in the following situations: 
a) the programme makers, with whom the FTA TV company 
shares a portion of the broadcasting spectrum (thus providing 
a service of carriage) in return for payment; 
b) the advertisers, when the FTA TV company sells them the 
sponsorship slots. 
As far as Pay TV is concerned, the platform charges both viewers and 
advertisers a price that is in any case cheaper than the price they would 
pay without platform intermediation in buying content from content 
providers. This is possible because for advertisers and content 
providers there are positive externalities arising from participation in 
the platform due to the large amount of consumers it involves24. For 
this reason the platform charges one side more than the others as a 
result of the higher value it attributes to that side’s participation. 
There is also the case when a channel’s producer, who is not the owner 
of the broadcasting infrastructure or the radio spectrum, edits the full 
programme schedule of a channel (like Eurosport, Bloomberg and 
FashionTV for example), sells the advertising slots to advertisers and 
provides the broadcasting platform with the finished channel (as 
composed of both advertising slots and programmes). 
                                                          
24 See Chapter 3, par. 3.2 of this dissertation. 
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In this case the channel itself become a two-sided platform, i.e. a 
technological environment where two different customers with no 
direct relationship meet: (i) the advertisers and (ii) the broadcasting 
company that owns the radio spectrum. In this case the channel 
producer is not the buyer of the broadcasting platform, but is one of the 
platform’s suppliers25. 
Obviously from the consumer’s point of view, only the viewer’s 
relationship with the platform matters (in terms of FTA or Pay TV 
access), since the commercial agreements between the programme 
maker and the broadcasting platform or between the programme 
maker and the product sellers are unknown to the viewers. 
Furthermore when an FTA or a Pay TV company is the producer of its 
own channels and the owner of the broadcasting network, it is a 
vertically integrated platform in the sense that the platform has 
exclusive rights to the content. Let us give an example to explain. 
When Sky buys content from its providers and broadcasts it to the 
viewers (for example via the Sky Cinema or Sky Sport channels), the 
transactions it conducts with members of the two groups – content 
providers and consumers – are largely independent of each other and 
have little to do with two-sided market theory.  
But Sky is considerably more sophisticated than that. It also rents parts 
of its own radio spectrum to third-party channel producers like 
ClassEditori S.p.A or Rai Sat S.p.A. for example. The latter companies 
are responsible for supplying, displaying and advertising their 
programmes within the spectrum allocated to them by Sky. In this case 
Sky is a two-sided platform in the interaction between these 
programme publishers and the viewers, who are charged by the 
platform via the access fee and the subscription fee respectively. 
The situation is considerably more complicated from the consumer’s 
point of view. Since Sky is Pay TV, when the viewers subscribe to the 
                                                          
25 With reference to the idea of considering a channel as content that can be 
provided to a platform, see European Commission Case Decision 
COMP/M.5121 Newscorp/Premiere of 25.06.2008. 
 20 
whole bouquet, that is, they subscribe to all the channels produced by 
Sky (including Sky Cinema and Sky Sport) and the channels produced 
by other content providers. But viewers are not conscious of paying for 
content published by providers other than Sky. Indeed, companies such 
as ClassEditori S.p.A or Rai Sat S.p.A do not charge Sky subscribers, 
but rather the product sellers who buy advertising slots in the 
schedules of their channels. Thus although such channels (Class NBC 
and Raisat Cinema for example) are broadcast by a third party platform 
(like Sky), they are also platforms in themselves, in that they bring 
together advertisers and broadcasting companies. The functioning is 
similar to that of a FTA television company as described above: only 
one side is charged (the advertisers) for advertising slots, whereas it is 
assumed that the other side (the consumer) will buy those products on 
the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6. Relevant broadcasting markets. 
From the regulatory point of view, the broadcasting sector is highly 
fragmented. According to the European Commission’s description of 
the relevant broadcasting markets, a basic distinction in terms of 
distribution of content can be made between Pay TV and FTA TV 
companies26. The established distinction between Pay TV and FTA TV 
is based upon several features. Firstly, there is the difference in the type 
of financing. Pay TV establishes a commercial relationship between the 
platform and the viewer, whereas FTA TV only establishes a 
                                                          
26 See European Commission Case Decisions COMP/M.4504 – SFR/Télé2 France 
of 28.112006; COMP/M.4204 – Cinven/UPC France of 13.07.2006; COMP/M.3411 
– UGC/Noos of 17.05.2004; COMP/M.2876 – Newscorp/Telepiù of 02.04.2003. 
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relationship between the broadcasting company and the advertisers 
(i.e. the product sellers). Secondly, while there is undeniably interaction 
between the two markets from the viewer's perspective, a distinction 
can be drawn based on whether the TV service is provided at no 
specified cost or is the result of a subscription allowing access to certain 
programmes not otherwise available. Thirdly, from a viewer's 
perspective, the programmes and the "premium" content (i.e. content 
with more appeal for viewers) exclusively distributed via Pay TV often 
cannot be replaced with programmes and content available on FTA TV, 
since viewers do not consider Pay TV and FTA TV services as fully 
interchangeable. Obviously, the more attractive the content offered by 
an FTA broadcaster, the smaller the incentive for a viewer to opt for a 
Pay TV subscription. However, this interaction does not render FTA TV 
a simple substitute for Pay TV, as demand-side substitutability is 
limited by the fact that, unlike Pay TV, viewers of FTA TV generally do 
not have to pay a subscription fee to get access to a particular type of 
content or programme. Finally, there are major differences with regard 
to the business models of the two types of broadcasters, so supply-side 
substitutability is limited. While FTA channels are chiefly financed by 
advertising revenues and, in the case of the public broadcasters such as 
RAI in Italy, by public funds, Pay TV operators still largely rely on 
revenues from subscription fees and, to an insignificant extent, from 
advertising27. 
With reference to the nature of the audiovisual content, entertainment 
products involve several kinds of content that are not good substitutes 
for each other (e.g. films, sport, TV programmes and channels). TV 
broadcasting rights to this type of content belong to their publishers, 
who license them to broadcasters. From both the demand-side and 
supply-side perspectives, certain types of content bought by Pay TV 
operators are not mutually substitutable, since (i) sports events, (ii) 
                                                          
27 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.5121 Newscorp/Premiere 
of 25.06.2008. 
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premium films and (iii) other TV content (such as documentaries, 
youth programmes, etc.) are sold in separate markets.28 
The European Commission also stresses the difference between FTA 
TV and Pay TV companies in terms of their product differentiation 
strategies: FTA TV seeks to offer substantially similar products to their 
viewers (the so-called generalist channels), whereas Pay TV channels 
tend to be extremely differentiated (into so-called thematic channels).  
In recent years the broadcasting sector has undergone significant 
changes in terms of financing and the collecting of resources. Unlike 
what happened in the past, the broadcasting sector today involves Pay 
TV and FTA TV companies competing directly in terms of similar 
programmes (scripted and unscripted content29) and convergence 
through digitalization. There is also convergence of business models in 
the sense that Pay TV operators are increasingly financed not only by 
subscription fees but also by advertising revenues, whereas FTA 
broadcasters (traditionally financed primarily via advertising revenues) 
have started offering encrypted channels for which viewers have to pay 
a subscription fee. Furthermore both FTA and Pay TV broadcasters 
compete for the same content and audience. Despite this the European 
Commission's approach has changed little, although a different 
description of the relevant market would be probably more consistent 
with reality. 
With reference to the geographical dimension, the broadcasting sector 
is national in scope due to the regulatory regimes, language and local 
                                                          
28 See European Commission Case Decisions COMP/M.4504 – SFR/Télé2 France 
of 28.11.2006; COMP/M.4204 – Cinven/UPC France of 13.07.2006; COMP/M.3411 
– UGC/Noos of 17.05.2004; COMP/M.2876 – Newscorp/Telepiù of 02.04.2003. 
29 We can define ‚scripted content‛ as content which is established and thus 
entirely known by the programme maker before broadcasting (for example 
fiction, documentaries and animation). In contrast, ‚unscripted content‛ is 
known by the programme maker only with reference to the general 
characteristics of the format; the final result cannot be foreseen from the 
beginning and is subject to the evolution of the programme (as in the case of 
reality TV, talk shows, game shows and comedy shows).  
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culture, which also act as restraints on the entry and circulation of new 
content in a country30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7. Conclusions. 
The question of access to broadcasting platforms is a broad one. For 
this reason we shall limit our research to specific aspects. From a 
competition point of view the ownership by a broadcasting platform of 
both content and network matters in terms of their affordability by 
third parties. Thus, to avoid dominant positions and guarantee 
competition in the market, it needs to be regulated. In recent years, as a 
remedy against monopolistic behaviour, public competition authorities 
have decided to grant other platforms access to the content and 
networks of the dominant broadcasting platforms.  
But a platform can also broadcast content provided by independent 
producers, which are third parties that retain ownership of the 
broadcasting rights. In this case the platform is a multi-sided one in the 
sense that it becomes a technological environment where different 
economic operators meet and become purchasers of platform services. 
The number of purchasers involved in the platform determines the 
number of the platform’s ‚sides‛, for example whether it is two-sided 
(with content providers and viewers) or three-sided (with advertisers, 
broadcasting rights owners and viewers). 
The broadcasting platform charges its customers in accordance with the 
positive externalities they derive from the interaction with the other 
                                                          
30 See European Commission Case Decisions COMP/M.4504 – SFR/Télé2 France 
of 28.11.2006; COMP/M.4204 – Cinven/UPC France of 14.07.2006; COMP/M.3411 
– UGC/Noos of 17.05.2004; COMP/M.2876 Newscorp/Telepiù of 02.04.2003. 
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parties in the platform. Thus, it imposes the highest charges on the 
party that derives the greatest advantage from the largest number of 
members of the other parties. For example FTA broadcasting platforms 
do not charge viewers at all, in order to attract as many consumers as 
possible and therefore to increase the number of advertisers interested 
in the platform and hence its total revenues. 
In the following pages we will return to this point and discuss the 
broadcasting platforms’ strategies for maximizing their profits. In 
general it may be said that as in the other sectors, competition among 
broadcasting platforms is based on product differentiation and price 
differentiation31. 
Obviously the goal of maximising profit (by attracting ever more 
viewers, content providers and advertisers) influences the platform’s 
programming. It should also be pointed out that the relevant 
broadcasting markets are different in terms of both the demand side 
and the supply side. With reference to the affordability of the content 
for viewers, FTA TV and Pay TV are different markets; furthermore 
with reference to the acquisition of content rights, each type of content 
(e.g. films, sport, TV programmes and channels) forms a separate 
market since it cannot be replaced with another type32. The assumption 
of the European Commission on this point confirms our intuition about 
the fact that within multi-sided market theory, even a single channel is 
a type of content that can be provided to a platform, just like any other 
scripted or unscripted programme. When the channel publisher sells 
the finished channel (composed of programmes and advertising slots) 
to a broadcasting platform and the advertising slots to the advertisers 
the channel itself becomes a multi-sided platform. With reference to the 
price strategy, in this case there is no direct relationship between the 
advertisers and the viewers or between the channel publisher and the 
viewers. Furthermore if the broadcaster is an FTA TV company, then 
                                                          
31 See Chapter 3, sections 3.3 onwards, of this dissertation.  
32 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.5121 - Newscorp/Premiere 
of 25.06.2008. 
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viewers are not charged at all for watching the third-party channel, but 
even in the context of Pay TV they have no direct relationship with the 
channel producer or the advertisers. Obviously part of the subscription 
fee paid by the consumer to the Pay TV company is used to cover the 
cost incurred by the platform in buying the channel, but the mechanism 
of financing by means of advertising slots is the same as any FTA TV 
company: viewers are expected to buy in the shops the products 
advertised on TV. 
This argument, together with the observation that Pay TV and FTA TV 
companies compete for the same content and audiences and also 
compete directly in terms of similar programmes and business models 
(Pay TV operators are increasingly financed not only by subscription 
fees but also by advertising revenues, whereas FTA broadcasters have 
started offering encrypted channels for which viewers have to pay a 
subscription fee), demonstrates that the current separation between 
FTA TV and Pay TV markets is set to progressively disappear. From 
the antitrust point of view, public authorities should take this into 
consideration in their decisions. 
In a system of technological convergence among different transmission 
technologies, broadcasting has become a sector where information is 
broadcast via various media that can deliver the same content to the 
end user. For some researchers vertical integration is a typical response 
of some players to the convergence of scope, and the co-existence of 
multi-sided channel providers implies that there is a risk of anti-
competitive behaviour (e.g. the AOL-Time Warner debate)33. 
Furthermore competition policy and antitrust rules coexist in 
broadcasting markets together with regulatory aspects such as the ex 
ante control over the timing of advertising, the variety and quality of 
programming, and pluralism of information. 
                                                          
33 See RUBINFELD D.L. and SINGER H. J., ‚Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband 
Access?‛, supra, at footnote 12. 
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In the following pages our focus will shift away from the technical 
problem of integration among different networks towards competition 
among platforms and the issue of access to multi-sided platforms34. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 See Chapter 6, section 6.2 of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 
_____________________________________________ 
Pricing strategies in multi-sided 
broadcasting platforms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction. 
Until now we have made reference to the multi-sided market theory in 
broadcasting platforms without properly explaining the features and 
the consequences of this theory in terms of competition policy. The 
literature on multi-sided markets is copious35. 
                                                          
35 See for example ANDERSON S.P. and GANS J.S. (2008) TiVoed: The Effects of 
Ad-Avoidance Technologies on Broadcaster Behaviour [online]. Available from: 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=joshuagans
; DUKES A. (2006) ‚Media Concentration and Consumer Product Prices‛, 
Economic Inquiry, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 128-141; RENDA A., ‚Domanda e offerta di 
contenuti multimediali‛, supra at footnote 6; GARELLA P.G. and PEITZ M. 
(2006) Alliances between competitors and consumer information, Working Paper No. 
613, University of Crete, Department of Economics; STENNEK J. (2006) 
Exclusive quality. Why Exclusive Distribution may Benefit the TV-Viewers, Working 
Paper Series No. 691, Research Institute of Industrial Economics; JEON D.S. and 
ROCHET J.C. (2007) The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market 
Perspective, Working Paper No. 458, Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI); 
LEE R. S. (2007) Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided 
Markets, Working Paper No. 39, NET Institute; ARGENTESI E. and 
FILISTRUCCHI F. (2007) ‚Estimating market power in a two-sided market: The 
case of newspapers‛, Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 22, pp. 1247-1266; 
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In the next few pages we will describe the major trends in the economic 
literature on multi-sided platforms, the effects of competition on price 
strategy and the effects of competition on market share among 
platforms. Subsequently we will discuss price discrimination in the 
broadcasting sector. We will focus on the nature of the externalities 
involved and their implications for the prices set by platforms. 
We will describe the main externalities in a multi-sided market and 
deal with price allocations on the two sides, demonstrating that price 
allocation by platforms is not neutral. Then we will discuss the 
existence of different pricing strategies in one-sided and two-sided 
markets, in the case of both single homing and multihoming, and with 
exclusive and non-exclusive services.  
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3.2. Externalities in multi-sided platforms. 
We can distinguish between two main sets of externalities in multi-
sided markets: membership externalities and usage externalities. 
In such market a consumer on one side earns a positive net surplus by 
means of interaction with another consumer on the other side. This 
feature represents usage externality, whereas membership externality 
refers to the greater likelihood of deciding (ex ante) to join a platform 
when the numbers on the other side are higher. The positive net 
surplus comes from the number of members a consumer can meet in 
the platform. 
Usage externality results from interaction between the two user groups. 
Usage externality arises from one or several interactions, facilitated by 
the platform, between content providers and viewers. There are 
markets where only one type of interaction exists, such as real estate 
agencies; and markets with several interactions, as is the case of the 
broadcasting sector, in which the interactions can even be repeated. 
From this point of view, each agent receives some benefit from each 
interaction36. This happens for example for the viewers of the Sky 
platform, which offers subscribers ancillary services such as betting on 
the results of football matches by means of their remote control. 
The set of membership externalities closely resembles classical 
externalities, such as positive network effects. Membership externality 
is the principle that the higher the number of consumers connected to 
the platform, the greater the desire on the part of other consumers to 
join this platform.37 For example, the greater the number of consumers 
connected to a broadcasting platform, the more consumers will be 
willing to pay to join the same platform in order to be able to view the 
same content. In two-sided markets, however, the membership 
externality results from the presence of two different user groups. This 
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means that the greater the number of consumers of one group 
connected to the platform, the more attractive the latter becomes for the 
other group of consumers38. These are cross externalities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. General implications of externalities for platform 
pricing strategies. 
The presence of externalities in two-sided markets has implications for 
the prices set by platforms, allowing us to draw a distinction between 
multi-sided markets and their classical counterparts. 
Externalities impact both price level and price structure. In this respect, 
Rochet and Tirole argue that price structure can provide a basis for 
identifying two-sided markets39. Since there are two different user 
groups, the platforms face two distinct types of demand. Thus the 
overall end price is composed of a price paid by content providers and 
a price paid by consumers. The presence of externalities and the 
existence of two different prices raise the issue of price allocation. 
Two key questions arise. What are the efficient price levels and an 
efficient allocation of prices from the platform's point of view? And 
what are the implications of the presence of positive externalities? To 
answer these questions we will briefly describe the relevant economic 
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literature on this point without reference to any specific econometric 
model. 
Evans affirms that the price on each side can be different40. In cases 
where demand is high on both sides, price levels and allocation play an 
important role in maintaining the loyalty of two different types of 
consumer. 
We agree with Rochet and Tirole41 that since there is a membership 
externality, the price charged by platforms for a transaction decreases 
with the size of the installed base. Again, this effect closely resembles 
network positive externality.  
However, the usage externality may be internalised by the user groups 
through the price structure established by the platform. In this case 
Evans42 argues that the service is jointly consumed by the two types of 
users in two-sided markets, and the usage externality exists only if 
transactions with the platform take place. Consider the Pay per View 
system, where the viewers buy content they are interested in. The 
platform is the third party that allows supply (the content providers) to 
meet demand (the viewers). 
It is worth noting that in some other cases, such as advertising in 
newspapers, potentially negative externalities also exist. For example, 
consumers are willing to pay more to have less advertising.43  
Therefore the presence of externalities implies that the aim of the 
platform is not to offer cost-oriented and symmetric prices, but to 
balance demand, for example between advertisers and customers. In 
other words, a reason for discrimination arises. 
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In this situation the distinction proposed by Rochet and Tirole between 
the price level (the total price set by the platform) and price structure 
(allocation) becomes clear44. Thus there is no evidence that the two 
types of users equally share the total price for access to the platform. As 
underlined above, the benefit gained by a consumer (content provider 
or viewer) comes from their interaction via the platform. 
Rochet and Tirole explain the features of two-sided markets in the 
following way. They argue that from a theoretical point of view, it is 
impossible to apply Coase's theorem to two-sided markets, since the 
transaction between content providers and viewers takes place only if 
there is a platform. This implies the presence of a third party, which 
owns the platform, and prevents direct bargaining between the two 
participants. The authors conclude that, in a Coasian world, the price 
structure would be neutral. In other words, there would be neutrality 
in the allocation of the total price. However, as explained above, this is 
not the case in two-sided markets. Since there is no pricing neutrality, 
platform strategy is likely to be based on price allocation45. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Pricing allocation factors for platforms. 
Introducing the topic of price allocation, a distinction can be made 
between internal (i.e. intra-platform) competition occurring within the 
same platform, and external (i.e. inter-platform) competition, which 
occurs between two or more platforms46. 
                                                          
44 ROCHET J.C. and TIROLE J., Two-sided markets, supra at footnote 39. 
45 See ROSON R. (2005) ‚Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey‛, Review of 
Network Economies, Vol. 4: Issue 2, Article 3. 
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In this context, externalities have major implications for price structure. 
Therefore if the price on one side of the market decreases, for viewers 
for example, they tend to use the platform more. However, at the same 
time, the content providers also stand to benefit from this as the 
platform may charge the content providers less as well. Indeed when 
the price to the viewers decreases, the direct effect is that there are 
more viewers, so the incentive for the content providers to join the 
platform increases.  
This result is not surprising. However, interaction between the different 
user groups modifies the standard results of competition à la Bertrand, 
since the prices are cost-oriented. Thus the utility derived by one group 
depends on the number of users in the other group. In this context 
price allocation is an important issue.  
Armstrong and Rochet and Tirole present an overview of the price 
allocation problem47. Their study focuses on externalities and their 
implications for prices. More precisely, they consider a platform as a 
monopoly in order to explain how price allocation is affected by factors 
such as:  
a) multihoming; 
b) user costs; 
c) platform differentiation; 
d) a platform's capacity to apply a price based on the number of 
transactions48; 
e) the number of users49, 
f) externalities between user groups50; and 
g) externalities within a group51. 
Let us examine these factors. 
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3.5. A theoretical framework: a monopolistic platform. 
In line with Armstrong and Rochet and Tirole, we consider that a 
monopoly offers linear prices on both sides. In this situation the aim of 
a platform should be to define price level, but also efficient price 
allocation between content providers and viewers. 
Armstrong compares a situation whereby a platform maximizes the 
overall welfare of the industry to a situation whereby it sets prices to 
maximize its own profits. 
In cases where platforms maximize social welfare, prices for viewers 
for example are below fixed costs, since they are the result of this cost 
minus the value of the externality associated with the other side of the 
market. 
In cases where the platform maximizes its own profit, the price is equal 
to the fixed cost minus the externality plus a factor related to the 
demand elasticity of the group in question and the participation of the 
other side. 
Armstrong concludes that the member externality determines the 
allocation of prices.  
In contrast Roche and Tirole focus on the usage externality; for them 
the price depends on the elasticity of demand from both the viewers’ 
side and the content providers’ side (i.e. cross externality). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6. Platform competition with single-homing. 
In line with the principles described above (network effect and 
elasticity), this section considers competition between platforms in the 
case of single-home connection i.e. where each side can only be 
connected to one platform. 
Armstrong focuses on competition between platforms that provide 
services perceived as different by users. The author supposes that the 
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two groups of users can be connected to one exclusive platform only. 
The first insight provided by this study is that the net surplus for each 
group is a function of the external benefit of having an additional 
consumer in the group. Its main conclusion is that the platform should 
consider this external benefit as a measure of the opportunity cost52. 
This means that since there is competition between platforms, the 
strategy should be based on avoiding price hikes to discourage 
consumers from switching to a competitor's platform. The expression 
of price is simple. It is the sum of fixed costs plus the value of a service 
perceived as non-substitutable, minus the value of the inter-group 
externality resulting from the transaction. Moreover, this means that 
pricing is generally not cost-oriented. 
The impact of single-homing on pricing strategy can be summarised as 
follows. In the presence of single homing, the higher the value the users 
on one side place on the presence of the other group, the lower the 
price for both sides should be. However, the single-homing hypothesis 
is not really consistent with the platform market. Content providers in 
particular can be connected to several platforms and viewers can 
subscribe to more than one contract with different television platforms. 
Probably then in our context multihoming is more realistic and this will 
be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7. Platform competition with multihoming. 
Following Armstrong and Rochet and Tirole, this section considers 
cases where one side of the market can multihome, i.e. it can connect to 
several platforms. In these conditions the result is naturally as follows. 
                                                          
52 ARMSTRONG M., ‚Competition‛, supra at footnote 8. 
 36 
Users who multihome place a higher value on membership and usage 
externalities53. 
Rochet and Tirole propose a more general model than Armstrong. They 
suppose that advertisers are connected to two different platforms, and 
that end-users choose the platform where transactions take place. 
Transactions happen when the benefit to each user on each side (buyer 
and seller) is higher than the price set by the platform. 
At first the authors postulate that the price levels proposed by each 
platform are the same. In these conditions advertisers and platforms 
interact under three conditions: 
a) advertisers perform no transaction if the price is higher than 
the value generated by the transaction; 
b) advertisers make the choice of connection to one or two 
platforms according to the trade off in terms of demand from 
the viewers and service costs in the two situations 
(multihoming versus single-homing); 
c) thus, the platform’s strategy consists of setting a price lower 
than its rivals in order to limit the incentive for adopting 
multihoming. Indeed, when a platform decreases its price, it 
increases its own demand and attracts content providers or 
users that were previously multihoming. 
Therefore Rochet and Tirole conclude that there are cross subsidies 
between the two sides. The authors call this principle the "topsy-turvy 
principle", which can be defined as follows: an increase in the price on 
one side implies an increase in the mark-up for the platform, but also 
implies a decrease in price on the other side, in order to attract users 
and to preserve balanced demand. 
As a result, the more widespread multihoming becomes, the more 
platform competition implies a decrease in price on the advertiser side. 
Finally, the volume of transactions depends not only on the overall 
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price, but also on price allocation. Again, the price structure is not 
neutral in the presence of competition with multihoming54. 
Therefore platform pricing strategy should be guided by the following 
factors, which all have an impact on price allocation: 
i) elasticity: for example, if the installed base on one side 
increases and if this side is captive, then it is profitable for the 
platform to increase its prices for this group (the advertisers, 
for example) in order to decrease the price on the other side 
and attract new viewers; 
ii) the advertiser's market power: if advertisers enjoy significant 
market power, then the platform could decrease the price it 
charges for its services to decrease the double marginalization 
effect; 
iii) in the platform viewers can be seen as "marquee buyers". 
Indeed, their presence has a high value for advertisers and thus 
modifies the price structure. This effect implies that the 
platform could set a lower price for viewers and a higher price 
for advertisers55. 
The consequences of multihoming are not clear. Indeed, if some on the 
viewers' side are connected to several platforms then price sensitivity 
appears to increase on this side (higher elasticity). Platforms can react 
by charging viewers more and advertisers less, thus creating an 
incentive for those viewers to stop multihoming. Moreover, a higher 
access price charged to some content providers by one platform may 
lead to their foreclosure from the platform. Because of the resulting 
absence of their favourite channel, some viewers could then decide to 
cancel their subscription to the platform, shifting in this way to single-
homing.  
According to Evans other factors, such as investment on one side of the 
market, also impact price structure, since investment allows the 
platform to decrease the price on this side. As a result, this strategy 
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makes it possible to attract new consumers on the other side. Moreover 
Evans argues that multihoming offers a key insight into the study of 
two-sided markets, and that multihoming implies higher competitive 
pressure and tends to decrease prices56. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8. Competition for market share among platforms. 
The above analysis explains how the features of two-sided markets 
affect price structure, making them subject to economic consequences 
that differ from standard effects. Under such circumstances, a platform 
may have an incentive to modify price structure according to the value 
of the usage externality, since the demand from one side tends to 
decrease if the demand from the other side is too low. In this context 
the following two questions arise: 
What strategy should a platform adopt to attract both sides and reach 
critical installed bases on each side? 
On which side should demand be stimulated first by the platform? 
In a competitive market platforms must be able to defend their existing 
market share, while bidding for new clients. 
Following Caillaud and Jullien, who looked at this issue in greater 
detail, it can be argued that a platform must have a significant number 
of content providers in order to attract viewers. However, advertisers 
will only be willing to pay if they anticipate a large number of viewers, 
and on this point there is uncertainty from the content providers side. 
The authors argue that one possible strategy for platforms is to "divide 
and conquer" the market. This strategy is based on dividing one side in 
order to conquer the other, by means of price discrimination. Caillaud 
                                                          
56 See EVANS D.S., ‚The Antitrust Economics‛, supra at footnote 4. 
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and Jullien focus on market structure and platform strategies. Their 
study considers imperfect competition with a two-part tariff between 
platforms, whereby the services provided can be exclusive (single 
home) or non-exclusive (multihome) 57. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.9. Competition for market share with exclusive and non-
exclusive services. 
Exclusive services denote a single-home subscription. In this case, all 
users on both sides prefer to belong to the same platform. The 
platform's strategy is consequently based on giving subsidies to one 
side in order to keep them on board and maintain high market share. 
As a result, exclusive service externalities tend to favour market 
concentration. This appears to be an efficient market structure, which 
generates low profits as a result. 
Caillaud and Jullien explain this effect as follows. Let us suppose that 
two platforms compete against each other for exclusive services. This 
implies that all users are single-homing. A platform could decrease the 
price on the viewers' side in order to attract more advertisers, which 
stand to gain a higher net surplus from connection to this platform. 
This process can be continued until the platform becomes a monopoly 
with an efficient structure and low profits. 
In other words, when services are exclusive, competitive pressure is 
high. This is true however only as long as transaction prices are not 
                                                          
57 CAILLAUD B. and JULLIEN B. (2003) ‚Chicken & egg: Competition among 
intermediation service providers‛, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 34, pp. 309-
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distorted, that is, as long as the platform does not seek to collect all the 
profit on one side while subsidizing the other. Under such 
circumstances subsidies would appear to represent a competitive 
strategy and entail a concentrated market structure. When there is 
intense competition for market share with exclusive services, a 
concentrated market may offer an efficient market structure58. 
In many cases users are connected to several platforms (multihoming). 
This is particularly true for broadcasting users. 
Caillaud and Jullien show that service providers have incentives to 
offer non-exclusive services as this reduces competitive pressure and 
allows them to exercise their market power. In such cases it is easy to 
divide but more difficult to conquer, since it is more difficult to attract 
new users59.  
Finally Armstrong and Wright provide an analysis of this topic based 
on endogenous users' decisions when choosing between exclusive and 
non-exclusive services. Their results closely resemble those cited above. 
We can consequently argue that an optimal strategy for platforms is to 
sustain losses on one side in order to achieve a critical installed base on 
the other. In this "divide and conquer" strategy, platforms subsidize 
consumers on one side in order to attract them60. 
Once their participation is obtained, there is a bandwagon effect that 
allows the platform to recover the subsidy through the fixed fee paid 
by advertisers on the other side. This platform strategy is based on the 
idea of "buying" the participation of one side in order to create value 
for the other due to the presence of intra-platform externalities. 
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3.10. Conclusions. 
It seems that the usual principles of competition in terms of price level 
and allocation are modified in multi-sided markets. More specifically, 
membership externality and usage externality lead to a platform 
strategy that is not based on cost-oriented prices, but on the ability to 
achieve balanced demand. 
We have shown that price strategy depends not only on competitive 
pressure and elasticity, but also on externalities and their value for each 
group, which in turn depend on whether there is multihoming or not. 
The different value of these externalities impacts on both pricing 
strategy and on competition to maintain and conquer market share. 
Under such circumstances, a pricing strategy could consist of 
subsidizing one side to attract consumers on the other. For example 
some platforms offer to provide their clients with the set-top box for 
free in order to spread their own technology in the market.  
Some insight is afforded by the impact of externalities on price 
structure, which is not neutral in two-sided markets. An efficient price 
structure is no longer cost-oriented. However, it seems essential to take 
into account the surplus received by each consumer from transactions. 
Indeed, interactions between the two sides imply counter-intuitive 
effects. As shown with the "divide and conquer" strategy, we can affirm 
with Evans that the estimation of market power should take both sides 
of the market into consideration. This is particularly true if a price is 
higher than marginal cost on one side, and below marginal cost on the 
other side61. 
Competition policy in a traditional market can embrace price distortion 
(price below marginal cost) in the short term; but it is opposed to this 
principle once the market becomes mature. 
Thus, competition policy cannot consider prices on the two sides 
separately. Such a policy would not be appropriate for two-sided 
markets, where goods or services are only sold if the platform attracts 
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sufficient users on both sides. In this framework the competition 
authority is unable to analyse collective welfare without taking price 
level, price allocation and the external effects created by the presence of 
the two sides into account.  
Rochet and Tirole compare a two-sided market with a vertically 
integrated market structure. They suppose a vertical organization in 
which there is no direct relation with viewers (downstream market), 
but only with advertisers. In two-sided markets, advertisers benefit 
from the significant market power of the platforms, who may have an 
incentive to subsidize prices in order to increase the viewers' surplus 
and their willingness to pay. 
Another strategy according to Rochet and Tirole is to encourage 
competition on one side, in order to attract users on the other side. 
Platforms thus have an incentive to offer cost-oriented prices. This 
stimulates interactions and tends to make the volume of transactions 
optimal62. 
If we consider a vertical market structure such positive effects are 
limited because there is no internalization of the benefits resulting from 
transactions when platforms contract with advertisers only. The 
authors demonstrate that foreclosure is less likely in two-sided 
markets. 
The key insight of their study is the existence of differences in the 
economic effects of one-sided and two-sided markets. According to 
Rochet and Tirole a platform is able to control or regulate interactions, 
which is not the case in a vertically integrated market. Their analysis 
becomes valid if we consider a price lower than marginal cost, which 
does not necessarily imply a predatory pricing strategy, since the aim is 
usually to achieve a balance between the two sides. In a two-sided 
market, it is essential to consider that a given service is provided to 
each user on each side at the same time. 
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Furthermore, increasing the number of firms in a market, as is the case 
in a competitive multihoming scenario, has no positive impact on price 
structure. 
Under such circumstances we have seen that consumers may pay a 
lower price, since a platform’s strategy consists of reaching a critical 
installed base on this side. On the other side, advertisers are usually 
willing to pay a higher price to participate in transactions. As a result, a 
more competitive two-sided market does not imply that the price 
structure is more balanced. 
Moreover, if we consider a merger between platforms as Evans does, it 
can be argued that when competition policy faces a merger between 
two platforms, the presence of the two sides must be considered. In 
general terms, competition policy accepts or rejects the merger in view 
of the evolution of prices. 
However, in two-sided markets it is the total price that must be 
considered. Indeed, a price increase applied by the platform to one side 
can reflect a decrease on the other in order to preserve balanced 
demand, since a price decrease on one side increases willingness to pay 
on the other side. In the end the variation in the total price may be low, 
although the price structure has changed significantly63. By prohibiting 
this type of price discrimination, regulation runs the risk of preventing 
one side from participating.  
With reference to price we can argue that competition policy is not 
neutral if it attributes a competitive advantage to unregulated firms. 
In two-sided markets Wright points out that a non-regulated firm will 
not want to match a suboptimal price structure imposed on a regulated 
firm.  
The first impact of regulation is to decrease prices. However, users may 
prefer to pay more to access the non-regulated platform if installed 
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bases are larger, thus enabling the non-regulated firm to increase its 
market share and profits64. 
This analysis of regulatory policy can be extended in line with Laffont 
et al.65. They provide a model which considers a reciprocal access 
charge in a two-sided market. The framework of the analysis is as 
follows: suppose two platforms compete at the same time for final 
users and for content providers. The platforms set a reciprocal access 
charge for all users. This means that the platform at the origin of the 
traffic must pay an access charge to its rival for any user. In addition, 
the users' decision to join one exclusive platform (i.e. single-homing) is 
endogenous. 
The platforms are considered as perfect substitutes from the consumer's 
point of view. The total price set by both platforms consists of the price 
set for consumers, plus the price fixed for content providers. The 
authors adopt the "off-net cost principle" and assume that the "balanced 
calling pattern" hypothesis is respected. This reflects an important 
difference between their views and the theoretical literature on the 
telecommunications industry. The receivers of traffic pay a price to 
have access to the platform. 
This has two major implications. The first is related to prices, while the 
second is linked to competition stability. 
The impact on prices is as follows: when a viewer watches television 
without paying, the platforms pick up the perceived marginal cost. 
However, when viewers pay for watching, the perceived marginal cost 
is only equal to the opportunity cost of losing a consumer who may 
switch to another platform. This is the result of the usage externality in 
two-sided markets. Moreover, competition stability is stronger in this 
context. 
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Indeed, when viewers do not pay for watching programmes, then 
equilibrium can only exist if the access charge is close to the marginal 
cost or if the platforms are close substitutes. Yet in the scenario outlined 
above this is never the case, since the sum of the prices (for each side) is 
just equal to the traffic cost, independently of the access charge level. 
The access charge only determines how cost is allocated between the 
two sides. As a result, the price structure implied by the externalities 
modifies the access pricing problem. Here again, it is the study of the 
total price that is relevant66. All these features can potentially influence 
the tools used by competition policy.  
In short, two main difficulties for competition policy arise with regard 
to two-sided markets. The first is the issue of the benefits received by 
consumers, since there are usage and membership externalities to be 
considered. Although it is difficult to measure these externalities, they 
must be taken into account in studies of two-sided markets.  
The second difficulty concerns the advantages that consumers derive 
from price structure that enable them to perform transactions at the 
lowest possible cost. It is important to consider that the benefits on one 
side increase with participation on the other. Again, it is not easy to 
take this effect into account in competition policy. 
However, there is no reason to believe that non-competitive behaviour 
is more widespread in two-sided markets. In fact, behaviour is just 
different, with prices not based on cost on either side, for example. 
Moreover, price level and allocation must maximize output. From this 
point of view, Caillaud and Jullien show how dominant firms prefer to 
set prices related to volumes of transactions, rather than a fixed fee. 
Like Armstrong, Caillaud and Jullien show that the pressure of 
competition is more intense without multihoming67.  
                                                          
66 This point is made in LAFFONT J.J., REY P. and TIROLE J. (1998) ‚Network 
Competition: I. Overview and Non-discriminatory Pricing‛, RAND Journal of 
Economics, vol. 29(1), pp. 1-37. 
67 ARMSTRONG M. and WRIGHT J., Two-Sided Markets, supra at footnote 60; 
CAILLAUD B. and JULLIEN B., ‚Chicken & Egg‛, supra at footnote 57. 
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Therefore there are difficulties for competition and regulatory policy 
with regard to the features of two-sided markets. 
At first, our analysis shows that two-sided markets differ from their 
classical counterparts because there is a third party involved that is 
subject to two different types of demand. As pointed out earlier, there 
are two types of externality: users of the platform benefit from the 
presence of members on the other side and from transactions on the 
platform. 
Such interactions have an impact on price level, and especially on the 
allocation of the total price between the two sides of the market. 
Indeed, platforms charge each side a price. In such cases, it is possible 
for the third party to charge one side a price below marginal cost and 
the other a price that is higher than this cost. However, as 
demonstrated above, such prices do not express cross subsidies or 
market power. Price allocation is not neutral. 
As a result, we believe that competition policy tools should be modified 
to take account of such features of two-sided markets. The most 
efficient market structure is not always competition (multihoming). On 
the contrary, concentrated markets can be justified by their strong 
externalities. Similarly, mergers are not necessarily detrimental to the 
industry. Another point concerns the impact on competition and 
regulatory policy of the presence of externalities. In a two-sided 
market, a price higher than marginal cost does not necessarily reflect 
market power, while cross subsidies are not necessarily predatory. 
Thus a concentrated market is not an inefficient market structure and 
price regulation in two-sided markets would be not neutral. 
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Chapter 4 
_____________________________________________ 
Pluralism of information and ex ante 
regulation in the broadcasting sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction. 
One of the principles governing broadcasting services is pluralism of 
information, which entails freedom of expression and the right to be 
informed by a broad variety of content. In Italy this principle has been 
upheld by legislation and the courts. In fact the Italian Constitutional 
Court has played a key role in promoting pluralism of information, and 
many times legislation has been adapted to its judgments. Today 
pluralism of information has to be seen in the context of a new idea of 
‚public‛ broadcasting that is no longer limited to state broadcasters. 
Technological evolution and convergence among platforms has 
prompted the state to protect pluralism through ex ante regulation that 
is of course coordinated with antitrust legislation. We shall now review 
the ex ante regulatory framework to assess the level of liberalization of 
the broadcasting sector ahead of the planned switch-off of analogical 
television. 
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4.2. Freedom of information in the European Union. 
The first recognition of freedom of information in international law can 
be found in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
10 December 1948, which states explicitly: "Everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers". This article establishes the 
principles of plurality of information sources and the right of access to 
them, principles which have been repeatedly cited in doctrine and case 
law. 
Furthermore Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (herewith the ‚ECHR‛) of 4 November 
1950 expressly states: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless 
of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these 
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to 
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights 
of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary." 
The European Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of 
article 10 of the ECHR as the foundation of the principle of freedom of 
expression, understood as the right to profess one’s own opinion 
(active freedom) and the right to receive information (passive 
freedom)68. The latter means that the right to information has to be 
                                                          
68 See MANGIONE G.M.R. (1995) ‚Pluralismo e concentrazione dei mezzi di 
comunicazione di massa nel mercato interno e valutazione della necessità di 
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pluralistic, and thus not influenced by the dominant position of certain 
enterprises. The innovation of article 10 ECHR lies in its reference to 
the broadcasting and television industry. This principle has become 
part of the constitutional traditions of European countries, since the 
holding of dominant positions in the communications sector is per se 
incompatible with regulatory objectives. Therefore the European Court 
of Human Rights supports the legitimacy of ex ante market regulation 
by the State for the protection of the citizens’ right to pluralistic 
information69. The defence of pluralism is then pursued through state 
regulation of the audiovisual sector and protection of competition in 
broadcasting markets. 
In the Court’s opinion the general antitrust regulations are not in 
themselves sufficient to avoid the creation of dominant positions in the 
broadcasting sector, and a common communications policy is thus 
necessary70. In this way broadcasting is considered to be just like any 
other public service and as such its provision can be limited by the 
State71. 
                                                                                                                               
un’azione comunitaria. Il libro verde della Commissione delle Comunità 
europee del 23 dicembre 1992‛, Dir. Inf. Inform., p. 157 onwards. 
69 See MASTROIANNI R., La disciplina in materia di televisione tra diritto interno e 
diritto comunitario, presentation at the Conference on ‚L’evoluzione del sistema 
delle comunicazioni tra diritto interno e diritto comunitario‛ held in Florence 
on 23.04.2004, www.cesefinalbertopredieri.it. See also European Court of 
Human Rights Cases Informationserverin Lentia v. Austria of 24.04.1993 in Human 
Rights Law Journal, 1994, Jersild v. France of 23.09.1994, Series A no. 298, and 
Piermont of 27.09.1995, Series A, no. 314. More recently, in the Case Cgt Verein 
gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland of 28.06.2002, 34 EHRR 4, the Court ruled that 
the State is the ultimate guarantor of the right of information.  
70 On the relationship between the EU regulatory framework and Member 
States’ legislation see CARETTI P. (2004) ‚Le fonti della comunicazione‛, 
Quaderni costituzionali, 2, p. 313. 
71 An argument against this is to be found in BOGNETTI G. (1996) Costituzione, 
televisione e legge antitrust, Giuffrè, p. 16, who says that if television is subject to 
public regulation, the people involved in broadcasting are passive subjects who 
are not able to maintain freedom of information by themselves. 
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Furthermore for the same reason the European Commission, as obliged 
by the Court of First Instance72, has justified the financing of the 
broadcasting service by means of license fees together with advertising. 
The European Commission said that a Member State can impose a 
license fee in the following cases: (i) to finance public broadcasting 
networks; (ii) to finance public programmes designed to satisfy 
democratic, cultural and social needs; and (iii) to finance the activities 
of private companies, selected through transparent procedures, that 
perform the public broadcasting service73. 
Financing of the public broadcasting service by a State is in any case 
permitted under Article 86 of the EU Treaty if the financing of the 
broadcasting service does not damage competition in the sector and 
commercial trade in the European Union. Therefore, Member States are 
responsible for ensuring the smooth running of broadcasting by the 
various operators in accordance with domestic legislation, and the 
European Commission may call those who do not comply with their 
obligations to account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3. The protection of pluralism in the European Union 
before the Amsterdam Treaty. 
Originally the regulation of broadcasting did not fall under the 
competence of the European Economic Community (hereinafter the 
                                                          
72 See Court of First Instance Case Judgment T-95/96 - Telecinco of 15.09.1998, 
[1998] ECR II-03407. 
73 See MASTROIANNI R. (1999) ‚Il protocollo sul sistema della radiodiffusione 
pubblica‛, PREDIERI A. and TIZZANO A. (eds.) Il Trattato di Amsterdam (II), 
Giuffrè, p. 279. 
 51 
‚EEC‛), the matter being left to Member States in view of the scarcity of 
the radio spectrum and high infrastructure costs. 
Furthermore, the concept of public broadcasting was considered 
relevant to the EEC only in terms of competition policy, since 
broadcasting was regarded as a free economic activity subject to state 
intervention only in the case of market failures74. In 1996 the European 
Commission listed the general characteristics of services of general 
interest for the first time, defining them as services considered by the 
authorities to be public which are subject to some specific obligations75. 
However, public services became a European concept with Article 16 of 
the Amsterdam Treaty, according to which services of general interest 
can promote social and territorial cohesion among Member States 
although the latter retain their responsibility for such services under 
the Treaty.76 Protocol 32 of the Treaty of Amsterdam expressly says: 
‚the system of public broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to 
the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to 
preserve media pluralism; *<+ The provisions of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community shall be without prejudice to the competence of Member 
States to provide for the funding of public service broadcasting insofar as such 
funding is granted to broadcasting organisations for the fulfilment of the 
public service remit as conferred, defined and organised by each Member State, 
and insofar as such funding does not affect trading conditions and competition 
in the Community to an extent which would be contrary to the common 
                                                          
74 CARETTI P. (2007) ‚Pluralismo informativo e diritto comunitario‛, 
CARTABIA M. (ed.) I diritti in azione: universalità e pluralismo dei diritti 
fondamentali nelle Corti europee, Il Mulino, p. 415 onwards; CARTEI G.F. (2002) 
‚Servizio pubblico ed influenza comunitaria: profili evolutivi‛, in CARTEI G.F. 
and VANNUCCI V. (eds.) Diritto comunitario e ordinamento nazionale, Giuffrè, 
pp. 81-115. 
75 See European Commission Communication no. 443 of 11.09.1996, as revised 
by European Commission Communication no. 580 of 20.06.2000, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0580:FIN:EN:PDF. 
76 See RADICATI DI BRONZOLO L. (1998) ‚La nuova disposizione sui servizi 
di interesse economico generale‛, Il diritto dell'Unione europea, p. 530. 
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interest, while the realisation of the remit of that public service shall be taken 
into account‛. 
Thus Protocol 32 was the EEC’s first act of recognition of the public 
broadcasting system, since the Treaty of 1957 contained no express 
reference to State intervention in the broadcasting sector aimed at 
protecting freedom of information. At that time the European 
Economic Community saw pluralism of information as a restraint on 
economic initiative and not an essential principle for citizens’ freedom 
of information.77 Thus the Amsterdam Treaty marks a turning point 
regarding the free movement of ideas, which are the product of 
communication, and television regulation became part of the EU’s 
remit78. 
A ruling by the ECJ also confirmed that broadcasting lies within the 
purview of the European Union. It pushed for the harmonization of 
Member States’ legislation on television broadcasting and the creation 
of a common legal framework for the sector79. The consequence was the 
so-called Television Without Frontiers Directive (89/552/EEC) of 
October 3, 1989. Therefore the European Union has competence in this 
matter; in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it dictates the 
minimum requirements to ensure freedom of broadcasting, on the basis 
of which Member States regulate the sector in their specific countries. 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 See MASTROIANNI R. (1997) ‚Telecomunicazioni e televisioni‛, CHITI P. 
and GRECO G., Trattato di diritto amministrativo europeo, vol. II, Giuffrè, p. 1187; 
STROZZI G. and MASTROIANNI R. (1999) ‚La disciplina comunitaria delle 
attività televisive: recenti sviluppi in tema di tutela del pluralismo e la revisione 
della direttiva ‘Televisione senza frontiere’‛, ZACCARIA R. (ed.) Informazione e 
telecomunicazione, CEDAM, pp. 476-477. 
78 D’ARIENZO M. (2005) Profili costituzionali e regimi amministrativi nell’assetto 
del sistema radiotelevisivo, Editoriale Scientifica, p. 27. 
79 See ECJ Case Judgments C-33/74 - Van Binsbergen of 03.12.1974, [1974] ECR 
1299, and C-52/79 - Debauve of 18.03.1980, [1980] ECR 833. 
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4.4. Pluralism of information in the Nice Charter. 
Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
no. 364/01 signed in Nice on December 7, 2000, entitled ‚Freedom of 
expression and information‛, says that ‚1. Everyone has the right to freedom 
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. 2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be 
respected‛. Although this article has much in common with Article 10 of 
the ECHR it differs in part. In fact the expression ‚freedom and pluralism 
of the media shall be respected‛ promotes the pluralism of information as a 
principle of the European system.  
No longer a simple restraint on private initiative applied for 
competition reasons, pluralism of information has become a ‚value‛ of 
equal rank to those listed in Article 2 of the EU Treaty: "The Union is 
founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member 
States in a Society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail." Violation of the 
pluralism of information principle therefore represents an offence 
punishable under Article 7 of the EU Treaty, which requires European 
Council intervention if there is a ‚clear risk of a serious breach by a 
Member State‛. This was confirmed by the European Parliament 
Resolution of 15.01.2003. 
However, it should be stressed that Article 7 makes effective protection 
of the principle difficult, since European Council intervention in 
defence of pluralism is possible only when the breach is serious.  
Furthermore, the ECJ does not appear to provide much protection of 
pluralism either, because its jurisdiction is limited to verifying the 
procedural aspects of infringement control by the European Council. 
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4.5. Pluralism of information content.  
Under Article 10 of the ECHR as well as Article 11 of the Nice Charter, 
the European Union is committed to the protection of pluralism of 
information as an essential pillar of the right to information and 
freedom of expression. 
In fact since the early nineties there has been much discussion on 
pluralism of information content within the European Union. The 
European Commission published a series of documents in order to 
stimulate debate on the need for Community action in this field. The 
various consultations led to the conclusion that at present it would not 
be appropriate to submit a Community initiative on pluralism. At the 
same time, the European Commission underlined that it would 
continue to monitor the situation closely80. 
The audiovisual and media sectors are central areas for economic 
growth and for the fulfilment of the Lisbon agenda. Yet concentration 
of ownership and restrictions on market access limit the potential of the 
European economy. The protection of pluralism of information is 
essential for the harmonious development of the audiovisual and 
media sectors, although smaller and specific markets may not provide 
the economic basis for more than one player. 
Pluralism of information is closely connected with the principles 
underlying the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (2007/65/EC) of 
December 11, 2007 (hereinafter the ‚AVMSD‛ or the ‚Directive)81 
                                                          
80 See Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union, SEC 32 
16.01.2007 [online]. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/media_
pluralism_swp_en.pdf.  
81 Directive 2007/65/EC, OJ L 332 of 18.12.2007 amended the Television without 
Frontiers Directive and renamed it the "Audiovisual Media Services Directive". 
The amended directive came into force on 19.12.2007. Member States have two 
years to transpose the new provisions into national law, so that the modernised 
legal framework for audiovisual media services will be fully applicable by the 
end of 2009. The AVMSD provides a comprehensive legal framework that 
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which is concerned with the free movement of European television 
broadcasts, free access to important events, promotion of independent 
European and recently produced works, protection of minors and 
public order, protection of consumers through clearly recognisable and 
transparent advertising and the right of reply, which are all basic 
pillars ensuring freedom of expression and information. 
                                                                                                                               
covers all audiovisual media services (including on-demand audiovisual media 
services), with less detailed and more flexible regulation and new rules on TV 
advertising that allow for better financing of audiovisual content. The new 
rules, which were called for by the European Parliament especially, respond to 
technological developments and aim to create a level playing field in Europe 
for emerging audiovisual media services. The Directive reaffirms the pillars of 
Europe's audiovisual model, which are cultural diversity, protection of minors, 
consumer protection, pluralism of information, and the fight against racial and 
religious hatred. In addition, the new Directive aims to ensure the 
independence of national media regulators. The innovation of the AVMSD lies 
in the fact that it covers all "audiovisual media services", which means both 
traditional television ("linear audiovisual media services") and video-on-
demand ("non-linear audiovisual media services"). The enlarged scope of the 
Directive responds to the increasing importance and relevance of on-demand 
audiovisual media services. There are stricter rules for television broadcasts 
concerning advertising and the protection of minors, due to the greater degree 
of choice and control users can exercise with regard to on-demand audiovisual 
media services. It defines audiovisual commercial communications broadly, to 
include sponsorship, product placement, teleshopping, etc. and subjects them 
to a common set of rules. To enforce the responsibility of the makers of 
audiovisual programmes, the Directive obliges audiovisual media service 
providers to indicate all relevant data necessary for identification. With regard 
to satellite broadcasters operating from outside the European Union, the 
AVMSD reverses the subsidiary jurisdiction criteria. The criterion of "satellite 
up-link in a Member State" has precedence over the criterion that the "satellite 
capacity appertains to a Member State". This means that when a broadcaster 
established outside the Union uses a satellite up-link in one of the Member 
States, that Member State will have jurisdiction. When there is no up-link inside 
the European Union, the Member State to which the satellite capacity 
appertains will have jurisdiction. 
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The AVMSD obliges Member States to encourage such mechanisms at 
national level in the fields it covers. The Directive recognizes both the 
existence and the role of Member States' independent regulators. It 
envisages close cooperation between national regulators and the 
European Commission, notably on issues of jurisdiction, in order to 
ensure the correct application of the Directive. The national authorities 
can set out ex ante regulation while the European Commission 
intervenes only ex post in ruling on infrastructure matters. 
Pluralism of information is a concept that embraces mainly two aspects: 
(i) diversity of ownership, i.e. external pluralism and (ii) variety in 
sources of information and in the range of content available, i.e. internal 
pluralism82. 
With reference to external pluralism, the concentration of ownership is 
to be feared, since it may result in a skewed public discourse in which 
certain viewpoints are excluded or underrepresented. Furthermore, 
since some viewpoints are represented while others are marginalized, 
abuse of political power can occur through the lobbying of powerful 
interest groups – political, commercial and so on. Although pluralism 
of ownership is important, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for ensuring pluralism of information. Media ownership rules need to 
be complemented by other provisions. 
Indeed, internal pluralism is best guaranteed by a diversity of output 
and/or content, which can be stimulated and monitored by imposing 
programme requirements and obligations in the law or licence. It can 
be achieved by imposing structural obligations such as the creation of 
management or other bodies that are responsible for 
programme/content selection. These measures ensure citizens' access to 
a variety of information sources, views, voices etc., in order that they 
may form their opinions without the undue influence of one dominant 
opinion-forming power.  
                                                          
82 See ZACCARIA R. (2006) Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, 
CEDAM, p. 95 onwards. 
 57 
Obviously, discussion of media pluralism must also reflect the reality 
of the market and the structure of the media. During the past few years 
discussion has mainly been predicated on the notion that print, 
television, radio and the upcoming new media were separate. However 
the media today face radical changes and restructuring as a result of 
new technologies. We agree with those83 who consider pluralism to be a 
‚relative‛ concept, shaped by technological reality and the structure of 
the market. The aim should be to allow access to the full range of 
information sources and if the technological profile changes then the ex 
ante regulation should also be modified. For example, in European 
legislation the main way of guaranteeing pluralism in the television 
sector was to limit the number of channels that could be controlled by 
any broadcaster; with the switch-off of the analogical signal and the 
passage to a purely digital signal, new ex ante regulation has become 
necessary, governing for example the resources controlled by operators 
as well as the number of channels84. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6. Broadcasting finance and the competition rules. 
Article 86 (2) of the EU Treaty precludes the application of competition 
rules to firms engaged in a service of general interest only when it 
might prevent the fulfilment of the mission assigned to them. Thus the 
broadcaster who receives financial resources from the State, since it 
performs a service of general interest, is obliged to broadcast certain 
kinds of programme, but balanced programming also has to be able to 
                                                          
83 MASTROIANNI R., ‚Il protocollo sul sistema della radiodiffusione 
pubblica‛, supra at footnote 73. 
84 For example in Italy, Law 177 of 31.07.2005 and Law 249 of 31.07.2007. 
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maintain a certain level of audience85. According to the Commission 
Resolution of January 25, 199986 the license fee paid by viewers to the 
broadcasting company, together with capital investment, debt relief 
and direct financing by the state of that company are all forms of state 
aid that are subject to Article 87 (3), letter d) of the Treaty87. In fact the 
                                                          
85 See MASTROIANNI R., ‚Il protocollo sul sistema della radiodiffusione 
pubblica‛, supra at footnote 73. 
86 OJC, 05.02.1999, no. 30. The Communication proclaimed the following 
principles: ‚(1) The Amsterdam protocol confirms that it is the unanimous will 
of the Member States to stress the role of public service broadcasting; (2) thus 
the provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall be 
without prejudice to the competence of Member States to provide for the 
funding of public service broadcasting insofar as such funding is granted to 
broadcasting organisations for the fulfilment of the public service remit as 
conferred, defined and organised by each Member State, and insofar as such 
funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community 
to an extent which would be contrary to the common interest, while the 
realisation of the remit of that public service shall be taken into account; (3) the 
fulfilment of the public service broadcasting's mission must continue to benefit 
from technological progress; (4) broad public access, without discrimination 
and on the basis of equal opportunities, to various channels and services is a 
necessary precondition for fulfilling the special obligation of public service 
broadcasting; (5) according to the definition of the public service remit by the 
Member States, public service broadcasting has an important role in bringing to 
the public the benefits of the new audiovisual and information services and the 
new technologies; (6) the ability of public service broadcasting to offer quality 
programming and services to the public must be maintained and enhanced, 
including the development and diversification of activities in the digital age; (7) 
public service broadcasting must be able to continue to provide a wide range of 
programming in accordance with its remit as defined by the Member States in 
order to address society as a whole; in this context it is legitimate for public 
service broadcasting to seek to reach wide audiences‛. 
87 See DANIELE L. (2006) Diritto del mercato unico europeo, Giuffrè, p. 247 
onwards; BIONDI A. (2006) ‚Gli aiuti di Stato‛ FRIGNANI A. and PARDOLESI 
R. (eds.) La concorrenza, Giappichelli Editore, p. 447 onwards.  
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Commission Communication of November 15, 200188 says that ‚the 
system of public broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to the 
democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve 
media pluralism *…+ The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community shall be without prejudice to the competence of Member States to 
provide for the funding of public service broadcasting insofar as such funding 
is granted to broadcasting organisations for the fulfilment of the public service 
remit as conferred, defined and organised by each Member State, and insofar as 
such funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the 
Community to an extent which would be contrary to the common interest, 
while the realisation of the remit of that public service shall be taken into 
account”. 
First the European Commission needs to consider whether the state 
financing of broadcasters may be regarded as "existing aid" under 
Article 88 (1), which requires the Commission to "keep under constant 
review all systems of aid existing in those States. It shall propose to the latter 
any appropriate measures required by the progressive development or by the 
functioning of the common market". Under Article 1, letter b), point i) of 
Regulation 659/1999/CE, existing aid is ‚all aid which existed prior to the 
entry into force of the Treaty in the respective Member States, that is to say, 
aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still 
applicable after, the entry into force of the Treaty‛. If at the end of the 
evaluation the European Commission thinks that it counts as existing 
state aid, it follows a different procedure because it cannot issue the 
state with a penalty for lack of notification89. The Commission first 
                                                          
88 OJC, 15.11.2001, no. 320. See also CORTESE B. (2007) ‚Il testo unico della 
radiotelevisione e la disciplina comunitaria in materia di aiuti di stato e libera 
concorrenza: alla ricerca di un equilibrio tra tutela del mercato e garanzie del 
pluralismo‛, in CARLASSARE L. (ed.) Il pluralismo radiotelevisivo tra pubblico e 
privato, CEDAM, p. 73. 
89 For the differing areas of competence of the European Commission and the 
Member States see CAGIANO G. (2006) ‚Il ruolo della Commissione per la 
compensazione del servizio pubblico nella disciplina generale e televisiva‛, 
Studi sull’integrazione europea, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 70 onwards; SINAGRA A. (2001) 
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needs to verify the fulfilment of the exemption conditions of Article 87 
(2) and (3), and then the authorization envisaged in Article 86 (2) can 
only be given if the following conditions also apply: ‚The public service 
remit should be entrusted to one or more undertakings by means of an official 
act (for example, by legislation, contract or terms of reference)” and “the 
public service broadcaster be formally entrusted with the provision of a well-
defined public service. It is also necessary that the public service be actually 
supplied as provided for in the formal agreement between the State and the 
entrusted undertaking‛. Furthermore ‚Public service duties” imposed on 
the public broadcaster “may be either quantitative or qualitative or both. 
Whatever their form, they could justify compensation, as long as they entail 
supplementary costs that the broadcaster would normally not have incurred”. 
Finally ‚the Commission requires a clear and precise definition of the public 
service remit and a clear and appropriate separation between public service 
activities and non-public service activities. Separation of accounts between 
these two spheres is normally already required at national level to ensure 
transparency and accountability when using public funds. A separation of 
accounts is necessary to allow the Commission to carry out its proportionality 
test‛90. 
Moreover the European Court of Justice has set out further criteria for 
funding to be considered valid which are outside the scope of Article 87 
(Altmark Case)91. These include: (i) the expectation of certain 
obligations on the part of the company or other entity providing the 
public service, (ii) the transparent and objective determination of the 
economic criteria for the provision of financing, (iii) the limit of net 
                                                                                                                               
La disciplina comunitaria del settore televisivo. Con riguardo all’ordinamento italiano, 
Giuffrè, p. 59 onwards. 
90 See POLETTINI F. (2007) ‚Antitrust televisivo: da Gasparri a Gentiloni‛, 
Diritto Industriale, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 246 onwards. 
91 ECJ, 24.07.2003, C-280/00. 
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additional costs beyond which the benefit cannot be granted (iv) the 
comparison with normal, healthy and properly managed enterprises92. 
In addition, the rules of competition law are applied to the 
broadcasting sector in order to enforce pluralism of information by 
enhancing cultural debate and increasing the choice of programmes. 
Private broadcasting companies can also observe the duties imposed on 
the public company but they are not obliged to. Often they choose to 
observe the regulations applied to the public broadcaster in order to 
obtain subsidies or some fiscal advantage93. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7. Pluralism of information: the regulation of Italian 
broadcasting. 
In Italy the first legal measure governing pluralism in the broadcasting 
sector was Law 395 of 1910 by which the Italian Government reserved 
for itself the right to install and use broadcasting equipment. At that 
time the exclusive rights referred only to technical aspects (i.e. the 
equipment) and not to broadcasting tout court. The legislation changed 
                                                          
92 See BIONDI A., ‚Gli aiuti di Stato‛, supra at footnote 87; MARTINELLI M. 
(2004) ‚Aiuti di Stato e compensazioni di obblighi di servizio pubblico: atto 
secondo‛, Servizi pubblici e appalti, No. 1, p. 108 onwards; FRATINI A. and 
FILPO F. (2005) ‚Verso una nuova disciplina comunitaria in materia di aiuti di 
Stato per la compensazione di oneri di servizio pubblico‛, Rassegna Giuridica 
dell'Energia Elettrica , p. 15 onwards. 
93 D’ALFONSO S. (2003) Pluralismo dell’informazione e mezzi di comunicazione, 
Giappichelli Editore, p. 38. 
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in response to the technical evolution of the equipment and 
infrastructure94. 
Royal Decree 2191 of 14 October 1924 established exclusive state 
control over broadcasting, and granted a concession of six years to a 
single company, composed of a group of radio stations, named Unione 
Radiofonica Italiana (U.R.I.). To obtain the concession, the company 
agreed to observe a number of conditions concerning stakeholder 
control and management which the state imposed in order to maintain 
its power over it. State influence on the company became even stronger 
in 1927 when Royal Decree 2207 transformed the U.R.I. into the Ente 
italiano per le audizioni radiofoniche (E.I.A.R.) and transferred the 
controlling stake in the company to the Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale (I.R.I.), the public institution that managed the state’s shares 
in all companies. In 1947 the E.I.A.R. changed its name to RAI – 
Radiotelevisione Italiana and with that name it was the sole public 
concession holder for about thirty years. 
In the meantime some private companies started to broadcast their own 
channels using some free frequencies but problems of interference 
occurred. For this reason legislation to regulate the sector become 
necessary and on April 14, 1975 the Italian Parliament passed Law 103, 
the first to govern the broadcasting sector as a whole.  
After a key ruling by the Italian Constitutional Court (no. 202 of July 28, 
197695), liberalization of the broadcasting sector began, a process that 
                                                          
94 See CARETTI P. (2002) Diritto pubblico dell’informazione e della comunicazione, Il 
Mulino, p. 61; SANDULLI A.M. (1987) ‚Radioaudizioni‛, Enc. del dir., Giuffrè, 
p. 191 onwards; CAPOTOSTI P.A. (1980) ‚Modelli normativi della concessione 
radiotelevisiva: il problema del servizio pubblico‛, BARILE P., CHELI E. and 
ZACCARIA R. (eds.) Radiotelevisione pubblica e privata in Italia, Il Mulino, p. 93 
onwards; PALADIN L. (1979) ‚Problemi e vicende della libertà di informazione 
nell’ordinamento giuridico italiano‛, in PALADIN L. (ed.) La Libertà 
d’informazione, UTET, p. 2 onwards; ZACCARIA R. (1977) Radiotelevisione e 
Costituzione, Giuffrè, p. 19 onwards; SANTORO E. (1969) ‚L’evoluzione 
legislativa in materia di radiodiffusioni circolari: notizie e spunti”, Dir. radiodif., 
pp. 3 onwards. 
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continues to this day96. The laws that followed were responses to 
various rulings by the Constitutional Court, which played a key role in 
promoting legislation governing the broadcasting sector97. Examples 
are Italian Constitutional Court ruling no. 225 of July 10, 197498, which 
was followed by the above-mentioned Law 103 of April 14, 1975; ruling 
no. 826 of July 14, 198899, the origin of the so-called ‚mixed system‛, 
followed by Law 223 of August 6, 1990 (named the ‚Mammì Law ‛ 
after its parliamentary sponsor); ruling no. 420 of December 5, 1994100, 
followed by Law 247 of July 31, 1997 (the ‚Maccanico Law‛); ruling no. 
466 of November 20, 2002101 and Law 112 of May 3, 2004 (the ‚Gasparri 
Law‛) and Law 177 of July 31, 2005 (the ‚Consolidated Law on 
Television‛)102. We shall discuss these acts in more detail in the next 
section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
95 See Gazz. Uff. no. 205 of 4.08.1976. 
96 See ZACCARIA R., Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, p. 1, supra at 
footnote 82. 
97 See FARES G. (2008) L’apertura del mercato radiotelevisivo, Giappichelli Editore, 
p. 1. 
98 See Gazz. Uff. no. 187 of 17.07.1974. 
99 See Gazz. Uff. no. 169 of 20.07.1988. 
100 See Gazz. Uff. no. 291 of 14.12.1994. 
101 See Gazz. Uff. no. 47 of 27.11.2002. 
102 For a description of the evolution of broadcasting regulations in Italy see 
ZACCARIA R., Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, supra at footnote 
82, p. 231 onwards. 
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4.8. Antitrust limits in the ex ante regulation of 
broadcasting in Italy until 2002. 
Initially the intervention of the Italian Constitutional Court in defence 
of pluralism of information was necessary, since the scarcity of 
television frequencies in the broadcasting sector meant that the need to 
provide a public service had to be balanced with the need for 
affordability by private enterprises. In Italy, the state has a monopoly 
on the radio spectrum, and it allows private companies to use 
broadcasting frequencies under concession (ruling no. 225 of July 10, 
1974)103. 
The Court also set out the characteristics of television. In its opinion 
television is a means of spreading ideas, due to its well-known capacity 
for immediate and widespread circulation in the social field thanks to 
its penetration into people’s homes. It uses the evocative force of 
images and words, so that it has a special capacity for persuasion, 
influencing public opinion and social habits more than the press.104 
For these reasons legislators have intervened to impose limits on 
television broadcasting that are stricter than those on any other means 
of communication, such as print media. There is now a large body of 
regulations governing use of the radio spectrum in Italy, which also 
seek to limit the market power of any operator deemed to be in a 
dominant position in the television market.  
In 1988 the Italian Constitutional Court emphasized the need to 
regulate access to the market by economic operators in order to protect 
pluralism of information in view of the progressive constitution of 
                                                          
103 ZACCARIA R. (1974), ‚L’alternativa posta dalla Corte: monopolio 
pluralistico della radiotelevisione o liberalizzazione del servizio‛, Giur. Cost. p. 
2177. 
104 Italian Constitutional Court Judgment 148 of 21.07.1981, Gazz. Uff. no. 207 of 
29.07.1981; see PARDOLESI R. (1998) ‚Etere misto e pluralismo annunciato‛, 
Foro It., I, c. 2477. 
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dominant positions in the television and publishing markets by private 
groups.105  
On this occasion the Court analyzed the concept of pluralism of 
information with special reference to television. It defined external 
pluralism as “a central principle of all democratic societies which is achieved 
above all, by enabling the largest technically possible number of participants to 
enter the field of public and especially private television broadcasting, in order 
for external pluralism to be real and not merely theoretical – so that people 
with different opinions can express themselves without the risk of being 
marginalised as a result of the concentration of technical and economic 
resources in the hands of one or few persons and without losing their 
autonomy" [our translation]. With reference to internal pluralism, it 
stated: "In other contexts, pluralism results from the concrete possibility 
afforded to all citizens to choose from a plurality of information sources. Such a 
choice would not be real if the citizens, to whom the audiovisual means of 
communication address themselves, were not able to receive programmes that 
guarantee the expression of heterogeneous tendencies in both the public and 
private sectors." [our translation].  
In 1990, taking into consideration the widespread practice of broadcasting 
without authorization or government concession and the emerging problems of 
interference between network frequencies on a local level, the Italian 
parliament intervened in the broadcasting sector with the Mammì Law, which 
established the responsibilities of public and private broadcasters and set 
quantitative limits on the combined ownership of broadcasting and publishing 
enterprises. Article 15 of the Mammì Law, regarding the prohibition of 
dominant positions within the media and the obligations of private concession 
holders, allowed a broadcaster to hold no more than 25% of total frequencies. It 
also specified that they could either a) hold up to three television networks on 
condition that they relinquished any previously acquired controlling stake in a 
company publishing daily newspapers; or b) hold up to three broadcasting 
concessions and a minority stake in a publishing company; and c) hold a 
maximum of one or two broadcasting concessions and controlling stakes in 
                                                          
105 See Italian Constitutional Court Judgment 826 on 14.07.1988, supra at 
footnote 99. 
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companies publishing daily newspapers with a combined circulation of 
between 8% and 16% of the market106.  
In 1994 the Italian Constitutional Court ruled that the limit of 25% was too high 
and did not respect the principle of pluralism of information107. 
Thus the Maccanico Law of 1997 imposed new limits on the television 
sector. The Constitutional Court ruling of 1994 reduced the limit on 
control of the radio transmission spectrum to 20%, matching the 
criterion set for the printing sector, and imposed a new limit of 30% of 
national broadcasting sector revenues.  
The Maccanico Law envisaged a transitional period for the final 
implementation of these limits. This period was to be established by the 
Italian Communications Authority which, however, was in danger of 
postponing it indefinitely. Thus in ruling no. 466 of 2002108 the Italian 
Constitutional Court noted that nothing had changed with reference to 
the implementation of the antitrust limits set out in the Maccanico Law, 
and set December 31, 2003 as the deadline by which those limits should 
be enforced109. Any channels still exceeding the above-mentioned limits 
by that date would have to be broadcast only via cable or via satellite. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
106 In 1995 the referendum to limit ownership of television channels to just one 
per subject was not successful. See ZACCARIA R., Diritto dell’informazione e 
della comunicazione, p. 410-411, supra at footnote 82. 
107 Italian Constitutional Court Judgment 420 of 05.12.1994, supra at footnote 
100. 
108 See Italian Constitutional Court Judgment 466 of 20.11.2002, supra at footnote 
101. 
109 See MAGNANI V., Radiotelevisione: per la Corte serve un termine certo al regime 
transitorio previsto dalla legge n. 249 del 1997 [online]. Available from 
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it. See also CUNIBERTI M. (2006) 
‚Televisioni e posizioni dominanti‛, CUNIBERTI M. et al., Percorsi del diritto 
dell’informazione, Giappichelli Editore. 
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4.9. The Gasparri Law and the Consolidated Law on 
Television. 
The last stage of the long journey of Constitutional Court jurisprudence 
regarding the broadcasting system was ruling no. 466 of November 20, 
2002 in which the Court declared the Maccanico Law to be 
unconstitutional since it did not set out a time frame for its 
implementation. Consequently, the Court set a deadline of 31 
December 2003 for the application of the 20% limit on control of the 
radio spectrum and the 30% limit on total revenues. 
Parliament therefore tried to pass a new law to reform the broadcasting 
system by that date and to implement the Constitutional Court ruling, 
considering that 20% of the radio spectrum would allow each operator 
to hold up to two channels broadcast over a maximum of twelve total 
frequencies, with dangerous consequences for the existing operators 
(Mediaset and RAI), who would have to give up part of their terrestrial 
frequencies and switch off one of their programmes. 
But the new law on the reform of broadcasting soon ran into trouble. 
On December 13, 2003 the Italian President of the Republic sent the bill 
for the reform of the broadcasting sector, promoted by Minister 
Gasparri, back to Parliament with a message that emphasized three 
basic points: 
 the text did not specify a realistic and short term within which the 
transition to Digital Video Broadcasting – Terrestrial (hereinafter 
‚DVB-T‛) was to take place; 
 the 20% limit on control of the Integrated Communications System 
(i.e. the total revenues of the various communications sectors) 
could still lead to the rise of dominant positions, and as such was 
contrary to what the Italian Constitutional Court had said in 
rulings no. 420 of December 5, 1994 and no. 466 of November 20, 
2002; 
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 there was a danger that excessive use of advertising would dry up 
freedom of expression110. 
For this reason at the end of 2003 a decree was approved by the 
government to prevent the enforcement of the time-limit envisaged in 
the Maccanico Law. That decree was later converted into Law no. 112, 
which came into force on May 3, 2004 (the ‚Gasparri Law‛). 
The Gasparri Law repealed Articles 2 and 3 of the Maccanico Law111 
and replaced the previous antitrust guidelines with Articles 14 and 15. 
In 2005 the government then issued the first Consolidated Law on 
Television (hereinafter the ‚Consolidated‛) which applied the dictates 
of the Gasparri Law to the letter112. 
Firstly the new law gave rise to some confusion between the rules on 
the total pluralism of information (which do not allow the 
consolidation of dominant positions) and antitrust laws (which merely 
prohibit abuse of a dominant position113). Indeed, the Maccanico Law’s 
technical limit of 20% remained but now it referred to a radio spectrum 
where broadcasting is conducted in digital format. Although the radio 
spectrum was the same, the new broadcasting technique increased the 
potential number of channels and created room for a much higher 
                                                          
110 See PACE A., Per una lettura “in controluce” del messaggio presidenziale su 
pluralismo e imparzialità dell’informazione [online]. Available from 
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it; OLIMPIERI P., Il messaggio del 
presidente della Repubblica sul pluralismo e l’imparzialità dell’informazione. Brevi 
considerazioni “a caldo” [online]. Available from 
www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it. 
111 See GRANDINETTI O. (2002) ‚TV: Dalla legge Maccanico al digitale‛, Giorn. 
Dir. ammin., 3; CASSESE S. (2002) ‚Il concerto regolamentare europeo delle 
telecomunicazioni‛, Giorn. Dir. Ammin., no. 6. 
112 See MAMMONE M. (2006) ‚La delega del testo unico in materia 
radiotelevisiva e il vincolo comunitario‛, Dir. Econom. Mezzi Comunic., p. 55 
onwards. 
113 See ZACCARIA R., Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, p. 410-411, 
supra at footnote 82. 
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number of operators because it allowed better exploitation of the same 
resource114. 
Article 15 of the Consolidated contains provisions that are more 
permissive with regard to advertising than the Maccanico Law, since 
the limit of 30% of total revenues was repealed. 
The Consolidated increased to 20% the percentage of hourly 
advertising, despite the Italian Council of State’s recommendation that 
this should be kept within the 18% limit115. 
Furthermore the Consolidated introduced a new economic concept, the 
‚ICS‛ (Integrated Communications System), with which to evaluate the 
new antitrust limit of 20%. The ICS includes all revenues from public 
financing, national and local advertising, sponsorship, Pay TV 
subscriptions and sales of newspapers, periodicals and books including 
electronic publishing over the Internet.  
This means that the basis for calculating the 20% limit has increased 
significantly (in the opinion of Il Sole 24 Ore the ICS is worth around 26 
billion euros annually). Therefore incumbent companies such as Rai 
and Mediaset could continue to increase their share of the advertising 
market despite the fact that the Italian Communications Authority had 
already stated that it considered them to hold a dominant position116. 
 
                                                          
114 ZENO-ZENCOVICH V. (2006) ‚Motivi ed obiettivi della disciplina della 
televisione digitale‛, in FRIGNANI A., PODDIGHE E. and ZENO-
ZENCOVICH V. (eds.) La televisione digitale: temi e problemi, p. 11.  
115 See Council of State Opinion, Section II, 16.01.2002 and 10.07.2002, issued at 
the request of Agcom. 
116 For criticism of the Consolidated antitrust limits see GRANDINETTI O. 
(2006) ‚Il Testo Unico sulla radiotelevisione‛, Giorn. Dir. ammin., p. 124 
onwards; POLETTINI F. (2005) ‚Concorrenza nel settore televisivo: il punto 
dopo il varo del Testo Unico‛, Diritto industriale, 6, p. 591; POLETTINI F., 
‚Antitrust televisivo: da Gasparri a Gentiloni‛, supra at footnote 90, p. 244 
onwards; DE BENEDETTI F. (2007) Quarantacinque percento, Soveria Mannelli, 
p. 23 onwards; ZACCARIA R., Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, 
supra at footnote 82, p. 410-411. 
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4.10. The secondary market for the sale of frequencies. 
The Italian broadcasting system has been called "mixed", since all 
broadcasting platforms compete for the purchase or the production of 
audiovisual products, thus influencing the price. The Consolidated 
abandons the idea of public service, intended as a service of general 
interest, placing broadcasting in the category of supply of services 
envisaged in Article 49 of the EU Treaty. 
This new regulation falls within the process of network convergence, 
which started in Italy with Decree 318 of September 19, 1997, issued 
under the influence of the EU117. 
The concession of terrestrial radio frequencies is no longer the 
fundamental means for allowing broadcasting, since other means of 
transmission are now used (e.g. cable and satellite). For this reason the 
Consolidated cited the need for ‚a general broadcasting licence‛, 
granted to service and network providers by the Ministry of 
Communications. Programme makers on the other hand have to 
register their channels with the Italian Communications Authority. This 
new practice was introduced experimentally by Resolution 
435/01/CONS of the Communications Authority, under Article 2-bis, 
paragraph 5 of Law No. 5 of January 23, 2001, and was converted into 
Law 66 of March 20, 2001. In any case the Consolidated subsequently 
enshrined the principle of comprehensive reform in view of the switch-
                                                          
117 See Green Paper no. COM/97/623 on the convergence of the 
telecommunications, media and information technology sectors and the 
implications for regulation in 1997. According to this paper, the Commission 
was to begin public consultation on the implications for Community regulation 
of the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information 
technology sectors. The outcome of this consultation was given in 
Communication COM/99/0108/final (no longer published) to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions. 
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off of the analogical signal which is supposed to be completed in Italy 
by the end of 2012118. 
At present, the openness of the market is evident. The frequencies 
remain a finite resource and state control via the granting of 
concessions for the terrestrial radio spectrum is still necessary, but the 
Digital Video Broadcasting market will allow the number of platforms 
involved in the sector to expand. The incumbent companies can sell or 
license their frequencies or a portion of them to newcomers, the owners 
of network licences who will succeed them. The sale will in any case be 
subject to approval by the Ministry of Economic Development and the 
Communications Authority119, but the frequencies will be traded in a 
‚secondary market‛120. This is what should happen in theory but in 
practice the selling-off of frequencies has been not very common. In fact 
although the number of DVB-T channels has increased dramatically, 
relatively few new platforms have entered into the market121. This is 
because content providers prefer to avoid the entry costs involved in 
building up their own network, relying instead on the infrastructure of 
                                                          
118 See the calendar for the switch-off in each region of Italy in the Ministry of 
Economic Development Decree of 10.09.2008. 
119 See Article 14 of Law 259 of 01.08.2003 (the Electronic Communications 
Code). 
120 See ZENO-ZENCOVICH V., ‚Motivi ed obiettivi della disciplina della 
televisione digitale‛, supra at footnote 114, p. 19, who also discusses the 
impossibility of withdrawing existent concessions and returning them to the 
state for fresh assignment, as an alternative to the secondary frequencies 
market. 
121 For example in Sardinia, where the switch-off was completed on 31.10.2008, 
only two new local platforms were created. See the Italian Communications 
Authority’s Annual Report of 2009 *online+. Available from 
http://www.agcom.it/Default.aspx?message=viewrelazioneannuale&idRelazion
e=17, pp. 81-83. However the number of local channels in the Region increased 
from the initial 16 up to the current 67. See the III Report on digital terrestrial 
television in Europe and in Italy written by DGTVi [online]. Available from 
http://www.dgtvi.it/stat/Allegati/DIGITA_n_5_novembre_08.pdf, p. 2. 
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existing platforms. In this way content providers maintain control over 
their content and licence or sell their products to more than one 
platform who can package them as they prefer. This enables them to 
control access to content by the various platforms despite the European 
Commission’s call for translation of the network neutrality principle to 
the television sector.122  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.11. The Italian guidelines for switching off the analogical 
signal and conversion to DVB-T. 
The Italian regulatory framework on DVB-T has yet to be defined. 
Among other reasons, this is because the European Commission has 
expressed doubts concerning the anti-competitive effects of Article 2bis 
of Law 66/01 and Articles 23 and 25 of the Gasparri Law, which are 
held to infringe Article 9 of Directive 2002/21/EC and Articles 3, 5 and 7 
of Directive 2002/20/EC. Furthermore, until recently, Italian law 
attributed special rights to the existing analogical operators, thereby 
infringing Articles 2 and 4 of Directive 2002/77/EC, which require the 
abolition of such special rights123.  
                                                          
122 See Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union, supra at 
footnote 80. 
123 The Commission sent Italy a letter of formal notice as part of infraction 
procedure no. 2005/5086 following a complaint from the Italian consumers’ 
association Altroconsumo claiming that the Italian legislation regulating the 
passage from analogical to digital terrestrial broadcasting technology infringes 
EU Directives 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), 2002/20/EC (Authorisation 
Directive) and 2002/77/EC (Competition Directive), as well as other provisions 
of EU law. 
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For this reason, on June 6, 2008 the Italian Parliament modified the 
offending articles of the Consolidated by passing Article 8-novies and 
8-decies of Law 101/2008, and on September 10, 2008124, the Ministry of 
Economic Development issued a calendar for the implementation of the 
switch-off of the analogical signal. 
Subsequently, in response to the letter of formal notice regarding 
infringement procedure no. 2005/5086 brought by the European 
Commission against Italy, on April 7, 2009 the Italian Communications 
Authority, which is responsible for the implementation of the switch-
off, issued Regulation 181/09/CONS, setting out the criteria for the 
complete digitalization of terrestrial television in Italy  
The Italian Communications Authority (hereinafter ‚Agcom‛) used the 
phrase ‚horizontal entry model‛ to refer to the regulatory model based 
on three distinct regimes governing the three main players in DVB-T 
(content providers, service providers, network operators), which was 
introduced by Law 66 of 2001 and Regulation 435/01/CONS. 
It limited to 20% the proportion of digital terrestrial television 
programmes that can be broadcast by a single provider at national 
level. 
Until the implementation of the total switch-off across the country, 40% 
of the transmission capacity is reserved for content providers that are 
independent of any network operator. The frequencies can be obtained 
by means of the so-called ‚frequency trading‛ envisaged in Resolution 
No. 109/07/CONS of March 7, 2007, in accordance with the handbook 
issued by Resolution No. 645/07/CONS. Agcom states that firms that 
are not vertically integrated (that is enterprises that do not own 
broadcasting infrastructure but rent it without any broadcasting 
licence) can also compete for the assignment of frequencies. 
                                                          
124 According to Article 1, paragraph 6, letter c), n. 6, of Law 249 of 1997 and 
Article 29 of Legislative Decree 259, 2003, the Ministry of Economic 
Development (formerly Ministry of Communications) invites candidates to 
compete for rights to use television frequencies in accordance with procedures 
established by the Communications Authority . 
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In the case of vertically integrated national players, the structural 
separation between content providers and network operators is 
necessary but only for DVB-T and not for cable or satellite 
broadcasting. The framework of digital terrestrial television is 
complemented by a set of ‚best practice‛ rules aimed at safeguarding 
the interests of third parties, such as the requirement for network 
operators to not discriminate in providing transmission capacity to 
third parties. For example all analogical operators who have invested in 
the process of digitization are entitled to convert each analogical 
network they have into a digital one. 
The allocation of frequencies to network operators as a result of the 
switch-off has to be conducted in accordance with EU Directives on 
DVB-T and is therefore required to exploit the digital dividend (i.e. ‚the 
spectrum over and above the frequencies required to support existing 
broadcasting services in a fully digital environment, including current public 
service obligations”125). 
Agcom will apply the SFN (Single Frequency Network) technique126 in 
order to allow for the largest possible number of television channels in 
each region, which will be divided between national networks and 
local networks. One third of these is reserved, in accordance with 
existing legislation, to local television stations. 
The allocation plan provides for 21 DVB-T multiplexes with national 
coverage, accounting for approximately 80% of the spectrum, and a 
further 4 national networks to be used for Digital Video Broadcasting 
Handheld (hereinafter ‚DVB-H‛). 
Agcom guarantees appropriate safeguards for the significant 
investments made in the past by existing analogical television 
                                                          
125 See European Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions 
(COM/2007/700) of 13.11.2007 [online]. Available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0700:FIN:EN:PDF. 
126 The SFN technique has already been used successfully in the Sardinia 
Region. 
 75 
companies by assigning at least one multiplex to each broadcaster, 
taking into account technological developments such as High 
Definition (HD) and interactivity. In accordance with the principle of 
non-discrimination, this rule will also apply to Europe 7, recently 
assigned a TV channel. 
Based on these criteria the conversion of all channels currently 
broadcast via the analogical transmission system would require 8 out of 
the 21 multiplexes available for national DVB-T networks. 
In accordance with the administrative procedure, the national and local 
network operators operating legitimately by virtue of their acquisition 
of spectrum frequencies on the basis of Article 2-bis, paragraph 2 of 
Law 66 of 2001 and Article 23, paragraph 3 of Law 112 of 2004, have to 
relinquish the analogical frequencies they currently use in each region 
and return them to the state; in return, they will be assigned a single 
digital frequency for each network.  
The rationalization of existing DVB-H networks, deployed by operators 
through the trading of frequencies, allows the operators to keep the 
same frequencies and convert them into networks in recognition of the 
investments made for the development of such networks in compliance 
with the laws and regulations, and also in view of recent technological 
developments.  
Agcom has managed to ensure that the digital dividend is much higher 
in Italy than the average available in most European countries, and this 
is possible thanks to the use of SFN. 
A digital dividend of at least 5 national television networks, in addition 
to possible DVB-H networks, raises the possibility of allocating them 
through selective procedures based on objective, proportionate, 
transparent and non-discriminatory rules. 
The selective procedure is to be carried out in five lots divided into two 
stages as follows: (i) three lots are reserved for new entrants and 
incumbents with less than two national analogical television networks 
and (ii) two lots will be awarded by open tender in accordance with a 
beauty contest procedure. In any case, the number of assignable 
multiplexes is capped at 4. Thus in the case of the vertically integrated 
operators that currently operate 3 national analogical networks the cap 
is set at one additional multiplex. 
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In the case of the integrated operator that currently operates 2 national 
analogical networks the cap is set at two additional multiplexes. 
If any of the vertically integrated operators that currently have 3 
national analogical networks is the winner of the allocation procedure, 
it will be obliged to cede 40% of the transmission capacity of the 
additional multiplex to third party content providers that are not 
vertically integrated. If the vertically integrated operator which 
currently has 2 analogical television channels is the winner of two 
multiplexes in the allocation procedure, it will be obliged to give up 
40% of the transmission capacity of one of these two multiplexes to 
third party content providers that are not vertically integrated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.12. Regulation of the Digital Dividend: some criticism. 
Even though the regulation is not yet definitive, some authors have 
criticised Regulation 181/09/CONS of the Italian Communications 
Authority with reference to the allocation to third parties of the digital 
dividend, i.e. the frequencies that will remain free after switching off 
the analogical signal and converting to DVB-T, by the ‚beauty contest‛ 
procedure127. 
According to point 6, letter b) of the new ruling, Agcom reserves a fair 
number of frequencies for the existing broadcasters, to safeguard their 
investments and to allow them to continue their commercial activity, 
taking into account recent technological developments such as High 
Definition (HD) and interactive services. In this way the beauty contest 
                                                          
127 See VALLETTI T. (2009) Se lo Stato non vuole incassare il dividendo digitale 
[online]. Available from http://www.lavoce.info/articoli/pagina1001077-
351.html of 24.04.2009. 
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will be used for the minority of the spectrum, in accordance with a 
different approach from that of other countries where the majority of 
the freed-up spectrum will be assigned by auction. 
In UK for example ‚Ofcom is making preparations for the spectrum that will 
be freed up from switchover known as the digital dividend to be released. Last 
year [it] decided that the majority of the spectrum should be released through 
auction.‛ And in order “to align more of the digital dividend with other 
European countries *…+ This could significantly enhance the potential to 
create value through use of this spectrum for new wireless services, 
particularly mobile broadband in the UK and across Europe”128. 
In the United States in 2008 the government auctioned broadcasting 
frequencies corresonding to 700 MHz of bandwidth, earning $19 billion 
from the sale of licenses won mainly by Verizon, AT&T and new 
entrants.  
However, Italy does not have a consolidated tradition of assigning 
frequencies by auction. The only two auctions were held in 2000 and 
2008 for UMTS and Wimax technologies respectively. Indeed, analysts 
complain that the Italian Government often foregoes the high revenues 
arising from the sale of frequencies by auction. 
In addition to the economic benefits of public auctions for the allocation 
of frequencies, the auction selects the highest bidders for the radio 
spectrum, when demand is higher than supply. In contrast, reserving a 
large number of frequencies in favour of the existing broadcasters does 
not guarantee effective protection of pluralism of information and is 
not in line with the path taken by other Member States on the issue of 
exploitation of the Broadcasting Digital Dividend arising from the 
analogical switch-off129 . 
 
                                                          
128 See www.ofcom.org.uk/about/accoun/reports_plans/annrep0809/market/ of  
23.06.2009. 
129 See CAMBINI C. and VALLETTI T. (2009) ‚L’Asta fantasma‛ *online+. 
Available from http://www.lavoce.info/articoli/pagina1001188-351.html of 
3.07.2009. 
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4.13. Conclusions. 
On the basis of the above-described regulation in Italy it can be stated 
that pluralism of information in the country has made much progress 
but there is still a long way to go.  
Whatever happens, DVB-T is a good opportunity for the entrance of 
newcomers to the broadcasting sector. However, since the multiplexes 
will be assigned by the beauty contest method, based on the best 
broadcasting project, it will clearly be easier for the existing operators, 
who already have specific know-how in broadcasting, together with 
substantial capital to invest in technology and infrastructure. 
Companies that already enjoy a dominant position in the broadcasting 
sector are thus the favourites. 
Concerning the parameters used to evaluate dominance in the ICS, we 
need to make a few considerations. Firstly, the sale of advertising in 
television programmes constitutes a relevant market in which 
independent broadcasters sell space on their channels to advertisers, 
either in person or through dealers.  
The broadcasting industry has an important role in the European 
economy130. For this reason, as we have already said, the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive and the Consolidated relaxed the advertising 
constraints. 
As confirmed by the Italian Antitrust Authority in its deliberations on 
the purchase of advertising slots, investors think that television is not 
replaceable by any other means of communication. Therefore, the 
relevant market includes all advertising space on television (whether 
FTA or Pay TV), but not the space available in other media (such as 
radio or publishing)131. 
                                                          
130 RANIERI M. (2006) La libertà dell'esercizio dell'impresa di comunicazione di 
massa, Giappichelli, p. 33 onwards. 
131 According to the Italian Antitrust Authority (Resolution no. 15632 on 
28.6.2006, case A362, Football rights, in Bull. No. 26/2006, paragraph 28), 
investors consider advertisements on Free-to-air television to be substitutable 
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According to the Italian Antitrust Authority, this market is 
characterized by a "two sides" system in which television operators 
occupy an intermediate position between two distinct groups of 
customers: first, television platforms broadcast content to viewers; 
second, they sell advertising space to content providers at a price that 
depends mainly on the size of the first group, the audience132.  
In this context, the two main variables that drive the choice of an 
investor to buy TV advertising slots – and determine, therefore, the 
capacity of a platform to make advertising space available to the 
market – are: (i) the audience (i.e. the number of people reached by the 
programmes in which advertising is inserted), and (ii) the target (or 
type) of viewers to whom the television programme is addressed, 
which should coincide as much as possible with groups of potential 
customers for whom the advertising is intended.  
With reference to the structure of the Italian broadcasting market and 
its financial resources we can draw the following outline. 
According to the latest official figures from the Italian Communications 
Authority (for 2008), the Mediaset group occupies a dominant position 
in the market for the sale of advertising space on television, with a 
share of 55.1%. RAI follows with 27.9%, and Sky accounts for 5.9%133. 
                                                                                                                               
with advertisements on Pay-TV, but do not consider television advertising to 
be substitutable with advertising via other means of communication. 
Furthermore according to Agcom, advertising transmitted through different 
television platforms retains common characteristics in terms of competitive 
conditions. Thus the television advertising market can be considered as a single 
market, regardless of whether the message is conveyed over FTA-TV or Pay-TV 
(see Resolution No. 136/05/CONS on 1.03.2005, Gazz. Uff. of 11.03.2005, Annex 
n. 35, § 19). 
132 See the Consultation on Television by the Italian Antitrust Authority, IC23, 
enclosed with Resolution no. 13770 of 16.11.2004 (in Bull. No. 47/2004), p. 39. 
133 Annual Report 2009, p. 80 [online]. Available at 
http://www.agcom.it/Default.aspx?message=visualizzadocument&DocID=3239. 
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The Italian Antitrust Authority has also recognized the dominant 
position of Rai and Mediaset in the advertising market134. 
Indeed, as noted by the European Court of Justice (ruling of 13 
February 1979, Hoffmann-La Roche, paragraph 41 of the reasoning in 
Case 85/76), ‚very large shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional 
circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position." This ruling 
was cited in Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV, 1991, I-3359, § 60, which 
added: ‚That is the case where there is a market share of 50%‛135.  
Furthermore, according to data cited by the Italian Communications 
Authority, the Mediaset group and Sky are the only operators who 
have increased their market share compared to 2007, while in the same 
period of time RAI decreased its market share. 
With regard to the dominance of RAI, the legislation places stringent 
limits on the broadcaster concerning the sale of advertising space. As 
pointed out by the Italian Communications Authority, the transmission 
of advertisements by the general public broadcasting service licensee 
may not exceed 4% of weekly programming and 12 percent of any 
hour, and the excess must be recovered before or after the hour, 
without exceeding 2 percent in those adjacent hours. In contrast, for 
other broadcasters the limit is set at 18 percent per hour (Article 38, 
paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Consolidated). 
Moreover, as acknowledged by both the Antitrust Authority and the 
Communications Authority in Italy, the Rai and Mediaset groups have 
a decades-long dominance over the entire panorama of free-to-air TV in 
Italy136. In a further demonstration of this dominance, the Italian 
                                                          
134 See Italian Antitrust Resolution no. 15632 of 28.6.2006, Case A362, Football 
rights (in Bull. n. 26/2006). 
135 ECJ Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV of 03.07.1991 [1991] ECR I-3359, § 60. 
136 See AGCOM Resolution no. 544/07/CONS dated 31.10.2007 (available at 
http://www2.agcom.it/provv/d_544_07_CONS/d_544_07_CONS.htm), § 174, 
442 and 470. In § 470 of this Resolution, AGCOM noted that RAI and RTI had a 
joint dominant position in terrestrial analogical television. Therefore, in 
Resolution no. 159/08/CONS of 9.4.2008, AGCOM imposed a number of 
remedies on RAI and RTI. See also television survey no. IC23 by the Antitrust 
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Communications Authority obliged Mediaset to adopt transparent, fair 
and non-discriminatory practices in the sale of advertising space (see 
Article 1.1.d.2 of Resolution No. 136/05/CONS of the Italian 
Communications Authority), in order to avoid harming competition 
and pluralism in relation to other operators and customers as a result of 
its significant market power.  
Thus, all these remedies have been recently introduced in the Italian 
context to increase competition, to prevent the foreclosure of other 
companies interested in entering the market, and to safeguard the right 
of viewers to pluralism of information.  
Looking to the defence of pluralism of information and the further 
opening up of the television industry, some attempts have been made 
to amend the current regulatory system with reference to the limits on 
revenues. For example, recent reform proposals have focused on the 
advertising market, as it is widely believed that dominance in the 
advertising sector endangers pluralism of information by negatively 
affecting content production and distribution137. 
The idea was to cap the share of advertising revenues accruing to any 
single operator at 45%, in order to safeguard the pluralism of 
information138. 
A rational policy of supporting pluralistic provision of services should 
start from the consideration that the television market is founded on 
                                                                                                                               
Authority, which notes that the television market has the characteristics of a 
duopoly: because of the presence of Mediaset and RAI at all levels of the 
television industry (technical transmission services, advertising revenues, 
measurement of ratings), the two broadcasters have little incentive to compete 
fairly and tend to align their behaviour (see pp. 56, 103-105, 151-154, 157). 
137 BORRELLO R. (1988) ‚Cronaca di un'incostituzionalità annunciata (ma non 
dichiarata)‛, Giurispr. Costituz., p. 3960. 
138 See for example the bill drawn up by Communications Minister Gentiloni 
and subsequently dropped. See also MAZZOLENI G. and VIGEVANI G. (2006) 
‚L’anomalia italiana non è per niente finita”, Reset, 98, p. 36 onwards. For 
criticism see DE BENEDETTI F., Quarantacinque percento, p. 23, supra at footnote 
116. 
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the multi-sided markets theory. As already explained, a broadcasting 
platform offers at least two services that are complementary to the 
market: entertainment to the viewers on one side and advertising space 
to marketing companies on the other hand. 
In some cases the broadcasting companies get separate revenues from 
viewers and advertisers for the distinct services provided; this happens 
for example with Pay TV platforms. In other cases, as with FTA 
television, the system works differently, with the revenues from the 
sale of advertising space enabling the platform to broadcast content for 
free to viewers. 
The consequence of this phenomenon has been that the advertisers 
started to identify certain groups of consumers at whom their products 
should be targeted, and they started to select specific times of day 
when their advertising slots should be broadcasted. 
However the public was not conscious of asking for any specific 
content and moreover they were not paying a fair price for it. The 
viewer was simply considered to be more likely to appreciate some 
products than others. 
Thus in an FTA channel there is a relationship among three parties: i) 
the platform; (ii) the viewer; and (iii) the producer of the advertised 
good. 
The platform sells advertising space to the producer of the advertised 
good who pays a price for the service. The platform broadcasts 
entertainment content to the viewer who does not however pay any 
price for the received content. 
The producer of the advertised good is prepared to pay the platform 
for advertising space, so it has a role in determining the kind of 
entertainment the platform broadcasts and consequently what the 
viewers can watch on TV. In any case the transaction between the 
producer and the viewer is anomalous, since the latter has the power of 
influencing the production of the advertised goods by buying some 
products more than others in the shops, or more simply through 
audience share, at least in the long run. But in any event, the viewer 
cannot participate directly in the transaction with the FTA platform 
because it does not pay any price for watching the content.  
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If the television market was characterized only by FTA television there 
would be serious problems of allocative efficiency. In this context Pay 
TV, including video-on-demand services, represents a real step forward 
for the viewer, who would otherwise be cut out of a market dominated 
by advertising. This leads us to suppose that the market itself will 
spontaneously become more competitive and that the general antitrust 
rules described above are sufficient to regulate the market, although 
governments persist in interfering with the sector. Indeed, today a 
market share of 50% of total advertising revenue in the broadcasting 
market is considered illegal. 
But this approach could change, in consideration of the rapid 
development of broadcasting technologies now in progress. As in any 
other sector, it may be sufficient to apply the general antitrust rules 
against dominant companies, i.e. forbidding discrimination, predatory 
prices, and the binding and tying clauses that limit the advertisers’ 
freedom of choice; it may be that these rules can guarantee the 
pluralism of information as well139. 
However, despite the promising technological scenario, legislators 
continue to regulate this sector based on the opinion that resources are 
limited.  
At the moment the broadcasting market is made up of a small number 
of public and private oligopolistic companies that compete on the side 
of the resources and therefore in the advertising market. The 
consequence of this is that they excessively orient the entertainment on 
offer towards those programmes that gather the largest audiences 
among the type of public that is most sensitive to advertisements.  
Another aspect of competition among platforms is the quality of 
content they provide. Indeed, the different quality of the content can 
determine a significant variation in the attractiveness for the viewer, 
who will be more interested in some content types than others.  
                                                          
139 See LIBERTINI M., Report presented at the AREL seminar on Direttive per le 
comunicazioni elettroniche. Prime riflessioni, 1.11.2007, 2007/OC-4. 
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Content is divided into premium content and basic content. The former 
has greater appeal for the viewer (for example the final of the football 
world championship). The latter includes less popular events or 
content that has been already broadcast. In this case Pay TV can induce 
the consumer to subscribe through bundling of content and tying of 
services.  
To ensure access to impartial and pluralistic information, the viewer 
should be able to select content even via FTA TV, using video on-
demand for example.  
The market share of the broadcasting platforms is likely to diminish as 
users enjoy increasing choice in a market already near saturation in 
terms of the individual potential for consumption of audiovisual 
services within a 24-hour day.  
Moreover, escalating prices for premium content could subject 
platforms to budgetary pressures that might outstrip the capabilities of 
existing funding mechanisms. The issue is whether FTA broadcasters 
can continue to have access to attractive content in the face of fierce 
competition for the acquisition of programme rights. 
This is also stressed for example by point 3 of the AVMSD, which states 
that ‚Audiovisual media services are as much cultural services as they 
are economic services. Their growing importance for societies, 
democracy — in particular by ensuring freedom of information, 
diversity of opinion and media pluralism — education and culture 
justifies the application of specific rules to these services‛. 
Consumer protection is one of the aims of EU jurisprudence, so the 
state is expected to intervene to balance the interests at stake in the 
advertising market (e.g. economic distribution and freedom of 
expression on one side and copyright and consumer protection on the 
other)140.  
                                                          
140 See ECJ Case Judgment C-412/93 - Leclerc-Siplec of 09.02.1995, [1995] ECR I-
179, and the comment in FLAMINI E. (1995) ‚La televisione nella 
giurisprudenza comunitaria‛, Diritto Dell’Informazione, p. 579 onwards; see also 
ECJ Case Judgment C-245/01 - RTL Television of 13.12.2003, [2003] ECR I-12489. 
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The solution to the problem lies in the public nature of the broadcasting 
service. The role of competition watchdogs in this case remains 
essential, but their intervention ought to be ex post, not only in terms of 
regulating competitiveness among platforms, but also to safeguard 
viewers against unfair use of electronic communications.  
                                                                                                                               
See also RENZULLI A. (2005) ‚La sentenza RTL: verso un nuovo rapporto tra 
diritti fondamentali e libertà economiche nell’Unione europea”, Dir. Un. Eur., p. 
567 onwards. 
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Chapter 5 
_____________________________________________ 
Multi-sided broadcasting platforms and 
competition law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction. 
In antitrust and state aid cases (under Articles 81, 82 and 87 of the 
Treaty) and the merger notification within the broadcasting sector 
(under Regulation 139/2004), the European Commission described the 
relevant markets in which each economic operator involved in the 
platform (advertiser, content provider, viewer) carries out their 
activities. National competition watchdogs do not usually deviate from 
the descriptions of relevant markets made by the Commission. 
Identification of the relevant markets in the broadcasting sector is 
necessary for assessment of competition law infringement by platforms 
(inter-platform competition) or by the economic operators involved in 
the platform (intra-platform competition).  
According to Commission Communication No. 2004/C 101/07 and the 
Guidelines contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty141, the effect on 
Community trade must be interpreted in the light of direct or indirect, 
actual or potential trade flows between Member States. With reference 
to the possible violation of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, in assessing 
whether the impact is "significant", competition authorities must 
determine whether vertical agreements and the presence of a dominant 
                                                          
141 See OJC C 101/81 on 27.04.2004. 
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position throughout the territory of a Member State is likely to make 
access to the market so difficult as to bring about the foreclosure of 
competitors or customers. Let us now discuss the relevant markets of 
the broadcasting sector and the main antitrust cases under Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2. Relevant markets: a) the provision of TV services to 
end users. 
In terms of content delivery via a broadcasting platform, there are 
essentially two relevant markets: (a) the provision of TV services to end 
users; and (b) the acquisition of TV broadcasting rights. 
With reference to the provision of TV services to viewers, the relevant 
products and geographical markets must first be defined. 
Although the notifying party of a merger often tries to extend their 
relevant product by affirming that it includes the provision of both Pay 
TV and FTA TV channels, via all means of distribution (i.e. satellite, 
cable, and DBV-T), as well as the provision of nonlinear services such 
as pay-per-view (hereinafter ‚PPV‛) and video-on-demand (hereinafter 
‚VOD‛), the European Commission distinguishes between Pay TV and 
FTA TV products. 
Providers of these two products compete directly for the same content 
and audience. They have similar products on offer, and there is 
convergence of technology through digitalization. There is also 
convergence of business models in the sense that Pay TV operators are 
increasingly financed not only by subscription fees but also by 
advertising revenues, whereas FTA broadcasters (traditionally financed 
primarily via advertising revenues) have started offering encrypted 
channels for which viewers have to pay a monthly subscription fee. For 
this reason the European Commission's consistent practice of 
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considering the distribution of Pay TV and FTA TV as two separate 
product markets is being called into question142. 
The established distinction between Pay TV and FTA TV is based upon 
several features. Firstly, for the European Commission there is a 
difference in the type of financing of Pay TV as opposed to FTA TV. 
Pay TV establishes a commercial relationship between the content 
provider and the viewer, whereas FTA TV only establishes a 
relationship between the viewers and the advertisers. Secondly, while 
there is undeniably interaction between the two TV markets from the 
viewer's perspective, a distinction can be drawn based on whether the 
content is received for no specified cost or as the result of a subscription 
allowing access to certain programmes not otherwise available. 
Thirdly, from a viewer's perspective, the programmes and the 
"premium" content exclusively distributed via Pay TV are often not 
substitutable with programmes and content available on FTA TV. For 
this reason viewers do not consider Pay TV and FTA TV services as 
fully interchangeable. 
Obviously, the more attractive the products on offer from an FTA 
broadcaster, the smaller the incentive for a viewer to opt for a Pay TV 
subscription. However, this interaction does not render FTA TV a 
simple substitute for Pay TV, as demand-side substitutability is limited 
by the fact that, unlike Pay TV, viewers of FTA TV generally do not 
have to pay a subscription fee to get access to a particular type of 
content or programme. 
Finally, there are major differences with regard to the business models 
of the two types of broadcasters, which means that supply-side 
substitutability is limited. While FTA channels are chiefly financed by 
advertising revenues and, in the case of public broadcasters by public 
funds, Pay TV operators still largely rely on revenues stemming from 
                                                          
142 European Commission Case Decisions COMP/M.4504 – SFR/Télé2 France of 
04.12.2007; COMP/M.4204 – Cinven/UPC France of 13.07.2006; COMP/M.4338 – 
Cinven-Warburg Pincus/Casema-Multikabel of 06.09.2006; COMP/M.3411 
UGC/Noos of 17.05.2004, COMP/M.2876 Newscorp/Telepiù of 02.04.2003. 
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subscription fees and, to an insignificant extent, from advertising. 
Given these differences in financial models, Pay TV operators cannot 
readily switch to FTA TV in the short term and vice-versa, without 
incurring significant additional costs or risks.143 
As regards the Pay TV market, in many decisions the European 
Commission has also made a further distinction between classical or 
"linear" channels and non-linear channels such as PPV, "near-video-on 
demand" and VOD144. 
Whereas for the competition authorities there may be a clear distinction 
between types of content, they do not tend to break down the Pay TV 
market any further on the basis of the technical means of delivery. In 
other words, they do not distinguish between markets based on the 
different broadcasting technologies such as cable, satellite or DSL. The 
reason for this is that producers of Pay TV programmes usually want 
their channels to be distributed as widely as possible in order to 
maximise revenues and, at the very least, to have a presence on all the 
broadcasting platforms. 
According to the European Commission the relevant markets "for the 
provision of TV services to end-users" are national in scope, since they 
are national in nature or related to linguistically homogeneous areas145, 
primarily due to differences in regulatory regimes, cultural factors and 
other differences in the conditions of competition prevailing in the 
individual Member States (e.g. the structure of the market for cable 
TV). The restriction of broadcasting to national markets, including 
                                                          
143 See the European Commission’s note on the definition of relevant markets 
for the purpose of Community competition law, 97/C 372/03, paragraph 20. The 
short term is to be understood as ‚such a period that does not entail a significant 
adjustment of existing tangible and intangible assets.‛ 
144 See European Commission Case Decisions COMP/M.2211 Universal Studio 
Networks/De Facto 829 (NTL) Studio Channel Ltd. of 20.12.2000; COMP JV 37 
BskyB/Kirch Pay TV of 21.03.2000. 
145 See European Commission Case Decisions COMP/M.4504 – SFR/Télé2 France 
of 28.11.2006, COMP/M.4204 – Cinven/UPC France of 13.07.2006, COMP/M.3411 
UGC/Noos of 17.05.2004, COMP/M.2876 Newscorp/Telepiù of 02.04.2003. 
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encrypted satellite channels that could theoretically be received in 
neighbouring countries, also depends on content copyright 
considerations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3. Relevant markets: b) the acquisition of broadcasting 
rights (audiovisual content). 
According to the European Commission146, the audiovisual content 
market involves all "entertainment products" (e.g. films, sport, TV 
programmes and channels) that can be broadcast on TV. TV 
broadcasting rights belong to the creators of these products, who 
license them to broadcasters.  
The Commission distinguishes between the licensing of broadcasting 
rights for Pay TV and the licensing of broadcasting rights for FTA TV in 
terms of the way broadcasters use the content (e.g. different 
programming, specific target groups, packaging)147. Furthermore the 
Commission has also found that, from both a demand-side and a 
supply-side perspective, certain types of content bought by Pay TV 
operators are not substitutable with each other. For instance, a feature 
film and a made-for-TV film do not have the same value in terms of 
attractiveness to consumers; pricing structure and economic value are 
not the same, and suppliers of specific content are not able to switch 
production between different types of TV content. 
                                                          
146 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.5121 – 
NewsCorp/Premiere of 25.06.2008. 
147 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.2876 – NewsCorp/Telepiù, 
of 02.04.2003. 
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The European Commission considers (i) premium sports events, (ii) 
premium films148 and (iii) other TV content (such as documentaries, 
youth programmes, etc.) as separate markets. 
Premium sports events and premium films, which are expensive 
content, cannot usually be viewed on FTA TV. Rights to recent 
premium films and most regular football events with major teams tend 
to be acquired on an exclusive basis by Pay TV operators and constitute 
the essential factor (the driver) that leads consumers to subscribe to a 
particular Pay TV channel/platform. For this reason they must remain 
distinct from other TV content. 
In its most recent decision (COMP/M.5121 – News Corp/Premiere of 
June 2008), the European Commission preferred not to make any 
pronouncements concerning the differentiation of audiovisual content 
with reference to the Pay TV windows – VOD, PPV, 1st window, 2nd 
window – neither did it say anything about the distinction between US 
movies and European Movies. It only said that the public interested in 
European movies is a niche market, which might imply a separation of 
the market between US movies and European ones. The different 
appeal they have for the public determines the size of the audience who 
are interested in the platform that broadcasts them, so that the two 
kinds of movies have different markets. In addition, content shown in 
the 1st window of Pay TV cannot be substituted with content shown in 
the 2nd, just as live broadcasting of events cannot be substituted with 
delayed broadcasting.  
The European Commission considers that the markets for the 
acquisition of audiovisual TV content (films and other content) and for 
the production and acquisition of Pay TV channels are national in scope 
or relate to linguistically homogeneous areas. For this reason, 
audiovisual content is different from any other intangible content, like 
software products for example. Indeed, the European Commission 
pointed out that the software market is global since intangible products 
                                                          
148 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.2876 – NewsCorp/Telepiù, 
of 02.04.2003. 
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are broadly identical across different countries, customers consider 
offers from vendors from all parts of the world and there are no 
technological barriers that restrict vendors from supplying all over the 
world149.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4. Wholesale and retail markets for television services.  
The above-described relevant markets for a) the provision of TV 
services to end users and b) the acquisition of broadcasting rights for 
audiovisual content are simply the retail and wholesale markets for 
television services respectively. 
The former is the market where television companies provide television 
programmes to end-users, i.e. the viewers, independently of the 
transmission technique (cable, satellite and terrestrial)150. 
The geographical market for the retail distribution of broadcasting 
services is national in scope, mainly because it includes infrastructure 
and platforms which are not restricted to certain areas as is usually the 
case with cable networks. Initially the European Commission 
considered that the geographical market could be either limited to the 
coverage area of each cable operator or national in the case of platforms 
other than cable151. The European Commission stated for example that 
                                                          
149 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.5080 – Oracle/BEA, of 
29.04.2008. 
150 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.4521 – LGI/Telenet, of 
26.02.2007, paragraph 25. 
151 See European Commission Case Decisions COMP/M.4338, Cinven-Warburg 
Pincus/Casema-Multikabel of 06.09.2006; COMP/M. 4217, Providence/Carlyle//UPC 
Sweden of 02.06.2006. 
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if a separate market for transmission via cable is distinguished, this 
market should be defined geographically in such a way that each cable 
network constitutes a separate geographic market, given that those 
customers who are connected to a specific network can only be reached 
through that network152.  
In contrast, the wholesale market for the distribution rights of 
television services is the market where content providers and 
broadcasters negotiate the terms and conditions for the distribution of 
television content to end-users. Broadcasting platforms provide 
carriage (or transmission) services for signals based on different 
infrastructures (i.e. cable networks, satellite, DSL networks). 
Content providers are the enterprises that package radio or television 
content, either internally produced or bought from external suppliers, 
into channels. While content providers need transmission services 
provided by a network in order to reach the end-users (i.e. the 
viewers), the platforms need the content packaged by the content 
providers, which constitutes the products on offer to their subscribers. 
The European Commission admits that even though ‚it is conceptually 
possible to distinguish between the acquisition by the broadcasters of 
transmission services, on the one hand, and the acquisition of 
distribution rights over radio and television channels by the platform, 
on the other hand, there is in practice one single negotiation where both 
issues are jointly addressed‛153. 
Depending on the respective bargaining positions of the content 
provider and the platform concerned, the outcome of the negotiation 
will be that either the content provider will pay a fee for the 
transmission of the signal, i.e. a carriage fee, to the distributor, or 
alternatively the platform will pay royalties (or license fees) to the 
content provider. ‚Even when it is mutually agreed that the content provider 
                                                          
152 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.3355, 
Apollo/JPMorgan/Primacom, of 15.06.2004, paragraph 10. 
153 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.4521 – LGI/Telenet, of 
26.02.2007, paragraph 27. 
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pays a carriage fee and the platform pays royalties for the distribution of a 
given channel, the respective levels of both are closely linked.‛154 
Therefore the European Commission confirmed the fact that whenever 
content is supplied by third parties to a platform, there is a wholesale 
market for television rights and it makes no difference whether the 
content is integrated or not integrated in the platform. Thus when the 
platform is a multi-sided one and the programme maker pays a 
carriage fee to the platform, this means that the content provider is the 
purchaser of the signal carriage service and so the content provider and 
the platform share the broadcasting spectrum155. 
Furthermore the relevant wholesale market encompasses all categories 
of transmission infrastructure (i.e. cable networks, satellite, DSL 
networks), despite some exceptions. In the Cinven-Warburg 
Pincus/Casema-Multikabel and Providence/Carlyle/UPC Sweden 
cases156 for example, the European Commission concluded that the 
wholesale market for television services through cable networks 
constituted a separate product market compared to other transmission 
networks. This conclusion was based on the fact that in the countries 
concerned there was a very large penetration of cable (i.e. the majority 
of households were connected to a cable network) compared to other 
platforms and therefore other platforms were not substitutable from a 
TV content provider perspective; since cable penetration was so 
extensive, the platform was accessible from virtually all households157. 
Wholesale and retail markets are vertically connected, since activities in 
the upstream wholesale market have direct effects on the downstream 
retail market. Any anti-competitive behaviour in the wholesale market 
                                                          
154 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.4521 – LGI/Telenet, of 
26.02.2007, paragraph 27. 
155 See Chapter 2, section 2.5., letter a) of this dissertation. 
156 See European Commission Case Decisions COMP/M.4338, Cinven-Warburg 
Pincus/Casema-Multikabel of 06.092006; COMP/M. 4217, Providence/Carlyle//UPC 
Sweden of 02.06.2006. 
157 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.4521 – LGI/Telenet, of 
26.02.2007, paragraph 28. 
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has negative effects for the downstream market and so is subject to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5. Inter-platform competition and article 81 of the Treaty. 
Collusion among broadcasting platforms is forbidden under Article 81 
of the Treaty. Before examining European Commission decisions 
regarding the television sector, we shall first review the general rules 
under Article 81 of the Treaty and their application since Regulation 
1/2003 of December 16, 2002 came into force. 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty prohibits ‚all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, 
and in particular those which‛ fix purchase prices or other trading 
conditions, limit production, apply dissimilar conditions for equivalent 
transactions and impose supplementary contractual obligations (tying). 
However, according to article 81(3), these provisions are inapplicable 
under certain conditions, which we will describe subsequently. 
The European Commission gave up its monopoly on applying Article 
81(3), which, under Regulation 1/2003 is now directly applicable.158 In 
order to facilitate the application of Article 81(3) in accordance with a 
                                                          
158 ‚Agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) of 
the Treaty which satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall not be 
prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required‛. See Council 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16.12.2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, paragraph 1. 
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‚more economics-based approach‛, the Commission published a set of 
guidelines.159 
Undertakings are now required to do a self-assessment of whether an 
agreement that restricts competition under Article 81(1) might benefit 
from an exemption under Article 81(3). Each case must be assessed on 
its own merits by applying the guidelines reasonably and flexibly with 
reference to the following conditions.160 
According to the first condition of Article 81(3), any restrictive 
agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution 
of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress.  
According to the second condition of Article 81(3), consumers must 
receive a fair share of the efficiencies generated by the restrictive 
agreement. The concept of fair share implies that the passing-on of 
benefits must at least compensate consumers for any actual or likely 
negative impact. Within European competition policy, the only goal is 
to maximize "consumer" welfare. Therefore the distribution of the gains 
and pass-on issues are very important. 
In the context of the third condition of Article 81(3), the decisive factor 
is whether or not the restrictive agreement and individual restrictions 
make it possible to perform the activity in question more efficiently 
than would have been the case in the absence of the agreement or the 
restriction concerned.161 Once it is found that the agreement in question 
does indeed produce such efficiencies, then the indispensability of each 
restriction of competition flowing from the agreement must be assessed 
separately. A restriction is indispensable if its absence would eliminate 
or significantly reduce the efficiencies that follow from the agreement 
                                                          
159 European Commission, Communication of the Commission, Notice, 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ (C) 101/97, 
27.04.2004. 
160 European Commission, Guidelines on Article 81(3), paragraphs. 4 and 5. 
161 The question is not whether in the absence of the restriction the agreement 
would not have been concluded, but whether more efficiencies are produced 
with the agreement or restriction than in the absence of the agreement or 
restriction. 
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or make it significantly less likely that they will materialise. In this 
context it must be assessed whether individual restrictions are 
reasonably necessary in order to produce the efficiencies. 
According to the fourth condition of Article 81(3), the agreement must 
not afford the undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned. 
The application of the last condition of Article 81(3) requires an analysis 
of the various sources of competition in the market, the level of 
competitive constraint that they impose on the parties to the agreement 
and the impact of the agreement on this competitive constraint. In the 
assessment of the impact of the agreement on competition, it is also 
important to examine its influence on the various parameters of 
competition. Both actual and potential competition must be 
considered.162 
Application of article 81(3) to the broadcasting sector includes for 
example case COMP/C.2-37.398 of the European Commission in which 
an exemption under article 81(3) of the Treaty was granted for the 
arrangements under a joint agreement for the sale of the commercial 
rights to the UEFA Champions League signed between the Union of 
European Football Associations (UEFA) and its members.163 In its case 
decision the European Commission said ‚The Regulations of the UEFA 
Champions League provide UEFA, as a joint selling body, with the exclusive 
right to sell certain commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League on 
behalf of the participating football clubs. The joint selling arrangement 
restricts competition among the football clubs in the sense that it has the effect 
of coordinating the pricing policy and all other trading conditions on behalf of 
all individual football clubs producing the UEFA Champions League content. 
However, the Commission considers that such restrictive rules can be 
                                                          
162 See European Commission, Guidelines on Article 81 (3), paragraphs. 107 and 
108. 
163 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/C.2-37398 – UEFA 
Champions League of 23.07.2003. 
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exempted in the specific circumstances of this case.‛164 The Commission 
granted the exception because UEFA’s joint selling arrangement 
provided the consumer with the benefit of league-focused media 
products from this pan-European football club competition that were 
sold via a single point of sale and which could not otherwise be 
produced and distributed equally efficiently. In the words of the 
Commission: ‚The philosophy behind the Commission's insistence in giving 
the football clubs an opportunity for individual sale of such live TV rights is 
twofold. First, the efficiencies and benefits of joint selling can be argued where 
the joint selling body fails to find demand in the market for such rights. 
Secondly, maintaining competition between UEFA and the football clubs in 
bringing such rights to the market helps to avoid rights to the UEFA 
Champions League remaining unused, where there is demand for them. 
Football clubs should therefore also be able to meet demand from free-TV 
broadcasters”. 
In another case concerning the British Football Association Premier 
League (FAPL), the Commission considered the agreements per se not 
to be exempted since ‚the joint and exclusive sale of large packages of media 
rights created barriers to entry, various restrictions on the output of the FAPL 
limited the development of products and markets, and generally the sales 
policy led to foreclosure on downstream markets. The restrictions therefore led 
to further media concentration and hampered competition between media 
operators‛165. In this case the FAPL made some undertakings to the 
Commission, which it accepted without applying any sanction.  
The specific characteristics of the sport would appear to authorize 
agreements on rights distribution under a model of financial solidarity, 
as expressed for example in the declaration of the European Council in 
                                                          
164 Ibidem. 
165 See European Commission Case Decisions COMP/38.173 – Joint selling of 
the media rights to the FA Premier League on an exclusive basis of 30.04.2004; 
COMP/38.453 – FAPL+Sky –of 30.04.2004 . 
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Nice in December 2000166. On that occasion the Council encouraged the 
mutualisation of part of the revenue from the sales of TV rights, at the 
appropriate levels, as beneficial to the principle of solidarity between 
all levels and areas of sport. The Commission said that the model 
‚encourage[s] recruitment of young players, which serves to promote 
competition in European football. As a result of the financial policies 
implemented by UEFA, competition between clubs in Europe is enhanced and 
the number of competitors on the market is increased‛.167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6. Sport and television: from the Bosman case to the 
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. 
Sports and media are closely connected since sports broadcasting rights 
are fundamental for attracting viewers. Indeed, platforms seek to 
obtain the rights to the best sports events in order to increase their 
viewers together with their advertising revenues. 
                                                          
166 See Annex IV to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
364/01 of 07.12.2000. 
167 On this point see ECJ judgements in Case 36/74, Walrave v Union Cycliste 
Internationale [1974] ECR 1405, paragraph 4; Case 13/76, Donà v Mantero [1976] 
ECR 1333, paragraph 12; Case C-415/93, URBSF v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, 
paragraph 73; Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v Ligue 
francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union 
Européenne de judo (C-51/96) and François Pacquée (C-191/97) [2000] ECR 2549, 
paragraphs 41-42; Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-
Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB) 
[2000] ECR 2681 paragraphs 32-33. 
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But sport also has a social value and this has been underlined in the 
most recent European legislation and in the main competition policy 
decisions of the Antitrust Authorities, as described below. 
According to Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, which came into force on December 1, 2009168 after being 
amended by the Lisbon Treaty of 13 December 2007169, the Union has 
‚competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the 
actions of the Member States‛, the areas of such action to include sport. 
Article 165 of the same Treaty says that Union action is aimed at 
‚developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and 
openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible 
for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and 
sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen”. 
These provisions were introduced into the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon some months after the 
release of the White Paper on Sport170. The White Paper defined sport 
as any form of physical activity which, through organized 
participation, aims at expressing or improving physical fitness, 
developing social relationships or obtaining results in competition all 
levels. 
European Institutions encourage the practice of all sports activities, 
with special attention to combating negative phenomena such as 
doping. The European Court of Justice has pronounced on sport-
related cases on a number of occasions. The first was in 1974 in the 
Walrave and Kock case, when it said that sport is an economic activity 
under Article 2 of the EC Treaty, and that it must respect the law, 
particularly the provisions on free movement of workers171.  
                                                          
168 See the consolidated version in OJ C 115 of 09.05.2008. 
169 See OJ C 306 of 17.12.2007. 
170 See White Paper on Sport COM(2007) 391 of 11.07.2007. 
171 ECJ Judgment Case 36/74 – Walrave v Union Cycliste Internationale of 
12.12.1974 [1974] ECR 1405. 
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Also imortant to the field of freedom of movement was the Bosman 
case172, which for the first time called into question the system of 
transfer of players between football teams, totally altering the balance 
that had previously existed in relations between clubs. The Court 
essentially confirmed the principles of Walrave, with the difference that 
clubs were now forced to forego the training and promotion allowance 
(payable in the form of a ‚transfer fee‛ to the company at the time of 
football player’s sale to another club), which was considered an 
obstacle to free movement of sports players, contrary to the provisions 
of the Treaty. 
As a result of this ruling, many companies found themselves with huge 
budget problems, because the transfer fees had been highly lucrative. 
The Italian government tried to help football clubs in financial trouble 
by issuing the so-called ‛Decreto salva calcio‛173, which gave retroactive 
tax breaks to the clubs. Of course the European Commission took 
action, contesting the violation by Italy of Article 87 of the Treaty on 
State aid, and for this reason Italy repealed the Decreto salva calcio by 
Law No. 62 of April 18, 2005.  
The ECJ also made a revolutionary ruling on the question of doping. 
Setting aside a judgment by the Court of First Instance in a case 
brought by athletes Meca-Medina and Majcen, the ECJ said that the 
rules of doping are subject to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty since, 
although they have no economic value in that they are based on fair-
play and the spirit of sport (and if anything should be evaluated in the 
light of the Treaty’s provisions on the free movement of workers and 
                                                          
172 ECJ Judgment of 15.12.1995, Case C-415/93 Bosman. See the comments of 
MERONE G. (2007) ‚Lo sport nel diritto dell’Unione Europea‛, in TORTORA 
M., IZZO C.G. and MERONE G., Il diritto dello sport, UTET, pp. 366 onwards; 
ORLANDI M. (1996) ‚Ostacoli alla libera, circolazione dei calciatori e numero 
massimo di «stranieri comunitari» in una squadra: osservazioni in margine alla 
sentenza Bosman”, Giur. Civ., 3, p. 601. 
173 Decree Law No. 282 of 24.12.2002, converted into Law No. 27 of 21.02.2003.  
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services), the rules governing sports are written by companies that 
could restrict competition in the markets of the Member States174. 
On July 11, 2007 the Commission published its White Paper on Sport, 
which proposes a series of concrete measures to be implemented as 
part of the so-called ‚De Coubertin Action Plan‛175. 
The White Paper is a document of particular significance since it 
clarifies the EU’s position with reference to the world of sport, which 
involves states, organizations, international institutions of various 
kinds and individuals. In the Commission’s opinion, both the rules of 
specific sports and more wide-ranging rules (such as those on doping) 
are subject to European Union control. 
In the White Paper, the Commission also acknowledges the benefits of 
the collective sale of broadcasting rights, which sometimes creates 
problems of competition, although the gains outweigh the 
disadvantages. It says that “Issues concerning the relationship between the 
sport sector and sport media (television in particular) have become crucial as 
television rights are the primary source of income for professional sport in 
Europe. Conversely, sport media rights are a decisive source of content for 
many media operators. 
Sport has been a driving force behind the emergence of new media and 
interactive television services. The Commission will continue to support the 
right to information and wide access for citizens to broadcasts of sport events, 
which are seen as being of high interest or major importance for society. 
The application of the competition provisions of the EC Treaty to the selling of 
media rights of sport events takes into account a number of specific 
characteristics in this area. Sport media rights are sometimes sold collectively 
by a sport association on behalf of individual clubs (as opposed to clubs 
                                                          
174 See Court of First Instance Case Judgment T-313/2002 - David Meca-Medina 
and Igor Majcen of 30.09.2004, [2004] ECR II-03291; ECJ Judgment Case 
Judgment C-519/04 - David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen of 18.07.2006, [2006] 
ECR I-06991. 
175 See Commission Staff Working Document Action Plan ‚Pierre de Coubertain‛ 
SEC(2007) 934 of 11.07.2007. 
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marketing the rights individually). While joint selling of media rights raises 
competition concerns, the Commission has accepted it under certain 
conditions. Collective selling can be important for the redistribution of income 
and can thus be a tool for achieving greater solidarity within sports. 
The Commission recognises the importance of an equitable redistribution of 
income between clubs, including the smallest ones, and between professional 
and amateur sport.”176 
The concerns to which the Commission makes reference are the 
restriction of output arising from the joint sale of sports broadcasting 
rights and foreclosure in the downstream television markets177. This 
fear is based on the knowledge that the opportunity to broadcast 
football content plays a key role in competition among television 
operators, in the advertising, marketing and sale of pay TV. The ability 
of medium to small size platforms to gain access to football content is 
therefore considered an important element for achieving the goal of an 
open and competitive market178. 
On this point the Italian Parliament took a position, reversing its earlier 
policy of non-intervention179 and passed Law no. 106 of 19 July 2007, 
                                                          
176 See White Paper on Sport COM(2007) 391 of 11.07.2007, Section 4.8, 
paragraph 17. 
177 See European Commission Cases Decisions COMP/38.173 of 22.03.2006, 
relating to proceedings under Article 81 of the EC Treaty, paragraphs 25 et seq; 
COMP/C.2-37398 – UEFA Champions League of 23.07.2003, relating to paragraph 
116; COMP/C-2/37.214 – Joint selling of the media rights to the German 
Bundesliga of 19.01.2005 in proceedings under Article 81 and Article 53, 
paragraph 1, of the EEA, paragraph 23. 
178 See in this sense European Commission Case Decision COMP/C.2-37.398 – 
UEFA Champions League of 23.07.2003, which affirms that the sale of media 
rights to the UEFA Champions League in separate packages by public auction 
should increase the opportunities for television, enabling broadcasters and 
SMEs to acquire the content (paragraph 171). 
179 For a detailed description of the historical evolution of sporting rights 
distribution see GIANNACCARI A. (2006) ‚Calcio, diritti collettivi e ritorno 
all’antico. Storia a lieto fine?‛, Merc. Conc. Reg., 3, p. 487-520. 
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which empowered the Italian Government to enact a reform of the sale 
of rights by football clubs to broadcasting platforms. One aim of the 
new law was to improve the situation of the smallest sports clubs, who 
had least to gain from the individual bargaining of rights180. Following 
the principles of the enabling law, the Government adopted Law 9 of 
January 9, 2008, which formalized the solidarity principle in the sale of 
football broadcasting rights by imposing collective bargaining. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.7. Law 9 of January 9, 2008 and the collective sale of 
sport broadcasting rights. 
Law 9 of January 9, 2008181 introduced rules on the collective sale of 
broadcasting rights to sporting events including championships and 
other professional tournaments, providing that the organizer of each 
competition and the organizer of the related events are co-owners of 
                                                          
180 See the reason for this decision as described by the Ministry of Youth Policies 
and Sport in the preliminary report on bill no. 1496 of 2007 which led to the 
passing of Law 106 on 19.07.2007 available from 
http://legxv.camera.it/_dati/lavori/stampati/pdf/15PDL0010270.pdf. See also 
MASSEY P. (2007) ‚Are Sports Cartels Different? An Analysis of EU 
Commission Decisions Concerning Collective Selling Agreements for Football 
Broadcasting Rights”, World Competition, 30(1), p. 87; VROOMAN J. (2007) 
‚Theory of the beautiful game: the unification of European football‛, Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 54, No. 3. 
181 See PISCINI A. (2007) ‚L’evoluzione della disciplina sull’evoluzione dei 
diritti di immagine relativi agli eventi sportivi – in Italia e in Europa – tra affari, 
concorrenza e specificità‛, Riv. Dir. Ec. Sport, 3, p. 35-45; GIANNACCARI A., 
‚Calcio, diritti collettivi e ritorno all’antico. Storia a lieto fine?‛, supra at 
footnote 179. 
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the broadcasting rights182. The organizer of the competition lays down 
the guidelines for the trading of the broadcasting rights (premium and 
basic, live and delayed broadcast), the criteria for creating the relevant 
packages and additional rules, in order to allow candidates to 
participate in competitive procedures on an equitable, transparent and 
non-discriminatory basis. The media rights relating to events in ‚Serie 
A‛ and ‚Serie B‛ (the football league’s first and second division 
respectively) are sold separately on a collective, integrated basis 
(Article 6). 
The organizer of the competition must provide a balanced package to 
ensure the presence of events of major interest to users. The organizer 
of the competition also sets a minimum price for each package, below 
which, upon notice to the competition authority and the market, they 
may decide not to sell (Article 8). 
Participants in the procedure cannot compete for all packages. They 
must have a concession or a broadcasting licence and, if they are 
granted the rights, the contract can last no more than three years. The 
Italian Communications Authority and the Italian Antitrust Authority 
supervise the implementation of these rules, each according to its 
specific area of competence (Articles 6 and 7).  
The ownership of the sports rights is held exclusively by the organizer 
of the event itself (Article 3).  
The broadcasting rights for the individual events of the competition are 
traded by the organizer of the competition. The organizers of specific 
events can conduct autonomous commercial initiatives relating to the 
rights to broadcast highlights and repeats on the clubs’ official 
channels. 
The organizers of specific events are the owners of the pictures and the 
videos made during the event by themselves or others, in accordance 
with the competition organizers’ guidelines on production and 
technical and quality standards, with which the organizer of the events 
must comply. 
                                                          
182 See PODDIGHE E. (2003) Diritti televisivi e teoria dei beni, CEDAM. 
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The person or company that produces images of the sporting events is 
required to make them available to all purchasers of broadcasting 
rights, on a transparent and non-discriminatory basis, and according to 
a tariff established by the organizer of the competition under the 
supervision of the Italian Communications Authority (Article 4).  
In the case of football in Serie A and B, the competition organizer is the 
Lega Nazionale Professionisti (hereinafter the ‚Lega Calcio‛ or 
‚Football League‛). Consequently, Law 9/2008 gives the Football 
League a kind of collective mandate to trade exclusively for the sale to 
broadcasting platforms of national and international audiovisual rights 
relating to domestic football in Serie A and Serie B, the Italian Cup, 
Super Cup and Super Cup Primavera. 
On the basis of the legal framework described above, it should be 
pointed out that the agreement between the competition organizer and 
the event organizer, which gives the former an exclusive mandate to 
negotiate the collective sale of right to sporting events, should fall as 
such within Article 81 of the Treaty since it is a horizontal collective 
trading agreement. Similarly, since as a result of the assignment 
procedure a vertical licence agreement is signed between the sporting 
rights owners on one hand (the Football League on behalf of the event 
organizer) and the platform to whom the rights are awarded on the 
other, Article 81 of the Treaty again applies. However, in both cases, 
since the collective agreements were introduced by law, they are 
exempted from Article 81, which does not apply to the state (or its 
laws) but only to undertakings183. 
Furthermore, regarding the platform to which the sporting rights are 
awarded, the Lega Calcio and the event organizer are the providers of 
the football content since, although the Lega Calcio is responsible for 
the procedure by which the rights are awarded, Article 3 of Law 9/2008 
                                                          
183 See FIGUS DIAZ J. and FORTI V. (2008) ‚La disciplina antitrust della nuova 
legislazione sui diritti di trasmissione: quid novi sub sole?‛, Riv. Dir. Ec. Sport, 
2, p. 31. 
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makes it clear that the sports rights belong to the Lega Calcio and the 
event organizer. 
Since the existing platforms usually control their own networks, by 
acquiring exclusive rights to such content, they become vertically 
integrated. However, according to Article 14 of Law 9/2008, Lega Calcio 
cannot refuse to sell broadcasting rights to emerging platforms on the 
grounds that they have already ceded exclusive rights to some other 
platform. Emerging platforms, which typically do not control their own 
networks, are thus multi-sided rather than vertically integrated, since 
they do not have exclusive rights to the audiovisual content they 
broadcast184. Therefore such platforms, which by definition do not 
occupy a dominant position, should be under no obligation to grant 
access to rivals and no restraints should be placed on them, with the 
sole exception of their legal obligation under article 8 of Law 9/2008)185 
to make certain images, highlights, etcetera available to other 
platforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.8. Criticism of Law 9/2008.  
There has been intense criticism of Law 9/2008, especially the parts 
where it apparently seeks to impose state control over television rights, 
                                                          
184 On the question of whether the licence agreement makes it possible to 
vertically integrate content and technology within the platform, see European 
Commission Case Decision COMP/M.5121 – Newscorp/Premiere of 25.06.2008. 
We will return to this point in Chapter 6, sections 6.4 and 6.7. 
185 GERADIN D. (2004) Access to Content by New Media Platforms: A Review of the 
Competition Law Problems, GCLC Working Paper No. 01, pp. 68-94. 
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thus intervening in the football and television sectors186. For example, 
under articles 22 and 24 of the Law, the organiser of the competition is 
required to allocate specific percentages of its financial resources to 
certain areas: 
a) at least 4% for the development of the clubs' youth sectors, the 
safety of the sports facilities (including infrastructure) and the 
financing of at least two projects a year in support of disciplines 
other than football. (article 22); 
b) at least 6% for clubs in the lower divisions (article 24); 
c) a non-specified percentage for a "general mutual fund for 
professional team sports";  
d) the remainder to be shared as described below: 
i) at least 40% in equal parts among the participants in the 
competition; 
ii) 30% in relation to football results over the last 60 years; 
iii) the remaining 30% in relation to the population of the 
"catchment area" of each team. 
We have already mentioned that one of the reasons for Law 9/2008 was 
to encourage a collective negotiation of sports rights that would 
provide a better deal for the smaller clubs187. 
However, the terms of the Law clearly go further than this, even 
regulating the distribution of the proceeds. The state thus appears to be 
balancing the interests of the parties (football clubs and broadcasters) 
by means of heavy-handed measures that preclude free bargaining and 
are excessively biased in favour of the clubs.  
Indeed, it should be pointed out that the express abrogation under the 
terms of article 30 of the Law 9/2008 of article 2, comma 1 of Decree 15 
of January 30 1999, as converted with modifications into Law 78 of 
March 29 1999, has also had repercussions on the investments of those 
                                                          
186 ZENO-ZENCOVICH (2008) ‚La statalizzazione dei diritti televisivi 
sportivi‛, Dir. Inf. Inform., 6., p. 695. 
187 See paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7 of this chapter. 
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companies which had purchased football rights on the basis of the old 
legislation and consolidated their acquired rights. 
In addition, the purported defence of the right to report matches 
mentioned in article 5 of Law 9/2008 has given public broadcasters and 
other national and local television companies a fully-fledged right of 
access to the highlights of sport events, for re-transmission during news 
programmes, which is barely compatible with the private interests of 
the PAY-TV broadcasters who have bought such content. This right of 
re-transmission is limited to a total of eight minutes a day, with a limit 
of three minutes per event, to be shown at least three hours (and up to 
48 hours) after the end of the event. A right of this kind favours the 
competitors of the purchasers of the television rights to a greater extent 
than is envisaged in the EU's Audiovisual Media Services Directive. In 
fact Article 3-duodecies of the AVMSD establishes an obligation to apply 
fair, transparent and non-discriminatory conditions in terms of access 
to brief clips of "events of great public interest" for news purposes, but 
does not state that such access must be granted free of charge. 
The legislation also establishes an excessive degree of regulation of 
sport television rights from the point of view of ownership, by 
deferring to Italian Law 633/41 on copyright (article 4, comma 6, of Law 
9/2008). Thus footage of sports events is placed on the same level as 
intellectual property rights, with ownership residing not with the 
broadcaster who creates the footage but with the organiser of the event. 
The associated rights are managed by yet another entity, i.e. the 
organiser of the sporting competition. The consequence of all this is 
needless over-regulation. Many of Agcom's responsibilities, including 
approval of the Lega Calcio guidelines, identification of emerging 
platforms and the application of price caps under article 14 of Law 
9/2008, could be replaced by the spontaneous recognition by the parties 
of the obligations and rights that the Law imposes.  
Any attempt to provide an overall assessment of Law 9/2008 must take 
account of the clear strengthening of the position of the owners of the 
sporting rights in their negotiations with companies seeking a licence to 
broadcast the events, based on legislation that appears to go against the 
tendency to market liberalisation seen in the last few years. It is also 
true however that the current situation represents a concrete change 
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with respect to pre-existing legislation, and while the new regulation is 
not exactly impartial, it is a result of the failure of the market, which 
proved to be unable to guarantee the survival of the weakest clubs. 
Indeed, the new legislation is based on constitutional principles, 
specifically those set out in articles 2 and 32 of the Italian Constitution 
concerning the right to sport, which the state is required to promote. It 
is necessary therefore to assess whether the legislation is excessively 
favourable to one of the parties involved to the detriment of the other, 
and whether the new legal situation is likely to foster the concrete 
development of sport in general and the various subjects that keep it 
alive, including television broadcasters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.9. Inter- and intra-platforms competition under article 82 
of the Treaty. 
The abuse of a dominant position held by a broadcasting platform or an 
economic operator involved in a platform, such as a content provider, 
falls within Article 82 of the Treaty. 
Recently the Italian Antitrust Authority initiated two infringement 
procedures under Article 82 of the Treaty against the content provider 
Lega Calcio and the broadcasting platform Sky, both of which were 
considered to be in a dominant position188. 
                                                          
188 See the ongoing procedures relating to Italian Antitrust Resolutions No. 
18932 of 02.10.2008, and No. 20434 of 05.11.2009, Case A407 – Conto TV/Sky 
Italia, Agcm Bull. 37/08 on 29.10.2008 and Bull. 44/2009 on 23.11.2009, and 
Italian Antitrust Resolution No. 20116 of 22.07.2009, as extended by Resolution 
No. 20343 of 01.10.2009, Case A418 – Procedure Selettive Lega Nazionale 
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With reference to the alleged abuse by Lega Calcio of its dominant 
position, the Italian Antitrust Authority argued that the Football 
League was dominant in the relevant market of premium sports 
broadcasting rights189, because, according to Article 6, paragraph 1, of 
Law 9 of January 9, 2008, it is the only entity entrusted with preparing 
the guidelines for the trading of such rights. The guidelines for the sale 
of collective media rights were approved by Agcom and published on 
March 18, 2009 as an annexe to its Resolution no. l20/09/CONS.  
In the Antirust Authority’s opinion, the abuse of dominance stems 
from the fact that, although Lega Calcio was supposed to make 
available multiple packages for the sale of sports rights and none of 
them were to be exclusive, on July 1, 2009 it made available only two 
packages for the 2010-11 and 2011-12 seasons to terrestrial Pay TV and 
only two to satellite Pay TV, both of which were offered on an exclusive 
basis. The FTA market was offered only the highlights190. 
On November 20, 2009 Lega Calcio responded to the Italian Antitrust 
Authority under Article 14-ter of Law 287 of October 10, 1990. It 
                                                                                                                               
Professionisti Campionati 2010/11 E 2011/12, Agcm Bull. 29/09 on 10.08.2009 and 
Bull. 39/09 on 19.10.2009. 
189 TV broadcasting rights to football events played regularly throughout the 
year every year in the ‚Serie A, Serie B, Coppa Italia‛, UEFA Champions League 
and UEFA Cup competitions are a distinct market from events involving 
national teams. See European Commission Case Decisions COMP/C.2/37.214 – 
Joint selling of the media rights to the German Bundesliga of 19.01.2005 and 
COMP/C.2-37398 – UEFA Champion League of 23.07.2003; see also Agcom 
Resolution 7340 Sale rights (I/362) of 01.07.1999, Agcom Bull. 26/99. 
190 The Antitrust Authority uses the term ‚platform‛ to refer to different 
broadcasting techniques, e.g. satellite and DVB-T (see Antitrust Authority 
Resolution No. 20116 of 22.07.2009). In contrast we use the term to refer to any 
enterprise or infrastructure which supplies content to viewers, regardless of the 
transmission technique used. This is also confirmed by Article 2, paragraph 1, 
letter u) of Decree Law 9/2008 which defines the platform as the system used 
for the distribution of audiovisual products and technologies via the delivery 
and reception of images (both encrypted and unencrypted), including FTA-TV 
and Pay TV, by means of electronic communications networks. 
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proposed a possible unpacking of the existing packages and a fresh 
round of bargaining with the platforms to be completed by February 
26, 2010. If the Antitrust Authority accepts the proposals then the 
proceedings against Lega Calcio will be dropped and, as Lega Calcio 
requested, the Antitrust Authority will issue an administrative act 
obliging the platforms that have already bought the broadcasting rights 
to renounce them and to compete for them again in the new 
competitive procedure together with other platforms. 
A recent case brought by the Italian Antitrust Authority against Sky 
concerned inter-platform competition. Conto TV accused its competitor 
Sky of violating Article 82 of the Treaty. Sky is dominant in the Pay TV 
broadcasting market in Italy, with a market share of around 90%, and it 
was obliged to grant access to its content and television services to 
competitors by European Commission Decision COMP.M876 of April 
2, 2003. Conto TV complained that the access price demanded by Sky 
for wholesale services (e.g. customer care, simulcrypt, inclusion of its 
channels in the Electronic Program Guide, hereinafter ‚EPG‛191) was 
not cost-oriented, implying abuse by Sky of its dominant position192.  
In both the described cases the anti-competitive effects of the dominant 
firm’s behaviour have negative consequences for consumers and 
competitors since they can determine their foreclosure. 
The case brought before the Italian Antitrust Authority against Sky 
gives rise to some important considerations. The complaints by Conto 
TV actually recall the situation we have previously described of a 
programme maker (such as Conto TV) that uses the radio spectrum or 
the carriage services belonging to another platform (such as Sky)193. In 
                                                          
191 Simulcrypt is a service that broadcasts digital content encrypted using more 
than one encryption standard so that it can be viewed using more than one 
conditional access system. 
192 See Italian Antitrust Resolutions No. 18932 of 02.10.2008 and No. 20434 of 
05.11.2009, Case A407 – Conto TV/Sky Italia, Agcm Bull. 37/08 on 29.10.2008 and 
Bull. 44/2009 on 23.11.2009.  
193 See Chapter 2, section 2.5., letter a) and section 5.4 of this Chapter in this 
dissertation. 
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this case Conto TV is a content provider that pays Sky TV to carry its 
channels and make them available to Sky subscribers, who can 
purchase PPV content directly from Conto TV, in addition to their 
regular subscription to Sky. 
Hence with respect to Conto TV, Sky acts just like a multi-sided market 
platform, because it does not integrate Conto TV’s content. The access 
price that Conto TV has to pay for the wholesale services provided by 
the platform should be cost-oriented and must be calculated in a 
transparent and fair way, taking account of the revenues (and 
externalities) coming from the platform subscribers194. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.10. Anti-competitive vertical effects: input and customer 
foreclosure. 
Anti-competitive vertical effects may arise from cooperation between 
companies at different levels of the supply chain when an integrated 
platform limits or eliminates competitors' access to supplies (input 
foreclosure) or to markets (customer foreclosure)195. 
But the risk of input and customer foreclosures in the broadcasting 
sector can also arise when there are agreements between economic 
                                                          
194 For a description of the access price rules see Regulation 360/04/CON of 
28.10.2004 of the Italian Communications Authority. 
195 See the European Commission’s Guidelines on the assessment of non-
horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, adopted on 28.11.2007, available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/nonhorizontalguide
lines.pdf, at paragraphs 29-30. 
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operators (e.g. advertisers, content providers) and the platform in the 
downstream market. 
Considering that the production and the distribution of content on a 
broadcasting platform can be integrated or non-integrated (multi-
sided)196 we shall verify the different consequences of the obligation to 
grant access to content in both cases. 
In contrast to horizontal agreements which may, by eliminating 
competition between the parties, or by increasing the scope of 
collusion, give rise to a significant impediment of effective competition, 
vertical agreements are less likely to produce negative economic effects. 
Indeed, vertical agreements might even have some positive impacts on 
consumer welfare. For example, it is generally accepted in economic 
theory that a vertically integrated platform might eliminate the double 
marginalisation problem and opportunistic behaviour. Other positive 
results might be lower transaction costs, increasing efficiencies in input 
choices and other static and dynamic efficiencies. Under exceptional 
circumstances, vertical platforms may give rise to two types of 
foreclosure concerns: input foreclosure and customer foreclosure. 
Input foreclosure depends on the following factors: 
d) the ability of the vertical firms to foreclose; 
e) the incentives to foreclose; and 
f) the overall impact on effective competition197. 
As recognised by the Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal 
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, adopted on November 28, 2007, in order to be 
able to foreclose competitors, the platform must have a significant 
degree of market power in one of the markets concerned. Specifically, 
the Guidelines stress that the platform would only have the ability to 
                                                          
196 See Chapter 2, section 2.4 of this dissertation. 
197 See the European Commission’s Guidelines on the assessment of non-
horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, supra at footnote 195, paragraphs 31 et 
seqq and 60 et seqq. 
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foreclose downstream competitors if, by reducing access to its own 
upstream products or services, it could negatively affect the overall 
availability of input for the downstream market in terms of price or 
quality.198 
There may be an incentive for input foreclosure if it enables the 
platform to foreclose its competitors in the downstream market. This 
might occur if the integrated firm can raise its rival’s costs by increasing 
input prices while the downstream entity of the firm still has access to 
the input at marginal costs, thus gaining a competitive advantage. 
Input foreclosure also arises if the merged firm simply stops supplying 
rivals of its downstream entity, completely denying access to the input. 
Conversely, downstream foreclosure or customer foreclosure by 
vertically integrated firms occurs when the downstream platform 
exclusively purchases content from its upstream division.  
However, customer foreclosure is generally seen as less harmful than 
input foreclosure. Due to vertical integration, a non-integrated 
upstream firm may have a smaller market, which could make it 
difficult for them to cover their fixed costs. But the non-integrated 
firms’ pricing is not likely to change and the integrated firms’ prices 
might even be lower due to efficiencies. Only if the non-integrated 
rivals are forced to exit the market will the merged firm be able to raise 
prices above competitive levels. But these effects are felt in the long 
term only and are thus subject to some speculation. Moreover, rivals 
have enough time to discover alternative ways to reach their customers. 
On the other hand, input foreclosure leads to immediate price effects. 
The non-integrated firms face higher costs and thus have to raise their 
prices. If the supply of input is denied, non-integrated firms must find 
alternative sources that will probably be more expensive. If they cannot 
find a substitute for the input they might even exit the market, which 
                                                          
198 See the European Commission’s Guidelines on the assessment of non-
horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, supra at footnote 195, par. 36. 
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will increase the market power of the remaining firms and probably 
lead to price increases. 
Therefore, input foreclosure is more likely to be harmful than customer 
foreclosure. 
Having said this, the vertical integration of a content provider in a 
platform rarely causes input or customer foreclosure, unless it seeks to 
offer content exclusively to one single platform. But usually content 
providers want to offer their content to a number of platforms even in 
the case of premium content, which is usually sold to Pay TV 
platforms. 
As pointed out by the European Commission199, content rights are 
generally managed by collecting societies on behalf of publishers 
and/or authors. Collecting societies generally sign agreements with 
programme makers, allowing them to grant a licence to all content, 
including back catalogues, on standard, non-discriminatory terms. 
Therefore, all end users should enjoy full and non-discriminatory 
access to programmes (this is true first of all for movies and 
entertainments, including sports events).  
With reference to customer foreclosure, the same is true for a 
broadcasting platform which does not have a dominant presence in the 
downstream TV market. Since upstream rivals will continue to have 
access to a sufficient customer base post-integration, alternatives exist 
in the downstream market for the upstream rivals of a merger. A 
platform will usually seek to maintain access to a broad range of 
entertainment products as it competes for a share of audience and 
advertising revenues200. 
 
 
                                                          
199 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.4404 of 22.05.2007, 
Universal/BMG Music Publishing, on the licensing to TV and radio broadcasters 
of performance and sound recordings rights. 
200 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.5533 – Bertelsmann/ 
KKR/JV of 08.09.2009. 
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5.11. Conclusions. 
Even though multi-sided broadcasting platforms have been around for 
a long time, they have not yet been expressly considered as a specific 
entity under the definition of the relevant market either by the 
European Commission, or, to our knowledge, by the Italian Antitrust 
Authority, which does not deviate from the descriptions of the relevant 
broadcasting markets made by the Commission. Until now Antitrust 
Authorities have preferred to analyze competition in the broadcasting 
sector with reference to the different markets in which the various 
economic operators involved in the platform carry out their activities. 
When the commercial relationships between multi-sided platforms, 
content providers, service providers, network providers and 
advertisers are founded on vertical agreements, they may fall within 
Article 81 of the Treaty. Indeed even if these agreements do not imply a 
concentration of firms in the market, they are still vertical agreements 
and as such have effects on both the downstream and the upstream 
markets. 
Agreements that are anti-competitive or have actual (or potential) anti-
competitive effects are forbidden under art 81(1) of the Treaty, unless 
they have pro-competitive benefits that outweigh the anti-competitive 
effects under article 81(3). The balancing of anti-competitive and pro-
competitive effects is evaluated within the framework of Article 81(3) 
of the Treaty and therefore the ‚structured rule of reason‛, set by 
Regulation 1/2003 of European Council, applies. 
Abuse by a multi-sided platform of its dominant position falls within 
Article 82 of the Treaty. In any case the assessment of anti-competitive 
behaviour by dominant multi-sided platforms has to take account of 
their distinctive structure, which is different from that of an integrated 
platform. This means for example that in fixing the best access price to 
the platform the cost orientation criterion is not by itself sufficient. 
Other criteria have to be considered, such as the revenues from the 
other platform users, taking into consideration the positive externalities 
arising from interaction with the other parties in the platform and the 
fact that the platform charges higher fees to the party that derives the 
greatest advantage from a large number of members on the other side. 
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Furthermore, considering that sports rights are fundamental for 
increasing platform revenues, under the influence of ECJ 
jurisprudence201 the Italian parliament has passed laws to improve 
competition in the sports rights distribution market by establishing a 
legal framework aimed at introducing collective bargaining for sports 
rights between the football teams and the broadcasting platforms. The 
previous system (and also the present one if we consider that the 
procedure under Article 82 against the Lega Calcio for abuse of its 
dominant position is still pending before the Italian Antitrust 
Authority) had clear repercussions on the competitive ability of 
different football teams. Indeed, the sale by individual teams of 
television rights was useful only for the most important football clubs, 
who were able to support very high transitional costs, while the minor 
clubs, who could not rely on the same resources, saw their competitive 
position progressively diminish. 
Sport has a social role because it improves the health of citizens and 
plays a role in culture and recreation. It is subject to the competition 
rules of Articles 81 and 82 insofar it is an economic activity and also 
with reference to more wide-ranging rules (on doping for example) that 
can restrict competition.  
 
                                                          
201 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/C.2-37398 – UEFA 
Champions League of 23.07.2003. 
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Chapter 6 
_____________________________________________ 
Access to content by alternative multi-
sided platforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction. 
Platforms that vertically integrate content limit the spread of content in 
the market, since emerging platforms are not able to obtain premium 
content, the most attractive for viewers, because the existing platforms 
have exclusive rights to it (by virtue of property or licence). Ex ante 
regulation and ex post intervention by antitrust authorities both seek to 
improve the production and distribution of content in an equitable, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and unbundled manner. One remedy 
for example is the so called ‚must offer‛ provision, by which platforms 
have to grant competitors access to content on request. In contrast, the 
‚must carry‛ remedy is applied in favour of those content providers 
that are not network operators or are not integrated into any platform; 
it thus favours emerging multi-sided platforms for example. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2. The access to content problem. 
The digital broadcasting sector is currently affected by the 
phenomenon of technological convergence. At the same time it is 
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increasingly characterized by a plurality of transmission techniques 
and the arrival of new channels through which audiovisual content can 
be provided to viewers. Audiovisual products flow between old and 
new platforms, via terrestrial networks (viewed on mobile or fixed 
terminals from the classic television to the mobile phone), via cable 
(connected to both televisions and personal computers) and via 
satellite. 
Each different broadcasting platform has its unique structural 
characteristics, but the intangible goods that it carries, i.e. audiovisual 
content, are common to all platforms. However there is significant 
differentiation among the various platforms with reference to content 
distribution. 
In this regard, we have already discussed the characteristics of Pay TV 
and FTA markets and seen that they are considered to be separate by 
the European Commission202. 
Here we simply wish to point out that in any case the common aim of 
Pay TV and FTA TV platforms is to maximize revenues203, firstly those 
coming from subscriptions and the licence fee and secondly from the 
sale of specific services to content providers or advertisers. 
These two distinct forms of income depend on an identical and shared 
element: the ability to attract an audience (i.e. viewers) and to draw 
their attention to the services offered. The more users each operator is 
able to capture, the greater the platform’s scope for generating direct 
income in the first case and indirect in the second. 
The most effective way for a platform to achieve this aim is to collect 
the best content. The better the content on offer (including so-called 
‚premium content‛) the more the platform will be able to attract the 
attention of viewers, and the higher, in consequence, its revenues will 
                                                          
202 See Chapter 2, section 2.5., letter a) and Chapter 5, section 5.4 of this 
dissertation. 
203 On this point see investigation of the broadcasting sector IC23, Italian 
Antitrust Authority Resolution No. 13770 of 16.11.2004, published in Agcm 
Bull. no. 47/2004 on 06.12.2004. 
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be. Premium content is usually broadcast by thematic channels, i.e. 
those channels that dedicate most of their programming to a specific 
topic in order to cater for a certain type of audience. The market 
strategy followed by the various platforms is to try to obtain the best 
content, the most attractive among what is available. Platforms try to 
purchase exclusive rights to broadcast certain types of content, or to 
negotiate privileged rights thereto. Overall, then, it is not difficult to 
imagine the interrelations between different broadcasting platforms, 
which are all seeking to obtain the best content. 
This situation shifts the focus away from the retail market for the 
distribution of content to end users towards the upstream wholesale 
market for the acquisition of content. For this reason, competitiveness 
among platforms starts in the wholesale market, where the 
implementation of digital technology (by all players) increases the 
quantity and variety of contenders204. 
Of course, the main focus of competition in the upstream market is 
valuable content such as movies, sporting events of particular 
significance and social events of great interest. Transformed into objects 
for which broadcasting rights can be acquired, they become the subject 
par excellence of dispute, or rather, of competition. If platforms succeed 
in capturing large amounts, perhaps taking advantage of their strong 
positions, they are likely to enjoy tangible results in the downstream 
market for distribution of content to viewers. The result is a clear 
dominance of the platform with the best content, and as a consequence 
a shrinking number of platforms and a consequently lower level of 
pluralism. 
To maintain equilibrium among platforms, intervention by competition 
authorities may be required in order to assist the negotiations 
concerning access to content by minor platforms. The legislation could, 
for example, impose an obligation on the content providers to give 
                                                          
204 See DIFELICEANTONIO L. (2005) ‚Competizione tra piattaforme nel 
mercato televisivo digitale‛, Merc. Conc. Reg., 3, pp. 551-556. 
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specific types of content to different broadcasting platforms, negotiated 
on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis205.  
More recently the demand for access to content on the part of new 
content distributors has risen sharply, since they aspire to build their 
own platforms and develop their own networks206. 
In Italy in particular, new entrants to the digital TV market include 
cable television and mobile-TV network providers. These are multi-
sided platforms since they are not structured like vertically integrated 
operators. Basically, their role is that of carriers of content: they have no 
in-house programme production that they can develop on the basis of 
corporate links, but can only hope to negotiate more or less direct, 
reliable synergy agreements with content providers. 
Vertical integration, by contrast, is precisely the tendency of 
broadcasting platforms to vertically integrate content providers. Since 
the best content is in the hands of the main vertically integrated 
                                                          
205 Consider in this regard Article 5 of Decree Law 9/2008, which grants the 
state broadcaster RAI the right to show highlights of sporting events in 
accordance with a specific daily schedule. See also ZENO-ZENCOVICH V. 
(2004) ‚I rapporti tra gestori di reti e fornitori di contenuti”, Dir. Inf. Inform., 3, 
pp. 421-431, who suggests "compulsory licenses" for audiovisual content, as 
used for example in the music sector where all radio stations can broadcast hit 
songs on payment of a fair fee. 
206 See CREA G. and GIANNACCARI A. (2005) ‚Il binomio banda larga e 
industria dei contenuti tra innovazione, diritto antitrust e regolazione‛, Merc. 
Conc. Reg., 1, pp. 77-118, who argue that the availability of content, including 
premium content, is an important driver of platform development, and, 
ultimately of competition among operators. The risk is that with their greater 
economic strength the incumbents can acquire the content with exclusive 
rights, thus discouraging other players from investing in their own 
infrastructure and ultimately producing a closed (or even monopolistic) 
market. The authors maintain that access to content and access to network 
infrastructures are among the main bottlenecks concerning which intervention 
is necessary in order to open up the market for new and converging operators. 
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platforms, emerging media platforms are disadvantaged in terms of the 
acquisition of valuable content207.  
Indeed, established platforms are offering resistance to other carriers 
that can deliver content208 by refusing to grant competitors access to 
                                                          
207 See MONTI M. (2004) Access to content and the development of competition in the 
New Media market – the Commission approach, speech given at the Workshop on 
Access to quality audiovisual contents and development of New Media 
(Brussels, 8.7.2004), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/index_theme_8.html. Monti 
considers access to content to be the key to the development of policies 
designed to favour media competition, especially new media: ‚one concern of 
competition authorities should be to ensure that media content can be provided over 
new networks and not just the traditional ones. [These new networks include not only] 
the new 3G mobile networks [third generation mobile telephone networks] but also 
broadband DSL and cable connection to the Internet‛. The crucial question is to 
ensure the development and competitiveness of new media, by providing them 
with access to the most attractive content (such as sports, movies, etc.). The 
author makes a distinction between new media (such as third generation 
mobile phones or the internet) and new technologies, such as DVB-T which is a 
new technology for a traditional medium. 
208 See CREA G. and GIANNACCARI A., ‚Il binomio banda larga e industria 
dei contenuti tra innovazione, diritto antitrust e regolazione”, supra at footnote 
206, p. 104; who argue that horizontal and vertical integration lead to the 
creation or strengthening of dominant positions and this, together with the 
mechanisms of exclusivity, often gives rise to a loss of competition. Inter- and 
infra-platform competition may decrease, and the incumbents, thanks to their 
superior financial resources and (exclusive) access to premium content, can 
erect high barriers to market entry for newcomers. The risks of anticompetitive 
behaviour mainly have two causes: the leverage effect and the closing of 
markets. The leverage effect is based upon the power to influence related 
markets in which established platforms can determine the foreclosure of 
competitors. The vertically integrated operator could, in fact, make only its own 
content available on its communications network. Alternatively, it could 
discriminate between content, potentially degrading its quality. That is why the 
creation and the development of alternative platforms is crucial. 
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their own content and that of other content providers by means of 
exclusive rights agreements. 
To bypass these barriers and to guarantee the entry of newcomers into 
the market (and, through them, new technologies, opening up the 
market to more players), the most recent legislation has introduced ex 
ante regulation aimed at the vertical disintegration of broadcasters 
using DBV-T technology209, and this was confirmed by the Italian 
Communications Authority in Annex A to Regulation 181/2009 of April 
7, 2009. This structural separation has not yet been introduced for 
satellite and cable technologies. An extension of the structural 
separation principle to them as well would probably increase the 
number of multi-sided platforms using those technologies. 
Regardless of the transmission technique, digital technology enhances 
the capacity to disseminate audiovisual content, and is suitable for all 
types of broadcasting network. As such, it may contribute to pluralism 
in the market and increase effective competition, as long as access to 
content by the various operators is guaranteed210. 
 
 
                                                          
209 See Article 5, paragraph 1, letter g.2) of the Consolidated, which stipulates 
that corporate separation is required when the network operator of a national 
television company is also a content provider or service provider associated 
with interactive or conditional access services. This does not apply to television 
stations that broadcast only via cable or satellite, or to content providers and 
network operators on the local level. 
210 See PRETA A., BERNI G. (2006) ‚Dual or triple play?‛, Beltel, 5, pp. 15-17. 
The authors argue that in the converging communications market, for the new 
digital networks to spread, they must be fleshed out. The crux, then, is not so 
much possession of the most advanced technology, but of the most attractive 
content. Ultimately, what emerges is that television – like telecommunications – 
is evolving towards a new paradigm, in which competition is likely to cross 
national borders, abandoning the traditional, closed, vertically integrated, 
distribution model based on the maintenance of a secure income, in favour of a 
more open and dynamic model made possible by the new digital environment. 
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6.3. “Must-offer” and “must-carry”. 
A study of the role and nature of ex ante measures prescribed in the 
laws of various states yields interesting examples of the recognition 
and protection of the right of access to content. These include ‚must 
offer obligations”, which are popular in the USA and the UK, and are 
also present in European countries like Holland, Belgium, and Italy. 
Their purpose is to regulate the television platform market by 
providing a certain degree of legal support for requests for access211.  
The starting point for the must-offer obligation is the fact that by using 
their leverage over certain content providers, some network operators 
(again, vertically integrated ones in particular), try to prevent access to 
content by rival platforms by obtaining exclusive licences. In the face of 
such exclusive rights agreements, in most cases competing platforms 
can only aspire to second-window broadcasting rights to those 
programmes that have great appeal for viewers, which often are also 
covered by an exclusivity agreement. In response to this situation, 
during the nineties, the United States of America intervened to curb the 
excessive power of vertically integrated operators in the market for the 
purchase of content. First it was established that vertically integrated 
cable platforms could not hold exclusive rights to content. This was 
followed by the imposition on established broadcasters of the must-
offer obligation in the negotiation of re-transmission rights to their 
content212.  
                                                          
211 See ROUKENS J. (2005) ‚What are We Carrying Across the EU these days?, 
To have or not to have Must-carry rules‛, IRIS Special European Audiovisual 
Observatory, Strasbourg, pp. 7-19. The author argues that "a "must-offer" already 
explicitly exists in the UK, Ireland and Belgium (Flanders) for the PBS [Public 
Broadcasting Service] (p. 18, footnote 61). 
212 See DIFELICIANTONIO L., Competizione tra piattaforme nel mercato televisivo 
digitale, supra at footnote 204. The Program Access and Carriage Rule (see 
section 628 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act 
of 1992) prohibits unfair or discriminatory practices in the sale of television 
channels by programme makers who are vertically integrated within a 
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The must-offer obligations in the UK are even more stringent than 
those of the USA. The UK Communications Act of 2003 requires that 
content providers have to negotiate broadcasting rights for FTA re-
transmission in good faith with all digital platforms that request them, 
without discrimination, and negotiate the re-transmission of their 
channels with FTA platforms213. The programmes are thus made 
available to the various operators of platforms that have an interest in 
showing them to their viewers. 
The rationale for the must-offer obligations can be described as follows: 
a) firstly, by requiring content providers to negotiate the 
distribution of some of their channels, and by prohibiting 
discriminatory practices, the must-offer obligation establishes 
the principles of fairness and transparency. In addition, the 
various broadcasting platforms gain access to the distribution 
of channels. The must-offer obligation is a significant new 
development for distribution platforms that want to compete in 
the television market; 
b) the must-offer obligation is closely connected to the principle of 
net-neutrality, by which regulators seek to guarantee equal 
treatment to viewers regarding access to FTA channels. 
Platforms are neutral in terms of the audience, who are able to 
watch the same audiovisual content on a variety of platforms;  
                                                                                                                               
platform. Vertically integrated platforms are also prohibited from applying an 
exclusive distribution of channels. In 1999 Congress passed the Satellite Home 
Viewer Improvement Act, which further strengthened the regulatory 
framework by introducing ‚must-offer‛, i.e. the duty for FTA terrestrial 
broadcasters to negotiate re-transmission rights in good faith with all platforms 
and prohibiting the sale of rights to only one platform (p. 558). 
213 See Sections 272-274 of the Communications Act of 2003. In the UK OFCOM 
is entrusted with the task of regulating the obligation to provide content that is 
attributable to "a) every licensed public service channel [...] and c) every licensed 
television service added [...] to the list of must-carry service" (section 272, c. 1). In this 
way, both public service channels and channels that enjoy the status of ‚must-
carriers‛ are obliged to offer their content to others. 
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c) the imposition of ex lege constraints on the sale of certain 
content also helps to make certain channels considered of 
general interest accessible to the broadest number of viewers. It 
is no coincidence that in the UK, the suppliers who are most 
burdened by must-offer constraints are the broadcasters who 
are entrusted with the mission of public service. 
Therefore, ensuring the dissemination of certain channels via all the 
different broadcasting platforms and facilitating agreements between 
the publishers and platform operators for their re-distribution not only 
strengthens the multi-sided platform system, but also effectively 
supports the widest possible circulation of content. 
By its very nature, content is an essential tool in giving substance to the 
right of information, which is a fundamental right of the individual. 
Thus while the rights and obligations concerning access to content 
described in this section encourage competition among broadcasting 
platforms, they also protect the public interest in terms of the pluralism 
of information. 
More generally, however, the must-offer obligations are often 
considered a reflection of the must-carry rules, which require networks 
to grant access to content providers214. 
Under the must-carry rules, content providers have access to the 
platform networks; on the other hand, this means that the platforms 
that grant such access can also request content from the content 
provider. 
                                                          
214 On the specific nature of the must-carry duty in the new regulatory 
framework, see Article 31, paragraph 1, of Directive 2002/22/EC of 07.03.2002, 
which states: ‚Member States may impose reasonable must carry obligations, for the 
transmission of specified radio and television broadcast channels and services, on 
undertakings under their jurisdiction providing electronic communications networks 
used for the distribution of radio or television broadcasts to the public where a 
significant number of end-users of such networks use them as their principal means to 
receive radio and television broadcasts. Such obligations shall only be imposed where 
they are necessary to meet clearly defined general interest objectives and shall be 
proportionate and transparent. The obligations shall be subject to periodical review‛. 
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For this reason must-carry constraints should be encouraged by 
regulation. Content providers who have the right of access to networks 
thanks to the must-carry obligation should, in turn, be obliged to offer 
their content to all platforms that request it, in a way that allows such 
platforms to compete effectively with others and at the same time to 
achieve the widest possible dissemination of certain content.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4. The right of access to content: from the Consolidated 
onwards.  
Recognition of the right of access to content is contained in Article 5, 
paragraph 1, letter f) of the Consolidated, which, in order to safeguard 
pluralism of information and competition, establishes the general 
principle for content providers of non-discriminatory practices when 
selling to the various distribution platforms. Article 5 also regulates, 
according to market conditions, exclusive clauses, copyright rules and, 
negotiation between the parties for the transfer of content rights to 
platforms. 
This provision, which reproduces almost exactly the wording of Article 
5, paragraph 1, of Law 112/2004, in itself represents an indisputable 
novelty in the Italian context. For the first time national legislation 
refers to a principle that looks like the generic must-offer obligation. It 
imposes on all content providers the obligation to transfer content 
rights to all distribution platforms that request them, in accordance 
with the principles of network neutrality – which is now the focus of 
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renewed regulation of digital communications215 – and non-
discrimination. 
The new regulation therefore appears to be particularly useful in 
breaking down those barriers associated with vertical integration that 
are an obstacle to the development of a system with multiple operators 
(or platforms) engaging in real competition among themselves.  
However, it could be argued that Article 5, paragraph 1, letter f) of the 
Consolidated does not introduce a real must-offer obligation since the 
requirement to grant equal conditions arises only in the context of the 
sale of content rights. Thus, if the parties do not agree a sale, there is no 
must-offer duty for the content provider to grant equal treatment to 
another platform. The failure of Article 5 to fully implement the must-
offer principle lies in its respect for the freedom of negotiation; in 
practice the fulfilment of the principle depends on the good faith of the 
contracting parties216. 
Although the Consolidated does not introduce a real must offer duty, it 
does however pave the way for Law 9/2008 which represents an 
important step towards the break-up of integrated platforms. 
Law 9/2008 introduces the collective sale of sports broadcasting rights, 
by which a single negotiator (the competition organizer) sets the rules 
of the assignment procedure and trades the sports broadcasting rights 
of all teams on a fair, equal and non-discriminatory base. 
                                                          
215 See PACE A. and MANETTI M. (2006) Commentario. Rapporti civili. Art. 21, 
Bologna. The authors argue that although Article 5.1.f of Law No. 112/2004 
prohibits discrimination between platforms in terms of content distribution (the 
principle of net neutrality), content providers may refuse requests for its 
content from platforms that use a lower level of technology (p. 678). 
216 See PACE A. and MANETTI M., Commentario. Rapporti civili. Art. 21, supra at 
footnote 215, who argue that given the duopoly of Rai and Mediset, the main 
purpose of Article 5.1.f of Law No. 112/2004 is to safeguard free negotiation 
between the parties. While it is legitimate for a content provider to take account 
of the technological quality of the platform that requests the content, this 
should not be understood as allowing the content provider ample freedom to 
withhold the transfer of rights, otherwise the law would have no purpose. 
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This new regulation was enacted to protect those minor content 
providers who are not able to bear the high costs of negotiating with 
broadcasting platforms. Thus although the rationale for this new 
procedure introduced by law was not to force content providers or 
platforms (as the teams may be considered when they are entitled to 
broadcast their own programmes as network providers) to grant access 
to the broadcasting platforms who ask for them, the effect of the 
assignment procedure was to improve access on a non-discriminatory 
basis. 
Consequently there is a ‚sort of‛ must-offer obligation on the sporting 
rights owners. This also means that the platform’s right of access to 
content is based on the obligation of the sporting rights owner to grant 
access as if there was a general must-offer obligation. 
Furthermore, the possibility of abuse of dominant position on the part 
of the integrated platforms has been reduced by the following two 
general restraints operating on the platforms to which rights are 
awarded: (i) the duty to grant images of the event, on request, to all 
other platforms to which rights are awarded; and (ii) the prohibition on 
any platform acquiring all the sporting packages on offer (Articles 4 
and 9 of Law 9/2008). 
The must-offer duty is definitely introduced by Article 14 of Law 
9/2008, which expressly states that the Communications Authority, 
periodically and at least every two years, can identify the emerging 
platforms who should be admitted to the sporting rights assignment 
procedure. Audiovisual rights for emerging platforms are offered on a 
non-exclusive basis. The organizer of the competition, in order to 
support the development and growth of emerging platforms, has to 
grant a licence directly to these emerging platforms broadcasting 
audiovisual products, including a significant proportion of the share 
for the first airing, taking account of their technological characteristics, 
at prices proportional to the actual user base of each platform.  
Thus this provision is a significant step towards the break-up of 
vertically integrated platforms and the free movement of sports 
broadcasting rights. Emerging platforms, which do not integrate 
content and do not hold exclusive rights, can still broadcast premium 
content. They have a right of access to content that derives from the 
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must-offer duty of the content provider. This duty is a legislative 
remedy against the foreclosure of emerging platforms by existing 
vertically integrated platforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5. Ruling 665/09/CONS by Agcom and the emerging 
platforms. 
With reference to the above-described centralised sale of sport media 
rights, article 14 of Law 9/2008 stipulates the following: 
‚The audiovisual rights allocated to emerging platforms must be offered on a 
non-exclusive basis‛ (paragraph 3); 
‚In order to support the development and growth of emerging platforms, the 
organiser of the competition is required to grant audiovisual rights under 
licence directly to such platforms. Those rights must include a significant 
share of the rights pertaining to first-window and live broadcasts, adapted to 
the platforms' technological characteristics, at prices commensurate with the 
actual number of users of each platform who consume such audiovisual 
products‛ (paragraph 4); 
‚The sale of audiovisual rights to emerging platforms must take place on a 
platform-by-platform basis, in order to avoid the formation of dominant 
positions‛ (paragraph 5) *our translation+. 
In line with the provisions of Law 9/2008, the organiser of the 
competition should offer each emerging platform identified by Agcom 
one or more specific packages. In order to promote intra-platform 
competition, these packages must be assigned on a non-exclusive basis 
so that the events in question can be transmitted by a more than one 
operator. 
It should be stressed that although article 2 of the Law defines a 
‚platform‛ as ‚a system for disseminating audiovisual products via 
technologies and means of transmission and reception of images, both 
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unencrypted and by conditional access, free and for payment, on electronic 
communication networks‛ *our translation+, nothing is specified in terms 
of what exactly is meant by ‚emerging platform‛. 
Therefore Agcom, as requested by article 14, comma 1 of Law 9/2008, 
on November 29 2009 issued Resolution 665/09/CONS which defined 
the concept of an emerging platform and identified the emerging 
platforms to which article 14 of the Law should be applied. 
First of all Agcom makes reference to the definition of emerging 
markets given in the European Commission Recommendation of 
December 17, 2007217 on relevant product and service markets within 
the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council. Agcom argues that although the parameters specified 
therein referred to markets and not platforms, they could nonetheless 
be of help in the identification of platforms. Specifically, Agcom 
referred to the following criteria: ‚(a) the presence of high and non-
transitory barriers to entry. These may be of a structural, legal or regulatory 
                                                          
217 See OJ L 344 of 28.12.2007, p. 65, which states that ‚Newly emerging markets 
should not be subject to inappropriate obligations, even if there is a first mover 
advantage, in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC. Newly emerging markets are 
considered to comprise products or services, where, due to their novelty, it is very 
difficult to predict demand conditions or market entry and supply conditions, and 
consequently difficult to apply the three criteria. The purpose of not subjecting newly 
emerging markets to inappropriate obligations is to promote innovation as required by 
Article 8 of the Directive 2002/21/EC; at the same time, foreclosure of such markets by 
the leading undertaking should be prevented, as also indicated in the Commission 
guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications and services (1). 
Incremental upgrades to existing network infrastructure rarely lead to a new or 
emerging market. The lack of substitutability of a product has to be established from 
both demand and supply-side perspectives before it can be concluded that it is not part 
of an already existing market. The emergence of new retail services may give rise to a 
new derived wholesale market to the extent that such retail services cannot be provided 
using existing wholesale products.‛ 
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nature; (b) a market structure which does not tend towards effective 
competition within the relevant time horizon. The application of this criterion 
involves examining the state of competition behind the barriers to entry; (c) the 
insufficiency of competition law alone to adequately address the market 
failure(s) concerned‛. 
The logical and juridical reasoning followed by Agcom entailed 
verification of whether the individual platforms could be considered 
‚emerging‛ from both a technological and economic point of view, in 
order to determine the appropriacy of tightening the rules in their 
favour in the economic and technological fields. 
Agcom thus establishes the following technological parameters for the 
assessment: 
a) the date of definition of the technological standard (open or 
proprietary) on which the platform is based; 
b) the degree of maturity and evolution of the 
technology/standard; and 
c) the evolution of the networks, infrastructures and reception 
devices; 
On the basis of these indicators, each platform is classified as 
‚Emerging‛, ‚In transition‛ or ‚Consolidated‛ from the technological 
point of view. 
In terms of economic criteria Agcom chooses the following: 
d) the year of the first product launch; 
e) the characteristics of the products on offer; 
f) the market penetration of the platform; and 
g) the income of each platform (from products provided for 
payment and from advertising); 
These criteria are used to classify the platforms' phases of economic 
development as ‚Launch‛, ‚Maturity‛ or ‚Decline‛. 
Agcom thus concluded that a platform can be considered emerging if it 
is technologically ‚Emerging‛ and economically in its ‚Launch‛ phase. 
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On the basis of this analysis, Agcom ruled that platforms transmitting 
by terrestrial digital, by satellite and by internet are not emerging218. In 
contrast, the following platforms are held to be emerging: 
a) IPTV, i.e. TV via internet, since there is no open standard and 
each broadcaster uses a proprietary standard. In addition, the 
technology expected to be deployed is VDSL using direct 
access via fibre-optic cables (the so-called NGAN, Next 
Generation Access Network); 
b) Wireless platforms for mobile networks, which include both 
GSM/GPRS/EDGE and UMTS/HSDPA technologies, allowing 
the distribution of multimedia and information content of 
various kinds, such as video clips, sport, features, cinema, 
reality shows, etc. Like IPTV, this platform is usually based not 
on centralised broadcasting but on unicast-type 
communication (PtoP). This allows users to view on-demand 
content; 
c) Mobile terrestrial digital platforms, or DVB-H (Digital Video 
Broadcasting – Handheld), the standard for which was defined 
only recently by the DVB project. DVB-H is a broadcast 
technology, which means that the content can be received 
simultaneously by a very high number of mobile users. This is 
due to the use of the IP protocol, which allows simultaneous 
transmission on the same channel of video packets (the DVB 
stream) and data packets that can be used by client 
applications on the receiving device (IP Datacast). Currently 
DVB-H is the most widely used standard for mobile television 
in the EU. In some European countries (Italy, Finland, Austria, 
                                                          
218 Web Television (Web TV) allows audio and video content to be viewed by 
downloading the content (which may be for payment or free) via an open IP 
network, without the support of specific software or decoders other than 
normal player programs used to view multimedia content that have been 
available for some time and are technologically consolidated (e.g. Windows 
Media Player, Quick Time, Real Player, etc.). 
 135 
France, Switzerland and Spain) the commercial launch has 
already happened and in the remaining European countries 
testing is under way. Looking forward, a key development is 
likely to be the evolution of the DVB-SH standard (Digital 
Video Broadcasting – Satellite services to Handhelds) in the S 
band for delivering content to handheld terminals based on a 
hybrid satellite/terrestrial downlink. In Italy, mobile networks 
with DVB-H technology have been operating since mid 2006, 
and there are currently 2 multiplexes (H3G and Elettronica 
Industriale) in operation. 
Generally speaking, we agree with the technological and economic 
parameters applied in the study conducted by Agcom. However, we 
believe that the considerations which prompted the legislature to 
intervene in favour of emerging platforms in the first place are not fully 
taken into account in Agcom's analysis. 
Indeed, although Agcom assesses the development of the technology 
employed and the income generated by the platforms, it completely 
neglects the question of whether or not they already own rights to 
content, particularly premium content. Ownership of such content – 
access to which is fundamental to the success of emerging platforms – 
is the key factor in determining whether a platform becomes dominant 
in the wholesale content market. Thus, although the regulations 
introduced by article 14 of Law 9/2008 were intended to boost 
emerging platforms by guaranteeing them access to premium content – 
i.e. by introducing the ‚must offer principle‛ – Agcom's 
implementation of this Law shifts the focus away from intangible 
goods towards technological and other factors. It may be supposed that 
Agcom's approach in this case stems from the assumption a priori that 
companies employing such avant-garde technologies are unlikely to 
possess content, something which in our view should not be taken for 
granted.  
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6.6. Network neutrality. 
The restructuring of the market in the light of DVB-T and network 
convergence are only some of the expressions of media pluralism. 
Another aspect that is closely connected to access to content is network 
neutrality. In the opinion of the European Commission the ‚underlying 
principle of media pluralism should be technologically neutral, but it should be 
applied in a proportionate manner to reflect the emergent nature of new media. 
Pluralism rules should not seek to enshrine the legacy structure of the media, 
but rather permit new structures to emerge.”219  
Network neutrality means that content is broadcast in a regime that 
does not distinguish between content or digital services in terms of 
price. In addition, the price of content does not change from one 
provider to another or one user to another220. 
Network neutrality was originally conceived as a basic principle of the 
internet, but it is also valid for television. Unfortunately, instead of 
transmitting data and content without discriminating between 
providers, some network operators have recently demanded additional 
compensation for carrying valuable digital services and have also 
reserved the right to charge differently, based on the identity of the 
provider, even for the same type of data. 
The companies deploying these component technologies are of various 
kinds – from start-ups to established concerns, and from local 
monopolies to international competitors – and they face disparate 
regulatory constraints. The purpose of a platform is to transport 
information content from providers to users and the differences 
between them affect the offering of content to consumers. But these 
platforms are based on systems that have radically different 
architectures which influence the price. It is part of the nature of the 
                                                          
219 See Media pluralism in the Member States on the European Union, supra at 
footnote 80. 
220 ECONOMIDES N. and TAG J. (2007) Net neutrality on the Internet: A Two-
sided market analysis, Working Papers No. 27, New York University. 
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transport service offered by digital networks that in some cases the 
provider is fully aware of the type of content being transported (e.g., 
movies, point-to-point video, music, etc.), and in others the content is 
completely opaque.221  
The strategic competition between the internet, telephony and cable 
networks has been described in the economic literature in the following 
terms: ‚Networks promote choice, choice enhances quality and quality favors 
morality. Television is culturally erosive because its small range of offerings 
requires a broad, lowest-common-denominator appeal. Linking to millions of 
cultural sources, global networks provide a cornucopia of choices, like a 
Library of Congress at your fingertips”222. 
Television is not neutral in terms of the prices it charges for access to 
content. The economic reasons for the absence of net neutrality in the 
television sector are the following: 
1) in the broadcasting market, multi-sided pricing ensures that a 
platform charges a fee to the content provider ‚on other side‛ of the 
network which typically does not have any contractual relationship 
with the viewer. 
2) platforms prioritize content. Indeed, in the broadcasting market 
competitiveness depends first and foremost on the quality of the 
content and also of course on the network’s dimensions and efficiency. 
Content prioritization may enhance the value of premium content, 
which is broadcast first on Pay TV, potentially degrading the quality of 
the content left over for the FTA platforms. Under the current system of 
access to platforms, Pay TV typically shows thematic channels, while 
FTA platforms usually have generalist channels. By buying better 
                                                          
221 See MACKIE-MASON J., SHENKER S. and VARIAN H.R. (1995), ‚Service 
Architecture and Content Provision: The Network Provider as Editor‛, 
Telecommunication Policy. The authors found that differences in architecture 
affect the content provided to consumers, and that differences in the network 
provider's awareness could affect the selection of existing content that is made 
available to consumers. 
222 GILDER G. (1995) ‚Angst and Awe on the Internet”, Forbes ASAP of 
4.12.1995, p. 132. 
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content, the Pay TV platforms generate a difference in the affordability 
of content between paying and non-paying platforms, demonstrating 
the absence of net neutrality. 
3) considering that there are very few platforms given the huge amount 
of investment needed to build the network, there is not enough space 
for all the content providers and the platform must necessarily make a 
selection. In so doing, it determines which content providers will get 
priority and which will be excluded. Thus, the determination of the 
content provider is in the hands of the platforms.  
4) new firms with small capitalization (or those innovative firms that 
have not yet achieved significant penetration and revenues) will 
probably will not be the winners of the prioritization auction. This is 
likely to reduce innovation. 
5) platforms can favour their own content and applications rather than 
those of independent producers. Finally, since access to content 
between platforms implies interconnection among different networks, 
any of these networks, and not just the ones providing final consumer 
access, can, in principle, ask content and application providers for a fee. 
This can result in multiple fees charged on a single transmission and 
lead to a significant reduction in broadcasting trade.223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7. Unbundling and exclusive rights to content. 
Exclusive rights and the aggregation of audiovisual content constitute 
the biggest restraints on access to platforms. Vertically integrated 
network operators in particular aim to prevent competing platforms 
                                                          
223 See ECONOMIDES N. and TAG J., Net Neutrality, supra at footnote 220. 
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from gaining access by purchasing exclusive rights to the content they 
distribute. 
The European Commission’s assessment of the dominant position of a 
platform is also conducted with reference to the licence agreements it 
signs. In the merger case decision COMP.M2876 of April 2, 2003 News 
Corp/Telepiù224, for example, the Commission accepted Sky’s 
undertaking not to broadcast its contents via cable and terrestrial DTH 
until December 31, 2011. In application of the so-called ‚no single buyer 
rule”, Sky also undertook to reduce the duration of the exclusive rights 
it had already obtained, and committed itself to buying new content 
with exclusive rights not exceeding two years’ duration for sports 
rights and three years’ duration for movie rights. In addition, until 
December 31, 2011, Sky has to grant access to all its premium content 
not covered by exclusive rights to emerging platforms who broadcast 
via DTH and cable, at their request, on a transparent, equitable, non-
discriminatory and unbundled basis. The newcomer is to purchase the 
premium content wholesale225. 
                                                          
224 See European Commission Case Decision COMP/M.2876 – NewsCorp/Telepiù 
of 02.04.2003. 
225 An example of the wholesale purchase of such content is provided by the 
experience of BSkyB, the satellite platform operating in the United Kingdom. In 
July 2004 the OFT launched an investigation of the national Pay-TV market as a 
result of concerns that the BSkyB platform (which appeared to hold monopoly 
power in the supply of premium sports and movies on Pay TV) enjoyed a 
position of dominance. In 1995 the OFT accepted the measures proposed by the 
platform to the extent that they provided adequate solutions to the distortions 
in the market that the investigation had recorded. In addition to a commitment 
to provide access to its technical platform, BSkyB proposed measures to free up 
the market for the provision of high quality content (in which it occupied a 
position of dominance). These included the obligation to offer premium 
channels and programmes (as well as basic ones, to some extent) to operators of 
alternative platforms (e.g., cable and terrestrial operators), on a non-
discriminatory basis, together with the obligation to publish the Rate card (i.e. a 
list with the reference costs for wholesale purchases). Additional market 
research conducted by the OFT in subsequent years (see The Director General’s 
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With reference to unbundling, the platform is required to separate the 
content on offer to emerging competitors into a number of packages or 
single channels, at their request. In this way the wholesaling of content 
is supposed to be more competitive since it involves more participants 
and is supposed to lead to a decrease in the sale price. 
Unbundling is a valid instrument to help develop an effective 
competition policy. Breaking down a content package means making 
access more flexible and adaptable to the needs of individual buyers, 
who can choose (freely and at their discretion) between different 
content and segmentation options. In general terms the greater the 
degree of unbundling, the greater the possibility for the emerging 
platform to broadcast the content in a re-aggregated and original 
package that differs from that of the platform they purchase it from. 
The originality of the re-aggregation may confer a distinct identity on 
the content, which is crucial to the question of how it is marketed to 
viewers226. 
Exclusive rights to content (based on either ownership or licence) are a 
legitimate consequence in terms of the general corollary of the freedom 
of economic initiative granted by Article 41 of the Italian Constitution, 
                                                                                                                               
Review of BSkyB’s Position in the Wholesale Pay-TV Market for 1996 and 
subsequent amendments [online], available from 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/media/oft179.pdf) demonstrated the 
easing of restrictions in the Pay-TV market (thanks to the emergence of 
significant alternative television platforms), and the OFT consequently 
reviewed the measures relating to the wholesale supply of content. In 2001-02, 
the OFT removed the requirement to publish the wholesale Rate Card (which 
meant the full deployment of contractual freedom in establishing prices for the 
content on offer) and the requirement to include basic channels. On this last 
point, see DIFELICIANTONIO L., ‚Competizione tra piattaforme”, supra at 
footnote 204, pp. 558-559. 
226 For a description of the characteristics of unbundling in the broadcasting 
sector see Italian Communications Authority Resolution 360/04/CONS, 
Definizione della controversia e.Bismedia S.p.A. / Sky Italia S.r.l. avente ad oggetto 
"offerta wholesale premium”, of 27.10.2004, Bull. 5 of Sept.-Oct. 2004. 
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since exclusive rights are useful for the exploitation of the economic 
value of intangible content. However, exclusive rights are still subject 
to the antitrust rules since they are related to economic activity that can 
distort competition227 
By means of exclusive rights platforms safeguard their investments and 
programme makers are remunerated for the inventive skill and/or the 
content packaging they perform. There has to be a time limit on 
exclusive rights however, otherwise a dominant position would arise228. 
Thus the obligations to forego exclusive rights and provide access to 
unbundled content are remedies imposed by ex ante regulation in order 
to improve competitiveness. Examples include Article 14 of Law 9/2008 
regarding the must-offer duty imposed on sporting event organizers 
with respect to emerging platforms, and the ex post decisions of the 
Italian Antitrust Authority (e.g. its interpretation of Article 6 of Law 
9/2008). This entails balancing the private economic interests of the 
platform with the public interest in competitiveness and pluralism of 
information, which are all values protected by legislation. 
As we have already mentioned, the European Union protects pluralism 
of information by means of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (C 364), signed in Nice on December 7, 2000229. Article 
6 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, which came 
into force on December 1, 2009230, also protects sport, considering it to 
be of social value, although it is subject to competition rules insofar it is 
also an economic activity. Therefore the social value of sport, together 
with its economic value in terms of broadcast rights (held under licence 
                                                          
227 See ECJ Judgment in Case 262/81 – Coditel II of 10.06.1982 [1982] ECR3381; 
European Commission Cases Decisions IV/31.743 – Film purchases by German 
television stations of 15.09.1989, OJ L 284 of 03.10.1989; and IV/31.851 – Magill TV 
Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE of 21.12.1988, OJ L 78 of 21.03.1989. 
228 See European Commission Working Staff Paper ‚The EU and sport: 
background and context accompanying document to the White Paper on 
sport‛, Brussels, 11.07.2007, SEC 2007 95. 
229 See chapter 4, section 4.3 of this dissertation. 
230 See the consolidated version in OJ C 115 of 09.05.2008. 
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or by virtue of ownership) are both protected by European legislation, 
which also seeks to strike the right balance between the two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.8. Conclusions. 
The recent technological, economic and social developments in the field 
of communications and information, including the progress of market 
liberalization, the rise of digital and the growth of convergence, have 
led to changes in the legislative approach. We have gone from vertical 
regulation, which kept broadcasting separate from 
telecommunications, to horizontal regulation, which does not 
differentiate between industries, but between networks and content, or 
rather between the transmission layer and the content layer. This trend 
affects legislation since technological convergence leads to regulatory 
convergence.  
We have seen that the main players in the digital broadcasting market 
are (and will continue to be) the network operators on one hand and 
content providers on the other. Their mutual relations will depend on 
the broadcasting to end-users of television programmes in abundant 
quantities and variety. 
The nature of the relations between network operators and content 
providers is of great importance to regulators, who recognize that these 
are contractual relationships. Obviously, the contractual relationships 
between structurally integrated content providers and network 
operators are different from the relationships between content 
providers and network operators who remain independent. In the first 
case in fact the prohibition of discriminatory practices or differential 
treatment among operators does not make sense, but in the second case 
it becomes necessary. 
Intervention by regulators has sought to reduce discrimination and 
unequal treatment on the part of network operators in their contractual 
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relationships with content providers, and to enable independent 
content providers to make legally based requests for the provision of 
network services: these measures are steps towards the idea of must-
carry. 
Taking this as a starting point, Italian legislators introduced some 
remedies, for example the idea that network operators should reserve 
part of their transmission capacity for broadcasting the programmes of 
independent content providers. 
The basis of the relationship between network operators and 
independent content providers remains content negotiation, and it is on 
this basis that the regulator must intervene to promote competition and 
accordingly pluralism. The ability of broadcasting platforms to obtain 
programmes of such quality and in such quantities as to make their 
offerings attractive and diversified (and hence to win the approval of 
large audiences) is closely dependent on their right of access to content, 
and this has to be protected. 
The initiatives of the European Commission have been stimulating and 
incisive in this regard, and the activities of the Italian Antitrust 
Authority and the Italian Communications Authority in regulating the 
communications sector have been equally effective. 
It is however desirable that the legislature should indicate without 
delay the criteria concerning procedures for exercising the right of 
access in various fields, especially sports events. 
There are widespread complaints about the limited amount of high-
quality content on the market, although the number of channels is 
increasing. Therefore what is needed is a strategy of supporting the 
production of content, and then eliminating the bottlenecks arising 
from its limited availability (associated with and aggravated by the 
practice of purchasing exclusive broadcasting rights). Such a strategy 
entails the adoption of regulatory measures governing access and 
curbing inflexible proprietary rights, in order to achieve the desired 
system of broadcasting platforms.  
Clearly, access cannot be confined to the context of industrial 
competition and the provision of services, but it should be subject to 
systematic regulation which safeguards both the economic side and 
pluralism of information. Therefore freedom of enterprise and freedom 
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of expression and information must be coordinated by comprehensive 
regulation. At present a complete description of the right of access is 
still lacking in the relevant regulatory framework. It is desirable 
therefore that this gap be filled as soon as possible. It is also to be 
hoped that this right, given its undoubted constitutional significance, 
can be incorporated in the near future in the Italian Constitution, 
possibly via a redrafting of Article 21 in accordance with the times. 
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Chapter 7 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding communication the contribution of liberalism is important, 
since the competitive circulation of opinion in the ‚ideas market‛ 
promotes the search for truth by means of reason.  
According to Milton231 and Mill232, the truth emerges from the free 
comparison of all ideas, including wrong ideas, that should not be 
censored. In their view, the truth cannot be subject to any restriction by 
the public power. The need to observe this principle is even stronger 
with reference to certain means of communication such as television233. 
This is because of the considerable potential of the medium itself and 
the interests involved in it. Broadcasting is governed by two 
constitutional principles, i.e. the free expression of thought and the 
freedom of private enterprise, both of which are linked to the need to 
find the best solution in the allocation of the limited radio spectrum. 
More than any other means of communication, even more the press, 
broadcasting is more important to the social value of information and 
viewers’ education234. However, although the latter is expressly 
                                                          
231 See MILTON J. (1987) Areopagitica. Discorso per la libertà di stampa, translation 
and introduction by BREGLIA S., Laterza. 
232 See MILL J. S. (1981), Saggio sulla libertà, Giuffrè. 
233 On broadcasting as a form of electronic communication see ZACCARIA R., 
Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, supra at footnote 82.  
234 On this subject see CHIOLA C. (1973) L’informazione nella Costituzione, 
CEDAM, p. 28 onwards, and CARETTI P., Diritto pubblico dell’informazione e 
della comunicazione, supra at footnote 94, p. 31 onwards; on the differences 
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mentioned by the Italian Constitution, the question of access to 
television platforms is not. 
This study has sought to analyze the issues of major interest regarding 
access to broadcasting platforms under a competition policy approach 
with particular reference to the new economic theory of multi-sided 
markets, taking into account the main recent innovations in 
broadcasting legislation and the associated issues that have been 
tackled by the Antitrust Authorities. 
We discussed the basic separation between Pay TV and FTA TV and we 
analyzed the architectures of these relevant markets in terms of the 
interrelations among the economic operators that are involved with the 
platforms. 
From an economic point of view, for a broadcasting platform to be 
genuinely multi-sided, the content providers, service providers and 
network providers must not be integrated within the same platform 
under the same corporation, neither legally nor de facto, otherwise the 
platform becomes vertically or horizontally integrated. In its relations 
with content and network providers, the platform may sign agreements 
for renting the infrastructure, carriage of the broadcasting signal, 
content distribution, etcetera, but in any case the parties must not 
transfer any exclusive rights to the platform, which must retain its 
third-party status with reference to both content and network 
providers.  
This contrasts with vertical integration: network providers provide the 
platform with a network over which a broadcasting signal can reach 
viewers, and content providers provide the platform with the content 
to be broadcast. In both cases they transfer control of the channel and 
the network together with editorial responsibility to the platform. In 
this way the integrated platform can foreclose the other competitors 
                                                                                                                               
between the press and broadcasting see PACE A. (1992) Problematica delle libertà 
costituzionali. Lezioni. Parte Speciale, CEDAM, p. 440 onwards; see also ZENO-
ZENCOVICH V. (2004) La libertà d’espressione. Media, mercato, potere nella società 
dell'informazione, Il Mulino, p. 42. 
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through network and content discrimination. The viewers, on their 
side, pay to watch the channels on that platform even though they may 
not be aware that there is no separation between the platform, the 
network operator and the content providers. Perhaps they would be 
more likely to realise this if the packaging, the brand and the name of 
the channel were no different from the name of the network operator.  
We discussed the openness of this market in terms of the entry of 
newcomers, who are mainly private and do not integrate audiovisual 
content235. In this context we took into account the technical evolution 
associated with the switch-off of the analogical signal and the new 
regulations concerning authorizations and concessions, the powers of 
the competent Authorities, and the constitutional principles involved, 
with reference to the right of private economic initiative. 
Analyzing all these aspects of the problem becomes even more difficult 
if we consider that the issue of ‘access to platforms’ is affected by the 
tangled web of relations between law and technology, and the latter is 
continuously evolving236. 
In the broadcasting sector there is an independent administrative 
authority, in addition to the antitrust authority, which serves to 
                                                          
235 ZENO-ZENCOVICH V. (2004) La libertà d’espressione, supra at footnote 234, p. 
47, explains the reasons why private companies are third parties in the 
application of the assumptions of a public service. 
236 For example, CAMPIONE F. (1961) ‚Sulla disciplina giuridica della 
televisione italiana”, Giust. Civ., III, p. 16, says that ‚to discuss, even briefly, the 
technical aspects of broadcasting is essential to an appropriate technical and juridical 
approach to the issue‛ *our translation+; see also DE SANCTIS V. M. (1959) ‚La 
televisione dinanzi alla Corte Costituzionale‛, Rass. Parl., 12, p. 302. See also 
NAZZARO A.C. (2006) ‚Natura giuridica del bene, proprietà pubblica e 
monopolio‛, in DI RAIMO R. and RICCIUTO V., Impresa pubblica e intervento 
dello Stato nell’economia. Il contributo della giurisprudenza costituzionale, Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane, p. 98 onwards, who argues that technological progress is 
the main parameter to be taken into account in television-related rulings by the 
Italian Constitutional Court. 
 148 
guarantee respect for fundamental rights concerning television and the 
duties arising from public service. 
The multi-sided markets theory adds new elements to the issue of 
public regulation of broadcasting with reference to the mission of 
public service, respect for the principles of competition and consumer 
protection. The issue of pluralism of information, which was the 
priority for the Italian Constitutional Court, now obliges jurists to find 
new parameters for addressing the need for pluralism in the 
broadcasting sector through a new technological media framework237, 
and through new economic rules. 
This is a hot topic from the point of view of political and institutional 
opportunities (think of the choices made by legislators on the antitrust 
limits and mergers to avoid dominant positions and conflicts of 
interest), and also with reference to the new technical and juridical 
aspects of broadcast financing. Jurists have to consider the implications 
of this new situation, and some ideas in this sense come from the 
theory of multi-sided markets. The commercial relationships among the 
economic operators of the broadcasting sector should be taken into 
account in their approach to this issue and a new regulatory framework 
should emerge. Specifically, this regulatory framework should be 
founded on the need for antitrust limits in the sector, just like any other 
sector subject to regulation and may also require a reform of the Italian 
Constitution. 
Currently, the legislation governing the sector is based on article 21 of 
the Italian Constitution, which does not mention the right of access. 
The question of access to a broadcasting platform in multi-sided 
markets is closely connected to the emergence of alternative new 
platforms, to whom at present the right to access (at least to sporting 
rights) is granted by law. 
                                                          
237 CHELI E. (2003) ‚Note in tema di pluralismo e servizio pubblico 
radiotelevisivo nella trasmissione del digitale terrestre‛, ALLEGRETTI U. et al., 
Diritti, nuove tecnologie, trasformazioni sociali. Scritti in memoria di Paolo Barile, 
CEDAM, p. 217 onwards. 
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A platform has to grant access to its own infrastructure and products, 
including the network and the content, to third parties only when it is 
vertically integrated, i.e. it has editorial responsibility and exclusive 
rights to those goods. 
Thus it should be no surprise if the European Commission and the 
other national competition authorities, took into account multi-sided 
theory with reference to emerging platforms, whose right of access on a 
non-discriminatory basis must be assured. 
Indeed, the integration by the platform of the surplus arising from the 
positive externalities of the content providers and the viewers in its 
pricing strategy cannot be considered anti-competitive behaviour, 
especially if the platform is not in a dominant position. As with any 
other business practice, subsidizing one’s own products in order to 
catch new customers by taking advantage of the indirect externalities 
cannot be prohibited, since it is part of normal entrepreneurial freedom.  
However, it is also true that the broadcasting sector is highly 
concentrated, and for this reason it is easy to be in a situation where a 
platform is dominant and is thus subject to article 82 of the European 
Treaty. When such platforms do not respect their must-offer and must-
carry obligations, for example when they apply discriminatory criteria 
or refuse to enter into commercial agreements with rivals, they become 
liable to sanctions. On this point it should be stressed that in the 
broadcasting sector it is not just abuse which is forbidden but the 
dominant position per se, since operators are bound by the principle of 
pluralism of information. Thus competition policy and regulation 
impose limits on the operators’ market power. In Italy, these limits are 
expressed as a percentage of the value of the entire communications 
sector (the ICS), including television, print media, and internet 
publishing. It should be borne in mind that an increasing proportion of 
the ICS is now accounted for by viewer subscriptions and Video-On-
Demand rather than by advertising, which was traditionally the main 
source of revenue in the sector. 
Furthermore the relations among content providers, service providers, 
network providers and advertisers that are not integrated into the 
platform usually involve vertical agreements that come under Article 
81 of the Treaty. If their objective is anti-competitive or if they have 
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actual (or potential) anti-competitive effects they are forbidden under 
art 81(1) of the Treaty, unless they also have benefits that outweigh the 
anti-competitive effects.  
As we know, the European Commission intervenes in the markets by 
regulating mergers, acquisitions and the creation of cartels, and by 
obliging dominant broadcasting platforms to deal with their 
competitors. On many occasions, authorization entails the adoption of 
remedies of some kind. For example, authorities may force the platform 
to carry out functional or structural separation. The European 
Commission has also imposed the obligation to grant access to at least 
one other competitor in accordance with a transparent procedure. The 
moral suasion applied by Member States to this effect tends to be 
accepted with more favour by the obliged company, partly because 
they it is considered helpful for improving innovation. 
Since the broadcasting sector is affected by the issue of pluralism of 
information, control over the relationships between the platform and 
the content providers is entrusted by ex ante regulation to the national 
authorities, which guard against the constitution of dominant positions 
by platforms. However, the authorities should bear in mind that given 
their know-how and the other resources at their disposal, vertically 
integrated platforms are also a force for innovation. 
Finally, it is possible that a grouping together of all the relevant 
markets identified by the antitrust authorities in their case decisions 
relating to the broadcasting sector would better reflect the tendency to 
convergence among networks envisaged in recent European legislation. 
If this happens then it would make more sense to speak of inter-
platform and intra-platform competition. In the first case the authorities 
should consider the risk of foreclosure from the market for the other 
competitors, that is for the platform together with all its users and not 
just the individual participants, as is the case at present. Only in the 
second case does it make sense to consider the horizontal effects 
between firms of the same sector (e.g. content providers). 
In conclusion, we note that although the broadcasting market is 
expanding by means of new technology and viewers are more aware of 
the content, ex ante regulation is still necessary. The ‚re-introduction‛ 
of must-offer obligations means that some failure has occurred in the 
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broadcasting sector, as most antitrust cases would seem to 
demonstrate. The right of access guaranteed by law, however, can only 
encourage content production, with the consequent improvement of 
pluralism of information. A constitutional guarantee of the right of 
access could facilitate this opportunity. 
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